

Tailings Storage Facility GISTM Disclosure Report

**Inactive Facilities with Consequence Classifications of Low,
Significant, and High**

Date: August 5, 2025



Teck

Executive Summary

Teck Resources Limited and its consolidated subsidiaries (referred to collectively in this document as "Teck") have committed to conformance with the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (GISTM) in accordance with the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) Conformance Protocol: Global Industry Standard for Tailings Management across all Tailings Storage Facilities (TSFs) operated or managed by Teck. This report provides information on Teck's inactive (i.e. no longer receiving tailings) facilities with consequence classifications of Low, Significant, and High (under the GISTM consequence classification system), in accordance with GISTM Requirement 15.1. GISTM disclosures for all other Teck TSFs can be found on our website.

Teck has programs in place for tailings management, environmental management, community engagement, and risk management. Information about these systems is described in this report and on Teck's website. Teck applies multiple layers of oversight and independent review to maintain safe and responsible tailings management. Engineers of Record (EORs) and Independent Tailings Review Boards (ITRBs) are in place where required. Teck also has experienced multidisciplinary teams, including tailings engineers, Responsible Tailings Facility Engineers (RTFEs), environmental specialists, social performance specialists, and risk specialists, who work collaboratively to manage each TSF.

Each Teck TSF undergoes a process of risk identification, assessment, and management. Risks are addressed in a prioritized manner with the aim of reducing risks to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). Material risks, if present, are described in this report, as well as mitigation and management measures that are in place. Regardless of the presence of material risks, all Teck TSFs have associated emergency preparedness and response measures, integrated into site-wide mine emergency response plans.

As of August 5, 2025, all Teck inactive TSFs classified as having "High," "Significant," or "Low" consequence classifications under the GISTM are in conformance with the ICMM's Conformance Protocols: Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (GISTM). PricewaterhouseCoopersLLP have completed limited assurance on Teck's conformance.

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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

This report contains information on Teck's inactive tailings storage facilities (TSFs) with consequence classifications of Low, Significant, and High in alignment with Requirement 15.1 of the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (GISTM) (under the GISTM consequence classification system). Disclosures for other Teck TSFs can be found on our website¹.

This report provides an overview of Teck's general approach to tailings management, covering key elements required under GISTM Requirement 15.1. Additional details can be found on teck.com/tailings. Facility-specific disclosure information for each of Teck's inactive TSFs with consequence classifications of Low, Significant and High is presented as a series of appendices.

What are Tailings and Tailings Storage Facilities?

Tailings are a common by-product of the mining process. They are typically created as mined ore is crushed, ground, and/or processed to separate valuable minerals and to create a sellable concentrate product. The residual material from this process primarily comprises ground rock and is called tailings. Due to the nature of the ore separation processes, tailings are commonly transported as a slurry of fine mineral particles and water, but may also be dewatered and transported using conventional earth-moving equipment. The tailings are then placed in a specially designed and engineered TSF.

TSFs exist in mining areas around the world. Teck recognizes that TSF failures have the potential to significantly impact communities, local economies and the surrounding environment. Teck's TSFs are designed by experienced, expert professional engineers based on factors such as the composition of the tailings being stored, site geology and geotechnical conditions, geochemical conditions, precipitation/ climate, seismic activity, community input, and environmental protection. Teck's teams take measures to safely manage each Teck TSF throughout the mining life cycle, including planning, design, construction, operation, and closure.

What is the GISTM?

In August 2020, the GISTM was released as the first global standard focused specifically on the safe management of TSFs. It was developed through a collaboration between the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), the United Nations Environment Programme, and the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI). The standard sets a global benchmark for the safe management of TSFs, with the goal of zero harm to people and the environment from TSF failures. Teck participated in the advisory group that contributed to the development of the GISTM and was actively involved in drafting the ICMM's Tailings Management Good Practice Guide and Conformance Protocol, both of which were created to support implementation of the standard.

¹ These disclosures relate specifically to TSFs. Teck also operates water retaining structures (WRS) (e.g. dams and dikes) at some operations and legacy sites. Like the TSFs, the WRS are designed and managed in conformance with applicable regulations, industry standards such as the Canada Dam Association Dam Safety Guidelines, and Teck's risk management framework, and higher consequence structures are independently reviewed with Independent Review Boards and Dam Safety Reviews.

Teck's Commitment

Teck is committed to the safe and environmentally responsible management of TSFs throughout the entire mining life cycle to protect the health and safety of people, the environment, and Communities of Interest (COI). This commitment is guided by Teck's [Tailings Management Policy](#) and broader Sustainability Strategy.

As a company, Teck is committed to:

- Managing TSFs in a manner that addresses risks and reduces potential long-term impacts to the environment and surrounding communities and includes consideration of climate change.
- Meaningful engagement with COI in a manner that respects Human Rights (HR) and Indigenous rights, including incorporating a local and Indigenous knowledge base into decision making, where appropriate.
- Management and decision-making practices that incorporate Best Available Practices and Technologies (BAPT), where practicable.
- Development of emergency response plans and implementation of mechanisms for post-incident recovery in collaboration with our COI.
- Maintaining our Management System to identify and implement regulatory requirements, objectives, training and competency requirements, resourcing allocation and risk management.
- Governance processes include internal and external audits, independent reviews, and assurance activities with the intent of continuous improvement in performance and safety.
- Transparent disclosure of information on our TSFs and their performance in a timely manner.

Teck's Tailings Facilities

Teck manages 28 TSFs across its active and legacy mine sites. This includes:

- 6 active facilities currently in operation.
- 22 inactive facilities that no longer receive tailings and remain under monitoring and management.

Some sites may have multiple TSFs, depending on the site operational history and site characteristics. The locations of Teck's TSFs are illustrated in Figure 1 and summarized in Table 1.

Additionally, Teck holds non-operated joint venture interests in two tailings facilities:

- Antamina (Peru): An active TSF at an operating mine site.
- NorthMet (United States): An inactive TSF at a growth-stage project.

GISTM disclosures for these non-operated TSFs are managed and published by the respective operating partners in accordance with their own GISTM commitments.




Figure 1. Map of Teck's TSFs

Table 1. Summary of Teck's TSFs¹

| Country | Site | TSF Name(s) | Status | GISTM Consequence Classification |
|---------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------|
| Australia | Lennard Shelf | Lennard Shelf - Tailings | Inactive | Significant |
| Canada | Beaverdell | Beaverdell - North TSF | Inactive | Significant |
| | | Beaverdell - South TSF | Inactive | Significant |
| | Duck Pond | Duck Pond Tailings Pond | Inactive | Significant |
| | Fisherman Road | Fisherman Road - Tailings | Inactive | Significant |
| | Highland Valley Copper | Bethlehem TSF | Inactive | Very High |
| | | Highland TSF | Active | Extreme |
| | | 7 Day | Active | Low |
| | | 24 Mile Lake | Active | Low |
| | | Highmont TSF | Inactive | Significant |
| | | Trojan TSF | Inactive | Very High |
| | Louvicourt | Louvicourt - Tailings | Inactive | High |
| | Pinchi | Pinchi Lake - Tailings | Inactive | Significant |
| | Pine Point | Pine Point Mines - Tailings | Inactive | Significant |
| | Sa Dena Hes | Sa Dena Hes - Tailings | Inactive | Significant |
| | Sullivan | Iron TSF | Inactive | Low |
| | | Old Iron TSF | Inactive | Significant |
| | | Siliceous TSF | Inactive | Significant |
| | | Gypsum TSF | Inactive | Significant |
| | | Calcine TSF | Inactive | Low |
| Chile | Carmen de Andacollo | Depósito de Relaves CdA | Active | Extreme |
| | Quebrada Blanca | Depósito de Relaves QB | Active | Extreme |
| United States | Douglas Mine | Douglas Tailings Dam | Inactive | Low |
| | Magmont | Magmont Mine Tailings Facility | Inactive | Significant |
| | Pend Oreille | TDF-1 | Inactive | Significant |
| | | TDF-2 | Inactive | Low |
| | | TDF-3 | Inactive | Significant |
| | Red Dog | Red Dog TSF | Active | Very High |

1. Grey shading indicates TSFs with disclosures in this document. All other TSF GISTM disclosures can be found on the Teck website.

For further information, please consult [Teck's tailings inventory](#).

TECK'S APPROACH TO TAILINGS MANAGEMENT

At Teck, the safety and security of communities, employees, and the environment is our top priority. To uphold our commitments, we have implemented a multi-tiered Tailings Management System (TMS) that includes:

- Corporate policies, standards, procedures, and guidance
- Site-specific procedures and monitoring programs
- Multiple levels of reviews
- Independent oversight and continuous improvement initiatives

Each TSF is managed in accordance with a TMS which outlines relevant management elements. Additionally, every TSF has an Operations, Maintenance and Surveillance (OMS) manual that defines facility-specific operational requirements. Teck has a team dedicated to managing legacy mine sites, which includes tailings, environmental and social performance professionals.

Further details on Teck's TSF management approach, activities, and practices are available on Teck's website through [Teck's Approach to Tailings Management](#).

Key Roles

Teck's approach to tailings management is supported by a multidisciplinary structure that includes corporate leadership, technical experts, site-based teams, and independent reviewers. Each role contributes to the safe, responsible, and transparent management of TSFs in alignment with the GISTM.

Leadership and Oversight

- **Board of Directors:** Oversees tailings management policies and standards through the Safety, Operations and Projects Committee.
- **Accountable Executives (AEs):** Senior leaders with ultimate accountability for each TSF.
- **General Manager (GM):** Site leader who is accountable for overall safety at their site, including TSFs.

Engineering and Technical Experts

- **Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer (RTFE):** Experienced tailings engineer assigned to each TSF who provides oversight of the construction and operation in accordance with the design. The RTFE is supported by a team of engineers and technicians appropriate to the complexity and status of the TSF needs.
- **Engineer of Record (EOR):** An experienced tailings facility design engineer responsible for the design of each TSF.
- **Central Tailings Team:** A central team of experienced professionals providing company-wide tailings oversight, guidance, and technical support, including leading Teck's Tailings Governance Review (TGR) program.
- **Independent Tailings Review Board (ITRB):** A panel of global experts who provide independent advice to Teck's tailings teams. An ITRB is in place for each Teck TSF, who meet annually (at minimum).

Site and Enterprise Support Teams

- **Multidisciplinary Site Teams:** Include environmental, health and safety, and emergency response personnel who support monitoring, risk management, and emergency preparedness at the site level.

- **Social Performance Team:** Personnel who work with tailings engineers and multidisciplinary site teams to coordinate engagement with communities and Indigenous Peoples, identify social risks, and integrate socio-economic and human rights considerations into planning. The team also supports grievance management, transparent communication, and maintains site-level records to support GISTM assurance and disclosure.

Collaboration and Continuous Improvement

- **Tailings Working Group (TWG):** Leading tailings engineers across Teck who collaborate to share learnings and lead continual improvement and consistency efforts.
- **Tailings Community of Practice (CoP):** A company-wide, multidisciplinary forum dedicated to knowledge sharing, learning, innovation, and continuous improvement in tailings management. The Tailings CoP comprises professionals in tailings engineering, social performance, environmental management, risk management, and other key disciplines.

These key roles in tailings management are illustrated in Figure 2. For further information on key roles involved in the implementation of tailings management, consult [Teck's Approach to Tailings Management](#).




Figure 2. Illustration of Teck's Governance Structure Related to Tailings Management

Risk Management

Teck has a comprehensive and robust risk management framework designed to identify, assess, and mitigate risks associated with TSFs. Teck's approach focuses on understanding and mitigating potential failure modes, even highly unlikely ones, to reduce risks.

Potential failure modes are identified through detailed technical evaluations conducted by expert teams, including Teck's RTFEs, EORs, and multidisciplinary specialists. These teams analyze various factors such as the materials used in the structure, the foundation conditions, climatic and seismic conditions, climate change, construction and foundation materials properties, construction quality, structural configuration, drainage systems, and surface water control measures. It is important to note that the

presence of failure modes does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may have failure modes and be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Once potential failure modes are identified, risk assessments are conducted with input from the RTFE, EOR and multidisciplinary team members. The assessment evaluates the likelihood of occurrence, potential consequences (further discussed below), and actions to control each failure mode. Appropriate Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) are involved in evaluating potential impacts to people, including risks to health and safety, livelihoods, and cultural values. Where relevant, outcomes of risk assessments inform site-level engagement and emergency preparedness activities with Project Affected People (PAP).

Where necessary, measures that further reduce the likelihood and/or consequences are documented in risk treatment plans. This could include measures such as additional instrumentation or monitoring, construction or design modifications, or additional studies to improve understanding. All risk treatment plans are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams.

Teck is committed to continuous improvement in TSF risk management, following the as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) process, in accordance with the GISTM. This means we continuously seek opportunities to reduce risk wherever practicable, even when the risks are already low.

Teck procedures require that changes that could impact the risk profile of a TSF, such as modifications to design, operations, or environmental conditions, must undergo review by the EOR, RTFE and central tailings team. These changes are documented, assessed for risk impacts, reviewed and approved at an appropriate level, and implemented only after formal approval.

Determining Impacts and Consequences

Teck uses a range of assessments to understand the potential consequences of credible failure modes. These look at possible impacts on people's safety, communities, the environment, and economic impacts. Assessments may include potential breach scenarios, community impact analysis, human exposure and vulnerability assessments, and environmental impact evaluations. These evaluations focus only on what could happen, not how likely a failure or an impact is, and help guide risk assessments and risk mitigation planning.

GISTM defines a consequence classification system that groups TSFs based on possible factors such as the number of people who could be affected, potential for loss of life, environmental damage, impacts on culture, and effects on infrastructure and the economy. Teck uses the results of failure mode analysis and these impact assessments to help determine the appropriate consequence classification for each TSF.

It is important to distinguish consequence classification from risk. While risk considers both likelihood and consequences, consequence classification only considers potential outcomes in the event of failure. A TSF with a higher consequence classification does not necessarily have a higher risk – the level of risk depends on how effectively risks are managed. A TSF with a higher consequence classification can be operated safely if risks are controlled and maintained at low levels.

Design and Performance Reviews

Teck applies several layers of oversight and independent review to maintain safe and responsible tailings management. These include:

- Regular inspections conducted by qualified Teck personnel
- Annual facility performance reports (AFPRs) completed by the EOR to assess the TSF performance

- Internal technical reviews conducted by Teck SMEs
- Dam safety reviews (DSRs) by external third-party experts every three to ten years, depending on the TSF consequence classification
- ITRBs, which are composed of senior external independent experts who meet at minimum annually to review TSF performance, design, operation, surveillance, maintenance, and management
- TGRs, which are completed every two to three years by senior Teck tailings personnel to assess conformance with internal standards, share learnings across sites, and promote continuous improvement opportunities
- Annual tailings management review meetings, where all key personnel – including the RTFE, AE, EOR, site personnel, GM, and the central tailings team – review the TSF performance and risk management over the prior year as well as plans and priorities for the following year

Teck's review processes provide multiple layers of oversight, incorporating perspectives from internal, external, third-party, and independent experts across both technical and non-technical disciplines. Findings from these reviews are prioritized and tracked to completion, shaping Teck's ongoing work plans to address key actions and further strengthen tailings safety and management.

Environmental Management and Monitoring

Environmental risks, such as air quality, water management, and climate change considerations, are incorporated into the TSF risk assessment and environmental consequence evaluation process for each TSF. These environmental consequences are assessed for each potential failure mode and contribute to the facility's consequence classification.

A multidisciplinary team, including environmental performance SMEs, supports the development of TSF risk assessments, risk treatment plans, environmental protection strategies, and climate change adaptation and mitigation planning. Environmental considerations are reviewed through Teck's TSF review and assurance programs, including ITRBs, internal governance reviews, and third-party assurance activities.

Each Teck site implements an ongoing environmental monitoring program to assess site conditions, including those relevant to the TSFs. These programs support adaptive management by identifying potential environmental impacts and informing appropriate mitigation measures when necessary. These monitoring programs include aspects such as air quality, biodiversity and closure, climate change, and water stewardship.

Environmental monitoring is integrated into TSF OMS programs. Environmental personnel working at TSFs receive training on OMS requirements to align their activities with facility-specific protocols.

For additional information on Teck's approach to environmental management, visit our [website](#).

Social Management and Monitoring

Teck's approach to tailings management includes engaging with local and Indigenous communities and other COI to identify and address potential social impacts. Social performance risks are included in the risk assessment process for each TSF, and potential impacts on people, such as health and safety, access to land, livelihoods, and cultural values, are considered for each potential failure mode.

A multidisciplinary team, including social performance SMEs, contributes to the development of risk assessments, risk treatment plans, and emergency preparedness measures. These considerations are

also reviewed through Teck's internal governance processes and external assurance activities related to TSF management.

Teck engages with COI throughout the lifecycle of each TSF through regular meetings, surveys, and structured feedback mechanisms, including options for anonymous submissions. These engagement processes help communities stay informed, raise concerns, and provide input into decisions that may affect them. Feedback is documented and tracked to support accountability and transparency.

Recognizing the significance of Indigenous engagement, Teck collaborates closely with Indigenous governments, organizations, and rights holders to seek Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) where new activities may affect their rights, lands, or interests. Teck does this, as appropriate, by engaging transparently, respecting Indigenous rights, incorporating Indigenous knowledge, and creating opportunities for meaningful participation in decisions and activities affecting Indigenous Peoples' lands and interests.

The Community Response Mechanism (CRM) provides a formal, accessible, and culturally appropriate way for COI to submit feedback or concerns. The CRM aligns with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP) and is regularly evaluated so it remains effective and responsive.

In addition, Teck's confidential whistleblower platform is available for reporting concerns related to ethics or conduct. Teck is committed to fairly and impartially investigating reports made in good faith and strictly prohibits any form of retaliation in relation to such reports. More information is available at www.teck.com/speakup.

Through the integration of social performance governance, feedback mechanisms, and inclusive engagement strategies, Teck seeks to uphold its commitment to human rights, responsible mining, and meaningful engagement with COI, in alignment with the GISTM.

For additional information about Teck's Social Performance approach, visit our [website](#).

Safe Closure

Teck has a comprehensive risk management program in place such that risks at TSFs are understood and managed at all current and future phases of the TSF lifecycle. Assessments, reviews and approvals of facilities nearing a 'safe closure' status are an ongoing process and are underway. Should Teck designate any facilities in 'safe closure', this will be disclosed in future communications; at this time, Teck is applying the GISTM requirements in full to all facilities.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

Each Teck TSF has an Emergency, Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) integrated with the site Mine Emergency Response Plan (MERP) to support a coordinated approach to tailings-related emergencies. The EPRP provides preparedness and response information to aid site teams in responding to an emerging TSF incident. The MERP outlines broader site-level emergency and crisis response actions, prioritizing life safety, humanitarian aid, and environmental protection. The plans are reviewed and tested annually to assess their effectiveness, resource adequacy, personnel training, and collaboration with external emergency response agencies and COI.

Teck's EPRPs are regularly reviewed and continuously improved through collaboration with external organizations, including local and regional government agencies, COI, and representatives of populations

at risk, in alignment with the Mining Association of Canada (MAC) Tailings Management Protocol. Each EPRP defines required resources, surveillance requirements, training requirements, communication protocols, and testing schedules. The EPRPs are based on credible TSF failure scenarios and outline response actions to reduce associated downstream impacts. At all sites, emergency measures would be taken to protect human life and minimize consequences in the highly unlikely event of an imminent TSF flow failure.

Teck's engagement framework outlines how public sector agencies and other organizations participate in emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. Each MERP identifies key response organizations, their roles, and communication protocols for coordinating actions during an emergency. Regular MERP tests involve representatives from emergency response agencies and COI to strengthen collaboration and readiness.

FINANCIAL CAPACITY

Teck confirms that it has adequate financial capacity to cover currently estimated costs of planned closure, early closure, reclamation, and post-closure of all Teck TSFs and appurtenant structures. These costs are disclosed annually in aggregate form in our annual financial statements contained within our [Annual Report](#). These cost estimates are based on the tailings facility closure designs described in TSF-specific disclosures (see appended materials). Further, Teck maintains insurance for our TSFs to the extent commercially available.

CONFORMANCE TO THE GLOBAL INDUSTRY STANDARD ON TAILINGS MANAGEMENT

Teck follows the ICMM Conformance Protocols: Global Industry Standard for Tailings Management in assessing conformance with the GISTM. Conformance is determined based on whether systems or practices are in place to achieve the intended outcomes of the standard while managing risk to TSF safety. Levels of conformance (modified from the ICMM Conformance Protocols) are outlined in Table 2 below.

As of August 5, 2025, all Teck inactive TSFs classified as having "High," "Significant," or "Low" (Table 1) potential consequence classifications under the GISTM are in conformance with the ICMM's Conformance Protocols: Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management. Conformance is defined in Table 2 below. Teck have obtained limited assurance on Teck conformance; please refer to PricewaterhouseCoopersLLP limited assurance report in Appendix P.

Table 2. Levels of Conformance (modified from ICMM Conformance Protocols)

| Level of Conformance | Description |
|----------------------|--|
| Meets | <p>Systems and/or practices related to the Requirement have been implemented, and there is sufficient evidence that the Requirement is being met.</p> <p>Note: Where an Operator is required to undertake engineering work or other measures to conform to some requirements, it is not necessary for such measures to be complete by the implementation deadlines for an Operator to be in conformance, but both the measures and associated timelines should be clearly documented and approved by an AE. This status can also apply to Requirements where a documented, scheduled and resourced process is in place to achieve the Requirement (e.g. engagement plans).</p> |
| Partially Meets | <p>Systems and/or practices related to meeting the Requirement have been only partially implemented. Gaps or weaknesses persist that may contribute to an inability to meet the Requirement, or insufficient verifiable evidence has been provided to demonstrate that the activity is aligned with the Requirement</p> |
| Does Not Meet | <p>Systems and/or practices required to support implementation of the Requirement are not in place, are not being implemented or cannot be evidenced.</p> |
| Not Applicable | <p>The specific Requirement is not applicable to the TSF</p> |

APPENDIX A – ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

List of Acronyms

| | |
|--------|--|
| AE | Accountable Executive |
| AFPR | Annual Facility Performance Report |
| ALARP | As Low as Reasonably Practicable |
| BAPT | Best Available Practices and Technologies |
| COI | Communities of Interest |
| CoP | Community of Practice |
| CRM | Community Response Mechanism |
| DSR | Dam Safety Review |
| EOR | Engineer of Record |
| EPRP | Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan |
| FPIC | Free, prior and informed consent |
| GISTM | Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management |
| GM | General Manager |
| HR | Human Rights |
| ICMM | International Council of Mining and Metals |
| ITRB | Independent Tailings Review Board |
| MAC | Mining Association of Canada |
| MERP | Mine Emergency Response Plan |
| OMS | Operations, Maintenance and Surveillance |
| PAP | Project-Affected People |
| PMF | Probable Maximum Flood |
| PRI | Principles for Responsible Investment |
| RTFE | Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer |
| SME | Subject Matter Expert |
| TGR | Tailings Governance Review |
| TMS | Tailings Management System |
| TSF | Tailings Storage Facility |
| TWG | Tailings Working Group |
| UNDRIP | United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples |
| UNGP | United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights |

List of Definitions (Teck's definitions, unless otherwise stated)

| | |
|---|---|
| Communities of Interest (COI) | Individuals or groups that may be affected by or have the ability to influence Teck. COI may include, but are not restricted to, Indigenous Peoples, community members, under-represented groups, personnel, contractors, suppliers, local environmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local governments and institutions. Other COI may include regional or national environmental organizations and NGOs, governments, and shareholders. Excluded from this definition of COI is/are Teck investors and customer. |
| Community Response Mechanism (CRM) | A formal process through which COI can provide feedback, request information, raise questions, concerns, or complaints, have their concerns responded to and seek to achieve effective remedy in a prompt, fair and respectful manner. |
| Credible Failure Modes/Scenarios | Refers to technically feasible failure mechanisms given the materials present in the structure and its foundation, the properties of these materials, the configuration of the structure, drainage conditions and surface water control at the facility, throughout its lifecycle. Credible failure modes can and do typically vary during the lifecycle of the facility as the conditions vary. A facility that is appropriately designed and operated considers all of these credible failure modes and includes sufficient resilience against each. Different failure modes will result in different failure scenarios. Credible catastrophic failure modes do not exist for all tailings facilities. The term 'credible failure mode' is not associated with a probability of this event occurring and having credible failure modes is not a reflection of facility safety. (GISTM) |
| Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) | A detailed, site-specific plan developed to identify hazards of the tailing's facility, assess internal and external capacity to respond, maintain a state of readiness and respond if an event occurs. |
| Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) | A mechanism that safeguards the individual and collective rights of indigenous and tribal peoples, including their land and resource rights and their right to self-determination. The minimum conditions that are required to secure consent include that it is 'free' from all forms of coercion, undue influence or pressure, provided 'prior' to a decision or action being taken that affects individual and collective human rights, and offered on the basis that affected peoples are 'informed' of their rights and the impacts of decisions or actions on those rights. FPIC is considered to be an ongoing process of negotiation, subject to an initial consent. To obtain FPIC, 'consent' must be secured through an agreed process of good faith consultation and cooperation with indigenous and tribal peoples through their own representative institutions. The process should be grounded in a recognition that the indigenous or tribal peoples are customary landowners. FPIC is not only a question of process, but also of outcome, and is obtained when terms are fully respectful of land, resource and other implicated rights. (GISTM) |
| Human Rights (HR) | Human Rights refer to universal rights of all human beings, regardless of legal jurisdiction or other localizing factors, including ethnicity, nationality, sex, indigenous identity, and other statuses. |

| | |
|---|--|
| Material | “Important enough to merit attention or have an effective influence or bearing on the determination in question. For the Standard, the criteria for what is material will be defined by Operator...” (GISTM). Herein, ‘material’ refers to the two highest levels of consequence on the Teck risk matrix. |
| Project-Affected People (PAP) | People who may experience impacts from a tailings facility. People affected by a tailings facility may include, for example, people who live nearby; people who hear, smell or see the facility; or people who might own, reside on or use the land on which the facility is to be located or may potentially inundate. (GISTM) |
| Risk | The effect of uncertainty on objectives. An effect is a deviation from the expected. It can be positive, negative or both, and can address, create, or result in opportunities or threats. Risk is usually expressed in terms of risk sources, potential events, their consequences, and their likelihood. |
| Slurry Tailings | A mixture of tailings and rock that behaves like a liquid during transportation. |
| Tailings | A by-product of mining, consisting of the processed rock or soil remaining from the separation of the commodities of value from the rock or soil in which they occur. (Teck Tailings Policy) |
| Tailings Storage Facility (TSF) | A facility that is designed and managed to contain the tailings produced by a mine, excluding tailings placed in an underground mine. (Teck Tailings Policy) |
| United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) | The UNDRIP is the most comprehensive international instrument on the rights of Indigenous Peoples. It establishes a universal framework of minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the Indigenous Peoples of the world and it elaborates on existing human rights standards and fundamental freedoms as they apply to the specific situation of Indigenous Peoples. (United Nations) |
| United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP) | The UNGPs are a global framework established by the United Nations in 2011 to prevent and address human rights impacts linked to business activities. These consist of 31 principles, which outline the state's duty to protect human rights, businesses' responsibility to respect human rights, and the need to ensure victims have access to remedy. |

APPENDIX B – LENNARD SHELF TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Lennard Shelf (LEN) TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Lennard Shelf property is the site of a former lead-zinc mine that operated periodically from 1997 to 2008; decommissioning and closure of the site was completed in 2010. The property is located 25 km southeast of Fitzroy Crossing within the West Kimberley region of Western Australia, as shown in Figure 1. The site is owned by Lennard Shelf Pty Ltd, a joint venture between Teck and Glencore plc. Teck is the operator for the site.

The site is located in a climatic region that may be characterized as sub-tropical savannah. The average annual rainfall is in the order of 525 mm, with most of this falling in the wet season (December to March). There is significant annual precipitation variability, with annual values in excess of 1100 mm on record. The site is situated in a zone of low seismicity.

TSF Description

The LEN TSF was constructed via central thickened tailings discharge, where tailings slurry is thickened and deposited centrally to form a low conical hill within a ring-shaped perimeter embankment. Permanent closure and decommissioning activities were completed in 2010. Activities included covering exposed tailings with a vegetated soil cover. This cover was constructed to limit the release of contaminants to the air, water, and land. Surface contouring and revegetation have been completed for protection against erosion. The rehabilitated TSF has no external catchment contributing run-off onto the TSF surface area. Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the LEN TSF.

A description of the current state of the LEN TSF is provided in Table 1; structures comprising the LEN TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown in Figure 2. A photo of the TSF is provided below in Figure 3.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, the LEN TSF is classified as a "Significant" consequence facility. Regardless of classification, this facility meets "Extreme" earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.




Figure 1. Lennard Shelf mine location

Table 1. Description of Lennard Shelf TSF

| TSF Design Summary | Description |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| Country | Australia |
| GISTM consequence classification | Significant |
| Deposition method | Central Thickened Discharge |
| Status | Inactive |
| Number (name) of tailings embankment structures | 1 (Lennard Shelf Tailings Embankment) |
| Type of Construction | Single-stage construction |
| Design storm event | 1 in 10,000-year event |
| Design earthquake | 1 in 10,000-year event |
| Maximum height (Current/Final) (m) | 12 |
| Crest length (m) | 4,800 |
| Overall downstream slope (H:V) | 4:1 to 5:1 |
| Most recent AFPR | 2025 |
| Most recent (and next) ITRB review | 2025 (2026) |

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Lennard Shelf TSF

| Structure | Purpose |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| Rehabilitated Tailings Embankment | Tailings retaining structure |
| Tailings Cover | Self-sustaining native plants cover across the surface, resistant to erosion and promotes drainage toward inner perimeter drains. |
| Inner Perimeter Drains | Convey clean water runoff across rehabilitated tailings cover toward spillways. |
| Spillways | Convey clean water flow from inner perimeter drains to the environment. |



Figure 2. LEN TSW



Figure 3. Aerial View of LEN TSW

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the LEN TSF was conducted in 2024. Risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At LEN, the most recent risk assessment did not identify credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the LEN TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

The LEN TSF does not have any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The LEN TSF does not have a credible flow failure scenario, even under extreme loading conditions.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The LEN TSF has no credible flow failure modes. Regardless, this TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the LEN TSF, the most recent DSR was completed in 2025. The timing of the next DSR will be determined by Teck taking into consideration regulatory, internal and GISTM requirements.

APPENDIX C – BEAVERDELL TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITIES

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Beaverdell TSFs. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facilities Description

Site Overview

The Beaverdell Mine, previously known as the Highland Bell mine, is a former underground mine located adjacent to the unincorporated community of Beaverdell, 70 km southeast of Kelowna, British Columbia, as shown in Figure 1. The mine ceased operations in 1991.

Beaverdell is situated in the southeastern corner of British Columbia's Interior Plateau. Its physiography is characteristic of the region, with tributaries originating in broad, shallow upland valleys and descending through steep canyons to flat valley floors that drain into the West Kettle River. Beaverdell experiences a continental climate, with cold winters and warm, dry summers. The site is situated in a zone of low seismicity.

Description of TSFs

Tailings associated with historic on-site extraction of silver and other saleable metals at the Beaverdell Mine are stored in two TSFs – the South TSF (Cells 1 to 5) and the North TSF (Cells 6 and 7). Precipitation is routed through the South TSF via a spillway at Cell 3, while a spillway at Cell 7 routes precipitation through the North TSF. Soil application and planting has been completed on the North and South TSFs.

A description of the current state of the inactive Beaverdell TSFs is provided in Table 1. Structures comprising the Beaverdell TSFs are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown in Figure 2. Photos of the TSF are also provided below in Figures 3 and 4.

Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the Beaverdell TSFs.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, the Beaverdell TSFs are classified as "Significant" consequence facilities. The North TSF meets "Extreme" earthquake and storm event criteria as defined by GISTM.




Figure 1. Beaverdel Mine location

Table 1. Description of Beaverdell TSFs

| TSF Design Summary | | Description |
|---|---|-------------|
| Country | Canada | |
| GISTM consequence classification | North TSF: Significant South TSF: Significant | |
| Deposition method | Slurry | |
| Status | Inactive | |
| Number (name) of tailings embankment structures | 2 (North TSF – Cells 6 & 7 and South TSF – Cells 1 to 5) | |
| Type of Construction | Earthfill using downstream construction method | |
| Design storm event | 1/3 between the 1 in 1000-year event and the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) (North and South TSFs; North TSF confirmed stable for 1 in 10,000-year event) | |
| Design earthquake | 1 in 2475-year event (North and South TSFs; North TSF confirmed stable for 1 in 10,000-year event) | |
| Maximum height (Current/Final) (m) | North TSF – 12 South TSF – 10 | |
| Crest length (m) | North TSF – 840 South TSF – 1,010 | |
| Overall downstream slope (H:V) | North TSF – 1.4:1 to 2.6:1 South TSF – 1.2:1 to 4:1 | |
| Most recent AFPR | 2024 | |
| Most recent (and next) ITRB review | 2024 (2025) | |

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Beaverdell TSFs

| Structure | Purpose |
|----------------------------|---|
| South TSF (Cells 1 – 5) | Tailings retaining structures |
| North TSF (Cells 6 – 7) | Tailings retaining structures |
| Cell 3 Spillway | Directs runoff (precipitation and snow melt) from the South TSF to the river if the spillway is activated during the design storm. Smaller precipitation events are contained within the South TSF. |
| Cell 7 Spillway | Directs runoff (precipitation and snow melt) from the North TSF to the environment; the North TSF can contain the PMF before the Cell 7 Spillway is activated. |




Figure 2. Beaverdell Mine Tailings Storage Facilities



Figure 3. Cell 7 - looking north towards Cell 6



Figure 4. West Kettle River and erosion protection adjacent to Cell 5 looking southwest

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the Beaverdell TSFs was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the Beaverdell TSFs, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At Beaverdell, the most recent risk assessment identified two credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

| Failure Mode | What could happen? | What are we doing to control the risk? |
|---|--|--|
| Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment. | River flood water level exceeds elevation of the South TSF Cell 3 Embankment and flood waters enter Cell 3. Flood waters and eroded tailings may be discharged via the Cell 3 Spillway to the river. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Emergency stockpile of riprap is available on site; equipment would be staged nearby if flooding is forecast.• Monitoring, including regular monitoring during freshet to detect potential significant flooding or precipitation events. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly.• Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. |
| Instability – damage to the embankment due to loss of toe support | Damage to the South TSF embankments caused by external erosion from a large flood event in the river could lead to tailings discharge into the environment. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Revetment at South TSF can sustain an extreme flood even in the river.• Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly.• Scheduled care and maintenance of embankments.• River flood monitoring protocol in place. |

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the Beaverdell TSFs, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental impact to the area downstream of the TSFs. As discussed above, despite these risks being unlikely to occur, Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Beaverdell TSFs do not have a credible flow failure scenario.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

All findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR related to material risks have been addressed.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at the BEA TSFs resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The TSFs at Beaverdell have an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the Beaverdell TSFs, the most recent independent DSR was completed in 2021. The next DSR is scheduled to occur in 2026.

APPENDIX D – DUCK POND MINE TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Duck Pond TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Duck Pond property is the site of a former copper and zinc mine that operated from 2007 to 2015. It is located approximately 30 km south of Millertown in central Newfoundland, as shown in Figure 1. During operations, ore was extracted mostly from the underground mine, with small open pits developed in the last years of operation.

The terrain around Duck Pond is characterized by a system of tributaries flow to the Exploits River with forested hillsides, low slopes and a chain of lakes. The valley base is very broad and both upland and lowland areas are typically marshy with alluvial foundations. The site experiences mild continental seasonal weather patterns with periodically heavy snowfalls, rain and high winds. The site is in a zone of low seismicity.

TSF Description

Duck Pond's inactive TSF includes two components: the Tailings Management Area (TMA) and the Polishing Pond. A water cover is maintained on this facility.

A description of the current state of the Duck Pond TSF is provided in Table 1. Structures comprising the Duck Pond TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. Figure 3 shows a photo of the TSF.

Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the Duck Pond TSF. Closure and reclamation work at Duck Pond began in 2015 when operations ceased.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, the Duck Pond TSF is classified as a "Significant". Regardless of classification, this facility meets "Extreme" earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.

Table 1. Description of the Duck Pond TSF

| TSF Design Summary | Description |
|---|--|
| Country | Canada |
| GISTM consequence classification | Significant |
| Deposition method | Slurry via subaqueous deposition |
| Status | Inactive |
| Number (name) of tailings embankment structures | 2 (Dam A, Dam B) |
| Type of Construction | Earth-fill embankments |
| Design storm event | 1 in 10,000-year event |
| Design earthquake | 1 in 1,000-year event (confirmed stable for 10,000-year event) |
| Maximum height (Current/Final) (m) | Dam A – 9.5 Dam B – 6.5 |
| Crest length (m) | Dam A – 850 Dam B – 580 |
| Overall downstream slope (H:V) | 2:1 |
| Most recent AFPR | 2024 |
| Most recent (and next) ITRB review | 2025 (2026) |

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Duck Pond TSF

| Structure | Purpose |
|---------------------------------|--|
| Dam A | Tailings retaining structure |
| Dam B | Tailings retaining structure |
| Polishing Pond (Dam C) | Polishing Pond (to support management of water quality during active care closure and will be removed for passive care when treatment in the TMA ends) |
| TMA Emergency Spillway at Dam B | Designed to protect Dam B from overtopping during extreme flood events. |




Figure 2. Duck Pond Mine TSF



Figure 3. Aerial View of Duck Pond TSF Facing East

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the Duck Pond TSF was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the Duck Pond TSF, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At Duck Pond, the most recent risk assessment identified three credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

| Failure Mode | What could happen? | What are we doing to control the risk? |
|--|---|--|
| Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment. | Water level exceeds crest elevation of the embankment from blockage of spillway, or crest settlement due to liquefaction of embankment or foundation materials causing release to the drainage areas downstream of the facility. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Engineered structures (e.g., spillways) to convey water during extreme floods. Maintain operating water levels to provide adequate storage through flood events. Water level monitoring. Routine and event-driven inspections. Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structure. |
| Internal Erosion – transport of embankment material through the foundation. | Seepage erosion process that transports soil particles from embankment from either frost penetration into core, presence of water above abutment, or sufficient gradient (together with unstable filter and differential settlement). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Structures engineered to resist internal erosion. Established operating water levels and action plans. Instrumentation to assess performance of embankments. Routine and event-driven inspections. Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structure. |
| Instability – Damage to the embankment caused by extreme static or earthquake loading. | Damage or slumping of embankment caused by extreme static or earthquake loading. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Embankments designed and constructed to resist seismic events within regulatory guidelines. Foundation investigations completed to characterize materials and assign appropriate strengths for design. Routine and event-driven inspections. Scheduled care and maintenance of embankment. |

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the Duck Pond TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed

by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental, public health and safety, private property and infrastructure impacts upstream of Millertown, Newfoundland as well as recreational land users in affected tributaries of the Exploits River. As discussed above, despite these risks being unlikely to occur, Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Duck Pond TSF has three credible failure modes that, although unlikely to occur, could result in a flow failure scenario; these are described above in the section entitled 'Discussion of Material Risks'. An inundation study has been completed to identify the potentially impacted area. Based on this study, Teck has assessed the potential for human exposure (potential for a person to be located in the inundation area) and vulnerability (existing physical, social, economic and environmental conditions that make people and the environment more susceptible to the impacts) to understand the severity of the potential impacts of a flow failure scenario.

The area of influence for a flow failure scenario at the Duck Pond TSF includes the drainage areas and creeks leading to the Exploits River, downstream of Dams A and B, and the polishing pond. The potential impacts to people, communities and the environment may include impacts to water supply, public health and safety, community infrastructure including access roads and Harpoon Brook Bridge and Indigenous territory. Potential impacts to Indigenous rights include interference with traditional, cultural and economic practices, including perceived and real impacts to subsistence foods including fish and species that may consume or encounter affected water or exposed tailings.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

All findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR related to material risks have either been addressed or are being addressed as part of the 2025 site activities – see prior discussion on Material Risks for further information.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The Duck Pond TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the Duck Pond TSF, the most recent independent DSR was in 2016. The next DSR is occurring in 2026.

APPENDIX E – FISHERMAN ROAD TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Fisherman Road TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Fisherman Road TSF is the site of historic tailings deposition and storage associated with the former Kenville Mine, which operated from 1890 to 1956.

The site is located in Blewett, approximately 7 km west of Nelson, British Columbia and is situated along the south side of the Kootenay River, within a broad east-west oriented valley that was deepened by glacial activity. Water levels in the Kootenay River are controlled by the Corra Linn hydroelectric dam located approximately 6 km downstream. Along the south side of the river, the sediments which form the foundation of the TSF consist of post-glacial overbank, fluvial, lacustrine and glacial till deposits underlain by bedrock.

Fisherman Road is west of the Rocky Mountain Trench and its climate is characterized as part of the mountain climate regime. The area has a humid continental climate with four distinct seasons. Winters are cold while summers are warm and drier. The site is in a zone of low seismicity.

TSF Description

The Fisherman Road TSF stores tailings on the upslope (south) side of Fisherman Road embankment, a public access road. Tailings are also present in Main Bay and trace amounts of tailings have been found in some of the surrounding areas. Tailings were placed in these locations by historical mining operations.

The downstream slope of the Fisherman Road embankment is approximately 1 m high along most of its length, except for an approximate 100 m long section along the east boundary where the berm is 3 m high to separate the TSF from Main Bay. The surface of the TSF is currently covered primarily by trees and vegetation.

A corrugated steel pipe culvert, referred to as the TSF Outlet, through the Fisherman Road berm at the southeast corner discharges surface water flow from the TSF into Main Bay. The Fisherman Road public road and the TSF Outlet are owned and operated by Ministry of Transportation and Transit of British Columbia.

A description of the current state of the Fisherman Road TSF is provided in Table 1. Structures comprising the Fisherman Road TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. A photo of the TSF is provided below in Figure 3.

Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the Fisherman Road TSF. Since 2012, Teck has completed studies to assess potential long-term options to further improve the site for the public and the environment. In 2025, Teck will undertake a review of past studies as well as engage with the community and road owner to inform planning for the long-term strategy for the Fisherman Road site.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, the Fisherman Road TSF is classified as a "Significant" consequence facility.




Figure 1. Fisherman Road Location

Table 1. Description of Fisherman Road TSF

| TSF Design Summary | Description |
|---|--|
| Country | Canada |
| GISTM consequence classification | Significant |
| Deposition method | Spigot |
| Status | Inactive |
| Number (name) of tailings embankment structures | 1 (Fisherman Road Embankment) |
| Type of Construction | Earth fill embankment, single stage construction |
| Design storm event | 1 in 50-year event (interpreted existing condition) |
| Design earthquake (road embankment) | 1 in 1,000-year event (interpreted existing condition) |
| Maximum height (Current/Final) (m) | 3 |
| Crest length (m) | 350 |
| Overall downstream slope (H:V) | 1:1 |
| Most recent AFPR | 2024 |
| Most recent (and next) ITRB review | 2024 (2025) |

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Fisherman Road TSF

| Structure | Purpose |
|---------------------------|--------------------|
| Fisherman Road Embankment | To retain tailings |




Figure 2. Plan View of Fisherman Road TSF



Figure 3. Photograph of Fisherman Road TSF

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the Fisherman Road TSF was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the Fisherman Road TSF, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At Fisherman Road, the most recent risk assessment identified one credible failure scenario that met the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria. This risk, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, is summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

| Failure Mode | What could happen? | What are we doing to control the risk? |
|---|---|--|
| Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment. | A large precipitation event and blockage of TSF outlet causing water level to exceed the top of the embankment and damage it. This could lead to flooding of public road infrastructure atop the embankment and environmental damage to fish habitat from tailings release. | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Options for further risk reduction are under consideration as part of planned 2025 works.An engineered structure (TSF outlet) exists to discharge excess surface water.Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall, earthquake) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly.Monitoring, including remote camera surveillance, on-site weather station, and automatic rainfall alert to detect potential overtopping. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected.Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures. |

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the Fisherman Road TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental impact caused by tailings mobilization into the Kootenay River; and health and safety impact to road users attempting to cross the road during flood event. As discussed above, despite these risks being unlikely to occur, Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Fisherman Road TSF has one credible failure mode that, although unlikely to occur, would result in a flow failure scenario; this is described above in the section entitled 'Discussion of Material Risks'. An inundation study has been completed to identify the potentially impacted area. Based on this study, Teck has assessed the potential for human exposure (potential for a person to be located in the inundation area) and vulnerability (existing physical, social, economic and environmental conditions that make people and the environment more susceptible to the impacts) to understand the severity of the potential impacts of a flow failure scenario.

The area of influence for a flow failure scenario at the Fisherman Road TSF includes the Fisherman Road, Main Bay area on the east of the TSF, and the Kootenay River downstream of the TSF. The potential effects to people and the environment in the unlikely scenario of a flow failure mode at the Fisherman Road TSF may include impacts to local public health and safety, community infrastructure, and Indigenous territory. Potential impacts to Indigenous rights include interference with traditional, cultural and economic practices, including perceived and real impacts to subsistence foods including fish and species that may consume or encounter affected water or exposed tailings.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

All findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR related to material risks have either been addressed or are being addressed as part of the 2025 site activities – see prior discussion on Material Risks for further information.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The TSF at Fisherman Road has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements. The 2024 EPRP test has been rescheduled due to availability of local emergency management staff.

Independent Reviews

At the Fisherman Road TSF, the most recent independent DSR was in 2024. The next DSR is scheduled to occur in 2029.

APPENDIX F – HIGHMONT TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Highmont TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Highland Valley Copper (HVC) Operations property is an open pit copper and molybdenum mine formed by the amalgamation of three historic mining operations: Bethlehem Copper, Lornex and Highmont. The property is located approximately 17 km west of Logan Lake and about 50 km southwest of Kamloops in British Columbia (BC), Canada, as shown in Figure 1.

The HVC site lies within the Highland Valley which is broad, glaciated and U-shaped, bounded on the west by the Thompson River and on the east by the Guichon Creek Valley. The region is characterized as having hummocky terrain with gentle to moderate slopes, with the Highmont TSF located on the eastern side within the watershed of the Witches Brook which is a tributary of the Guichon Creek. The site lies in the rain shadow of the Coast and Cascade mountains of the Southern Interior of BC, with a climate that is one of the warmest and driest in the province in the summer, and is dry while cold in the winter. Storms are typically convective (i.e., severe thunderstorms with heavy rainfall and strong winds). The site is located in an area of moderate seismicity.




Figure 1. Highland Valley Copper Operations site location

TSF Description

The Highmont TSF was constructed and operated between 1980 and 1984 and is an inactive facility. A description of the current state of the Highmont TSF is provided in Table 1 and structures comprising the Highmont TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2.

Between 2003 and 2012 the majority of the TSF was reclaimed by installing a closure spillway, flattening the downstream slopes of the dams, and revegetating the tailings beach and dams. These were completed in alignment with the HVC site's end land use plan which at the time included creation of areas to support agricultural grazing and the development of wildlife habitat. Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the Highmont TSF.

Consequence Classification

Based on GISTM consequence classification system, the Highmont TSF is classified as a "Significant" consequence facility. Regardless of classification, this facility meets "Extreme" earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.

Table 1. Description of Highmont TSF

| TSF Design Summary | Description |
|---|--|
| Country | Canada |
| GISTM consequence classification | Significant |
| Deposition method | Slurry |
| Status | Inactive |
| Number (name) of tailings embankment structures | 3 (North Dam, East Dam, South Dam) |
| Type of construction | Centerline |
| Design storm event | One-third between 1 in 1,000-year event and the Probable Maximum Flood (confirmed stable for Probable Maximum Flood event) |
| Design earthquake | 1 in 2,475-year event (confirmed stable for 1 in 10,000-year event) |
| Maximum height (Current/Final) (m) | North Dam – 35 East Dam – 30 South Dam – 30 |
| Crest length (m) | North Dam – 1,200 East Dam – 1,200 South Dam – 1,300 |
| Overall downstream slope (H:V) | North Dam – 2.5:1 East Dam – 2.3:1 South Dam – 2.3:1 |
| Most recent AFPR | 2024 |
| Most recent (and next) ITRB review | 2025 (2025) |

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Highmont TSF

| Structure | Purpose |
|-------------|--|
| North Dam | Cross-valley dam that retains tailings on the north boundary of the TSF |
| East Dam | A dam that retains tailings on the east boundary of the TSF, abutting natural ground to the north and the South Dam to the south |
| South Dam | A dam that retains tailings on the south boundary of the TSF, abutting natural ground to the west and the East Dam to the east |
| S1 Pond Dam | Collects surface runoff and seepage from the east side of the North Dam, and pumped flows from the S2 Pond and S8 Pond |
| S2 Pond Dam | Collects surface runoff and seepage from the west side of the North Dam |
| S3 Pond Dam | Collects surface runoff and seepage from the east side of the South Dam |
| S5 Pond Dam | Collects surface runoff and seepage from the East Dam |
| S8 Pond Dam | Collects surface runoff and seepage from the middle of the North Dam, and pumped flows from the S2 Pond |




Figure 2. Highmont TSF

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the Highmont TSF was conducted in 2025. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At Highmont TSF, the most recent risk assessment did not identify any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the Highmont TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

The Highmont TSF does not have any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Highmont TSF does not have a credible flow failure scenario.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPRs) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSRs)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR reports.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The Highmont TSF has no credible flow failure modes. Regardless, this TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the Highmont TSF, the most recent independent DSR was in 2023. The next DSR is occurring in 2028.

APPENDIX G – LOUVICOURT TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Louvicourt (LOU) TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The LOU mine is a former underground zinc, copper, gold and silver mine located approximately 20 km east of Val-d'Or, Quebec, as shown in Figure 1. The mine operated from 1994 to 2005. Environmental rehabilitation was conducted in 2007.

Approximately 45% of the tailings produced from the mine were pumped to the LOU TSF, located approximately 9 km northwest of the mine (Figure 1). The tailings were deposited under a water cover in the tailings pond for long-term storage to prevent oxidation and acid generation. The remainder of the tailings produced from the mine were used as paste backfill for the underground mine.

The site is located in Québec's Abitibi-Témiscamingue region, close to the border with Ontario. The region has an overall cold continental climate. Winter typically lasts from November to April. Summer is the wettest season. On an average annual basis, precipitation typically exceeds evaporation. The site is situated in a zone of low to moderate seismicity.

The regional topography is gently sloping with waterways that direct surface water flow towards James Bay. At the site, the terrain includes nearly flat plains, mostly covered with fine-grained sediments from glacial lakes. The TSF is located on the south-southeast bank of the Colombière River. The topography to the south-southeast, south and southwest is confining and relatively higher in elevation comprising natural soil and bedrock outcrops.

TSF Description

The LOU TSF comprises a tailings pond and polishing pond. The polishing pond is located immediately downstream (east) of the tailings pond. Water flows from the tailings pond through an operational spillway to the polishing pond, then through another operational spillway from the polishing pond to the downstream environment.

The tailings are maintained below a water cover to prevent oxidation and acid generation. The tailings pond is bounded by Dams 1A, 1B and 1C to the north and by Dams 1D and 1E to the east, Dams 2A and 2B to the west, and natural topography to the south. In addition to the operational spillway, two emergency spillways are located to the east at Dam 1E, at the northeast corner of the facility.

A description of the current state of the LOU TSF is provided in Table 1. Structures comprising the LOU TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown in Figure 2. A photo of the TSF is provided in Figure 3.

Teck has an ongoing program of environmental monitoring, surveillance and maintenance at the LOU TSF.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, the LOU TSF is classified as a "High" consequence facility. Regardless of classification, this facility meets “Extreme” earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.




Figure 1. Louvicourt Mine Location

Table 1. Description of Louvicourt TSF

| TSF Design Summary | Description |
|---|--|
| Country | Canada |
| GISTM consequence classification | High |
| Deposition method | Subaqueous |
| Status | Inactive |
| Number (name) of tailings embankment structures | 7 structures (Dam 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 1E, 2A and 2B) |
| Type of Construction | Earth fill dam, single stage construction |
| Design storm event | PMF |
| Design earthquake | 1 in 10,000-year return period |
| Maximum height (Current/Final) (m) | 18 |
| Crest length (m) | 2,510 |
| Overall downstream slope (Horizontal: Vertical) | 2:1 |
| Most recent AFPR | 2024 |
| Most recent (and next) ITRB review | 2024 (2025) |

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Louvicourt TSF

| TSF Design Summary | Description |
|---|---|
| Tailings Pond (including Dam 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 1E, 2A and 2B) | To retain tailings which are covered by water to prevent oxidation and acid-generation. |
| Polishing Pond (including Dam 4A, and 4B) | Receives water from the tailings pond and naturally enhances the water quality without active treatment. The Polishing Pond acts primarily as a safeguard to check that water released from the facility meets environmental quality standards. |





Figure 2. Plan view of Louvicourt Mine TSF



Figure 3. Photograph of Louvicourt Mine TSF

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the LOU TSF was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the LOU TSF, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At LOU, the most recent risk assessment identified two credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

| Failure Mode | What could happen? | What are we doing to control the risk? |
|---|---|--|
| Slope Instability – a mass movement of embankment material down a slope. | <p>A very large construction load, greater than the design, is added to the embankment and causes slope instability and damage to the embankment; or</p> <p>A very large earthquake event, greater than the design, causes slope instability and damage to embankment; or</p> <p>Slow deformation of the foundation results in strength loss causing slope instability and damage to embankment.</p> <p>Embankment damage could lead to release of tailings and/or water.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embankments are designed and constructed to meet Canadian Dam Association guidelines. A toe berm will also be expanded in 2025 at one location of the TSF to comply with Quebec mine closure guidelines. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melting, heavy rainfall, and earthquake) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Monitoring, including remote camera surveillance, automatic earthquake alert, regular instrumentation review, and regular satellite monitoring, regular survey to detect potential ground movement. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected. • Scheduled care and maintenance activities |
| Internal Erosion – transport of embankment material through the foundation. | <p>A very large precipitation event and blockage of spillway causing water level to rise and induce seepage erosion process that transports soil particles from embankment and damages the embankment.</p> <p>Embankment damage could lead to release of tailings and/or water.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structures are engineered to resist internal erosion between the dam core and downstream filter. • Established and managed operating water levels in TSF and water retention structures. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melting, heavy rainfall) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Monitoring, including remote camera surveillance and regular satellite monitoring to detect potential blocking of spillway. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected. • Scheduled care and maintenance activities |

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the LOU TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed

by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental impacts to the area downstream of the TSF from water and tailings release. As discussed above, despite these risks being unlikely to occur, Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The LOU TSF has two credible failure modes that, although unlikely to occur, would result in a flow failure scenario; these are described above in the section entitled 'Discussion of Material Risks'. An inundation study has been completed to identify the potentially impacted area. Based on this study, Teck has assessed the potential for human exposure (potential for a person to be located in the inundation area) and vulnerability (existing physical, social, economic and environmental conditions that make people and the environment more susceptible to the impacts) to understand the severity of the potential impacts of a flow failure scenario.

The area of influence for a flow failure scenario at the LOU TSF includes a hunting cabin and shelter near the TSF, Chemin Pare Bridge, the fire house pump, Highway 397 Bridge, three local roads, a structure near the Bourlamaque River banks, and recreational areas of Colombière and Bourlamaque rivers, Blouin Lake, and other nearby lakes. The potential effects to people and the environment in the unlikely scenario of a flow failure at the LOU TSF may include loss of life and impacts to surrounding waterbodies, public health and safety, community infrastructure, and Indigenous territory. Potential impacts to Indigenous rights include interference with traditional, cultural and economic practices, including perceived and real impacts to subsistence foods including fish and species that may consume or encounter affected water or exposed tailings.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

All findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR related to material risks have either been addressed or are being addressed as part of the 2025 site activities including proposed toe berm construction – see prior discussion on Material Risks for further information.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The TSF at LOU has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the LOU TSF, the most recent independent DSR was in 2020. The next DSR is scheduled for 2025.

APPENDIX H – PINCHI LAKE TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Pinchi Lake TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Pinchi Lake Mine was a former mercury mine that operated from 1940 to 1944 and from 1968 to 1975. The property is located on the north shore of Pinchi Lake, 25 km from Fort St. James, British Columbia, as shown in Figure 1.

The Pinchi Lake Mine is in a heavily wooded area with rolling hills. The climate is considered a humid continental climate, characterized by winters with significant snowfall and short, warm summers. The site is situated in a zone of low to moderate seismicity.

TSF Description

The Pinchi Lake TSF and associated water management infrastructure includes an earthfill tailings embankment, a dry tailings impoundment with vegetation cover on the surface, a closure spillway channel, and the Ed Creek diversion channel which diverts Ed Creek away from the TSF.

A description of the current state of the inactive Pinchi Lake TSF is provided in Table 1. Structures comprising the Pinchi Lake TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. Photos are provided below in Figures 3 and 4.

Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the Pinchi Lake TSF. Pinchi Lake TSF decommissioning and reclamation activities were completed from 2010 to 2012. The decommissioning activities included draining of the tailings pond, construction of a closure spillway channel to pass non-contact runoff through the facility, capping the TSF with till material, and reclaiming 55 hectares of land by seeding and planting native species to improve diversity and habitat.

Consequence Classification

Based on GISTM consequence classification system, the Pinchi Lake TSF is classified as a "Significant" consequence facility. Regardless of classification, this facility meets "Extreme" earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.




Figure 1. Pinchi Lake TSF location

Table 1. Description of Pinchi Lake TSF

| TSF Design Summary | Description |
|---|---|
| Country | Canada |
| GISTM consequence classification | Significant |
| Deposition method | Slurry |
| Status | Inactive |
| Number (name) of tailings embankment structures | 1 (TSF Embankment – East, South, West Legs) |
| Type of Construction | Earthfill tailings embankment |
| Design storm event | 1 in 10,000-year event |
| Design earthquake | Designed for 1 in 2,475-year event(confirmed stable for 1 in 10,000-year event) |
| Maximum height (Current/Final) (m) | 15 |
| Crest length (m) | 1,300 |
| Overall downstream slope (H:V) | 3:1 |
| Most recent AFPR | 2024 |
| Most recent (and next) ITRB review | 2025 (2026) |

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Pinchi Lake TSF

| Structure | Purpose |
|----------------------|---|
| Embankment | Earthfill tailings retaining structure. |
| Tailings Impoundment | Does not include water storage and has a vegetation cover on the tailings surface, contains approximately 1 million cubic metres of tailings. |
| Closure Spillway | Structure that provides release of non-contact runoff through the closed cover surface |




Figure 2. Pinchi Lake Mine TSF and Water Management Features



Figure 3. Pinchi TSF looking west-northwest



Figure 4. South leg of Pinchi TSF embankment looking west

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the Pinchi Lake TSF was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At the Pinchi Lake TSF, the most recent risk assessment identified no credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the Pinchi Lake TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

The Pinchi Lake TSF does not have any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Pinchi Lake TSF does not have a credible flow failure scenario even under extreme loading conditions.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR reports.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The Pinchi Lake TSF has no credible flow failure modes. Regardless, this TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the Pinchi Lake TSF, the most recent independent DSR was completed in 2023. The next DSR is scheduled to occur in 2028.

APPENDIX I – PINE POINT TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Pine Point TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

Pine Point Mine is an inactive lead-zinc mine located in the Northwest Territories approximately 68 km west of Fort Resolution and 90 km east of Hay River, as shown in Figure 1. The mine operated from 1964 to 1988. After the mine ceased operations in 1988, Teck reclaimed the mining areas and the associated leases were returned to the government of the Northwest Territories by 1990. Teck retained, and continues to manage, the inactive Pine Point TSF.

The terrain around the TSF gently slopes northwest towards Great Slave Lake. The area is a sporadic discontinuous permafrost area with no evidence of permafrost within the TSF area. Materials covering the site consist of mainly sand and gravel, lacustrine, glaciolacustrine and glacial till deposits formed during and after glaciation period. These deposits are underlaid by siltstone and limestone bedrock. The climate at the site is characterized by long cold winters with freshet generally starting in late April and finishing at the beginning of June, followed by short and warm summers. The site is situated in a zone of low seismicity.

TSF Description

The inactive Pine Point TSF retains tailings with earthfill embankments on four sides - North, West, East and South Dikes - and natural topography on the east. Due to local topography, a permanent pond, named Main Pond, is formed on the north side of the TSF. Two concrete spillways are present in the North Dike to allow passive flood water discharge to the downstream environment.

Main Pond water is conveyed to a polishing pond through a gated culvert that passes through an internal embankment, named Internal Dike. Water is treated then discharged via siphons through the polishing pond spillway to the downstream environment.

A description of the current state of the Pine Point TSF is provided in Table 1. Structures comprising the Pine Point TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. A photo of the TSF is provided in Figure 3.

After the mine was closed, a gravel cover was constructed over the tailings to control dust. Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the Pine Point TSF.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, the Pine Point TSF is classified as a "Significant" consequence facility.



Figure 1. Pine Point site location

Table 1. Description of Pine Point TSF

| TSF Design Summary | Description |
|---|---|
| Country | Canada |
| GISTM consequence classification | Significant |
| Deposition method | Slurry |
| Status | Inactive |
| Number (name) of tailings embankment structures | 4 structures (North Dike including 2 spillways; East Dike; South Dike; and West Dike) |
| Type of Construction | Downstream construction |
| Design storm event | 1 in 1,000-year event |
| Design earthquake | 1 in 10,000-year event |
| Maximum height (Current/Final) (m) | North and West Dikes – 9 South Dike – 6 East Dike – 2 |
| Crest length (m) | North Dike – 3,010 West Dike – 2,310 South Dike – 2,480 East Dike – 628 |
| Overall downstream slope (H:V) | North, South and East Dikes – $\geq 1.7:1$ West Dike – $1.8:1$ |
| Most recent AFPR | 2024 |
| Most recent (and next) ITRB review | 2024 (2025) |

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures comprising the Pine Point TSF

| Structure | Purpose |
|----------------|---|
| North Dike | Retains tailings and ponded water. Water collects and ponds against the North Dike and forms the Main Pond. The North Dike features 2 spillways which serve to control Main Pond water level. |
| West Dike | Retains tailings and ponded water. |
| South Dike | Retains tailings. |
| East Dike | Retains ponded water. |
| Internal Dike | Forms a Polishing Pond where the water from the Main Pond undergoes seasonal water treatment prior to release to the environment. |
| Main Pond | Stores surface water runoff (snowmelt and rainwater). |
| Polishing Pond | Water from Main Pond undergoes seasonal water treatment. |




Figure 2. Plan view of Pine Point TSF



Figure 3. Photograph of Pine Point TSF

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the Pine Point TSF was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the Pine Point TSF, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely to occur. At Pine Point TSF, the most recent risk assessment identified three credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

| Failure Mode | What could happen? | What are we doing to control the risk? |
|--|---|---|
| Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment. | <p>A large precipitation event and blockage of spillways causing water level to exceed the top of the embankment and damage the embankment.</p> <p>The embankment damage could result in the release of tailings and water.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engineered structures (spillways) exist to transport excess water. • Monitoring of snowpack to inform freshet water level forecast. • Monitoring, including precipitation forecast, real-time water level monitoring, on-site weather station monitoring, and remote camera surveillance to detect potential large precipitation, and overtopping. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures. |
| Slope Instability – a mass movement of embankment material down the slope. | <p>A large load/force greater than the design is exerted on the embankment, causing slope instability and damage to the embankment.</p> <p>A very large earthquake event greater than design causes slope instability and damage to embankment.</p> <p>The embankment damage could result in release of tailings and water.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embankments are designed and constructed to meet provincial regulatory requirements and Canadian Dam Association guidelines. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall, and earthquake) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Monitoring, including remote camera surveillance, automatic earthquake alert, regular instrumentation review, and regular satellite monitoring to detect potential ground movement. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures. |

Table 3 (Continued). Summary of Material Risks

| Failure Mode | What could happen? | What are we doing to control the risk? |
|---|--|--|
| Internal Erosion – transport of embankment material through the foundation. | <p>A large precipitation event and blockage of spillways causing water level to rise and induce seepage erosion process that transports soil particles from embankment and damages the embankment.</p> <p>The embankment damage could result in the release of tailings and water.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structures are engineered to resist internal erosion between the core and shell. • Water levels are maintained lower than during historical operations, reducing the gradient and potential for internal erosion. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Monitoring, including remote camera surveillance, on-site weather station, automatic rainfall alert, and regular instrumentation review to detect potential blockage of spillways and elevated water level. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures. |

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures. Additional assessments are being undertaken to enhance flood management capacity and to reduce the risk to ALARP.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the Pine Point TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental impact to the area downstream of the TSF.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Pine Point TSF has three credible failure modes that, although unlikely to occur, would result in a flow failure scenario; these are described above in the section entitled 'Discussion of Material Risks'. An inundation study has been completed to identify the potentially impacted area. Based on this study, Teck

has assessed the potential for human exposure (potential for a person to be located in the inundation area) and vulnerability (existing physical, social, economic and environmental conditions that make people and the environment more susceptible to the impacts) to understand the severity of the potential impacts of a flow failure scenario.

The area of influence for a flow failure scenario at Pine Point includes the relatively flat peat land between the TSF and Great Slave Lake, with potential for released water and tailings to reach Great Slave Lake. There are no inhabited buildings in the area and hence no permanent population at risk. The potential effects to people and the environment in the unlikely scenario of a flow failure mode at the Pine Point TSF may include impacts to health and safety for temporary populations (such as hunters, trappers, etc.). Potential impacts to Indigenous rights include interference with traditional, cultural and economic practices, including perceived and real impacts to subsistence foods including species that may consume or encounter affected water or exposed tailings.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

All findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR related to material risks have either been addressed or are being addressed as part of the 2025 activities – see prior discussion.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The Pine Point TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the Pine Point TSF, the most recent independent DSR was in 2024. The next DSR will occur in 2034.

APPENDIX J – SÄ DENA HES TAILINGS MANAGEMENT AREA

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Sä Dena Hes (SDH) Tailings Management Area (TMA). This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The SDH property is the site of a former lead-zinc mine that operated from 1991 to 1992; decommissioning and closure of the site was completed in 2015. The property is located 45 km north of Watson Lake in the Yukon Territory, as shown in Figure 1. The site is owned by the SDH Operating Corporation, which is a 50/50 joint venture between Teck and Pan-Pacific Metal Mining Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of Korea Zinc Company, Ltd. Teck is the operator.

The terrain around SDH is characterized by moderately steep, forested hillsides. The valley bases vary from narrow to very broad and are typically marshy with alluvial foundations. The site is situated on a divide between two drainage catchments and lies in the rain shadow of the Coast and St. Elias Mountains. These mountain ranges form a barrier against Pacific influences, resulting in a continental climate (cold winters, hot summers and sparse precipitation). Additionally, the Cassiar Mountains create a secondary rain shadow effect. The site is situated in a zone of low seismicity.

TSF Description

A description of the current state of the SDH TMA is provided in Table 1; structures comprising the SDH TMA are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. Photos of the TMA are provided below in Figure 3 and Figure 4.

Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the SDH TMA. Closure and decommissioning activities were completed in 2015. Activities included covering exposed tailings with a vegetated soil cover. This cover was constructed to limit the release of contaminants to the air, water, and land. Surface contouring and revegetation have been completed for protection against erosion.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, the SDH TMA is classified as a "Significant" consequence facility. Regardless of classification, this facility meets "Extreme" earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.




Figure 1. Să Dena Hes mine location

Table 1. Description of Sä Dena Hes TMA

| TSF Design Summary | Description |
|---|---|
| Country | Canada |
| GISTM consequence classification | Significant |
| Deposition method | Slurry |
| Status | Inactive |
| Number (name) of tailings embankment structures | 1 (North Embankment) |
| Type of Construction | Single stage embankment construction |
| Design storm event | 1 in 1,000-year event (able to withstand 1 in 10,000-year event under snow-free conditions) |
| Design earthquake | 1 in 2,475-year event (confirmed stable under 10,000-year event) |
| Maximum height (Current/Final) (m) | 15 |
| Crest length (m) | 260 |
| Overall downstream slope (H:V) | 2.5:1 |
| Most recent AFPR | 2024 |
| Most recent (and next) ITRB review | 2024 (2025) |

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Sä Dena Hes TMA

| Structure | Purpose |
|---|--|
| North Embankment | Tailings retaining structure |
| North Tailings Pond/South Tailings Pond Cover | Controls wind erosion of tailings, minimizes the impact of dust, and facilitates revegetation. The cover promotes runoff of clean water through constructed drainage features. |
| North Drainage Channel | Directs clean runoff from the covered tailings areas to the South Drainage Channel, via the SRS pond, and away from the TSF. |
| North Embankment | Tailings retaining structure |



Figure 2. Să Dena Hes mine tailings management area



Figure 3. SDH TSF North Embankment looking east



Figure 4. SDH tailings management area looking north

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the SDH TMA was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the SDH TMA, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At SDH, the most recent risk assessment identified two credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

| Failure Mode | What could happen? | What are we doing to control the risk? |
|---|--|--|
| Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment. | <p>Blockage of the TSF cover drainage channel from large snowpack or ice blockage causing formation of a temporary pond during snowmelt that overtops the embankment resulting in tailings erosion, or</p> <p>A very large precipitation event occurs that forms a temporary pond near the embankment that overtops it, resulting in tailings erosion.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tailings cover is designed to drain away from the embankment to reduce water pooling. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Monitoring, including remote camera surveillance and regular satellite monitoring during freshet to detect potential ground movement or pooling. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected. • The north embankment will be raised which will fully eliminate this potential failure mode and will also include adding stronger erosion protection on the downstream slope. |
| Internal Erosion – transport of embankment material through the foundation. | Transport of embankment material through its foundation over several years leading to deformation of the embankment which could lead to transport of eroded tailings downstream from a seasonal pond. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tailings cover is designed to drain away from the embankment to reduce water pooling and for water to drain through the embankment, in accordance with the design intent, without displacing embankment material. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Monitoring, including remote camera surveillance and regular satellite monitoring during freshet to detect potential ground movement or pooling. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected. |

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the SDH TMA, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental impact to the area downstream of the North Embankment. As discussed above, despite these risks being unlikely to occur, Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The SDH TMA does not have a credible flow failure scenario.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

All findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR related to material risks have either been addressed or are being addressed as part of construction activities – see prior discussion on Material Risks for further information.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The SDH TMA has no credible flow failure modes. Regardless, this TMA has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the SDH TMA, the most recent independent DSR was in 2015. The next DSR is occurring in 2025.

APPENDIX K – SULLIVAN MINE TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITIES

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Sullivan TSFs. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Sullivan Mine property is the site of a former silver, zinc and lead mine that operated from 1892 to 2001. The property is located in the City of Kimberley, in the southeast corner of British Columbia. Teck began reclamation work of the Sullivan property and the surrounding area in the 1990s and completed reclamation work in accordance with the Decommissioning and Closure Plan for Kimberley Operations, dated September 2000 (Closure Plan), in 2008.

The Sullivan Mine is situated in the foothills of the Purcell Mountain range on the edge of the Rocky Mountain Trench. The tailings area is located on a largely flat bench north of the community of Marysville, which drains generally to the south-southeast towards the St. Mary River, primarily through the Cow, James, and Luke Creek drainages. The site is in an area of historically moderate to low seismicity.

TSF Description

On the Sullivan Mine property, there are five TSFs (Iron, Old Iron, Calcine, Gypsum, Siliceous). At all TSFs, tailings are retained by engineered earthfill embankment structures. There are also collection ponds, pump stations, seepage collection points and a Drainage Water Treatment Plant on-site to manage mine contact water.

Reclamation work on the TSFs was initiated in 1990 and was completed in 2008. During the reclamation process, a significant amount of work was conducted to enhance long-term stability of the TSFs. These enhancements included construction of water management structures including diversion channels and spillways, an engineered soil cover with vegetation established on the surface, and modifications to the containment structures including flattening of slopes and/or the construction of toe berms, such that the TSFs structures meet or exceed industry standards.

A description of the current state of the Sullivan TSFs is provided in Table 1; structures comprising the Sullivan TSFs are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. Photos of the TSFs are provided below in Figures 3 to 6.

Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the Sullivan Mine TSFs.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, Sullivan Mine TSFs have been classified between "Low" and "Significant", as outlined in Table 1.




Figure 1. Sullivan Mine location

Table 1. Description of Sullivan TSFs

| TSF Design Summary | Description |
|---|--|
| Country | Canada |
| GISTM consequence classification | Iron, Calcine TSFs – Low Old Iron, Siliceous, Gypsum TSFs – Significant |
| Deposition method | Slurry deposition |
| Status | Inactive |
| Number (name) of tailings embankment structures | 9 (Iron Dike, Old Iron Dike, No. 1 Siliceous Dike, No. 2 Siliceous Dike, No. 3 Siliceous Dike, East Gypsum Dike, West Gypsum Dike, Northeast Gypsum Dike, Calcine Dike) |
| Type of Construction | Upstream |
| Design storm event | 1 in 10,000-year event – Calcine PMF – Iron TSF, Old Iron TSF, Siliceous, Gypsum TSF |
| Design earthquake | 1 in 10,000-year event ² |
| Maximum heights (Final) (m) | Iron Dike – 29.0 Old Iron Dike – 7.6 No. 1 Siliceous Dike – 4.9 ¹ No. 2 Siliceous Dike – 9.5 No. 3 Siliceous Dike – 12.5 East Gypsum Dike – 16.8 West Gypsum Dike – 22.9 Northeast Gypsum Dike – 10.0 Calcine Dike – 4.6 ³ |
| Crest lengths (m) | Iron Dike – 1,500 Old Iron Dike – 520 No. 1 Siliceous Dike – 2,000 No. 2 Siliceous Dike – 730 No. 3 Siliceous Dike – 1,540 East Gypsum Dike – 670 West Gypsum Dike – 640 Northeast Gypsum Dike – 120 Calcine Dike – 520 |

Table 1 (Continued). Description of Sullivan TSFs

| TSF Design Summary | Description |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Overall downstream slope (H:V) | Iron Dike – 3.5:1 Old Iron Dike – 15:1 No. 1 Siliceous Dike – 7:1 No. 2 Siliceous Dike – 3:1 No. 3 Siliceous Dike – 2.5:1 East Gypsum Dike – 3:1 to 7:1 West Gypsum Dike – 3:1 Northeast Gypsum Dike – 1.5:1 Calcine Dike – 1.5:1 |
| Most recent AFPR | 2024 |
| Most recent (and next) ITRB review | 2024 (2025) |

1 Tailings were placed downstream of the No.1 Siliceous Dike. The original height of the No.1 Siliceous Dike from original ground is 16.8 m.

2 Work is ongoing to determine the earthquake resiliency of the Silicious TSF

3 A municipal landfill abuts the downstream slope of the Calcine Dike. The height of the Calcine Dike from original ground is 15.2 m.

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising the Sullivan Mine TSFs

| Structure | Purpose |
|---------------|------------------------------|
| Iron TSF | Tailings retention structure |
| Old Iron TSF | Tailings retention structure |
| Siliceous TSF | Tailings retention structure |
| Gypsum TSF | Tailings retention structure |
| Calcine TSF | Tailings retention structure |




Figure 2. Sullivan Mine TSFs



Figure 3. Iron TSF, looking north



Figure 4. Gypsum TSF, West Gypsum Dike, looking north



Figure 5. Old Iron TSF, looking north



Figure 6. Calcine Dike crest and downstream slope

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the Sullivan TSFs was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At the Sullivan Mine, the most recent risk assessment identified no credible failure scenarios for the TSFs that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the Sullivan Mine, impacts associated with credible failure scenarios have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

The Sullivan TSFs do not have any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Sullivan TSFs have no material risks associated with credible flow failure modes.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at the Sullivan Mine resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The TSFs at Sullivan have an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

The most recent independent DSR for Sullivan was completed in 2023. The next DSR is occurring in 2028.

APPENDIX L – DOUGLAS MINE TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Douglas Mine TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Douglas Mine property is the site of a former phosphate mine that operated from 1962 to 1968. The site was closed and reclaimed incrementally between the early 1970s to the 2010s. The property is located about 10 miles south of Drummond, Montana, as shown in Figure 1. The site is owned by Teck American Incorporated.

The Douglas Mine is located west of the Continental Divide which drains into the Pacific Ocean through the Columbia River. The Continental Divide influences the climate of the adjacent areas. West of the divide, the climate can be identified as modified north Pacific coast type. The site is located in an arid region near the Deer Lodge valley, which is one of the driest areas of the western part of Montana with an average of 11 inches of precipitation annually. The terrain around the Douglas Mine is characterized by open range with plains type grasses and a scattering of small trees. The site is located in an area of moderate seismicity.

TSF Description

The inactive TSF was initially constructed in 1963 and received mill tailings from the Douglas Mine concentrator for about 5 years until 1968. The tailings were initially reclaimed by covering with soil in about 1970 and incrementally reclaimed to the early 2010s, including removal of all site structures, placement of additional soil to cover the tailings, seeding to vegetate the soil cover, fencing to prevent grazing of the cover, and additional controls to divert stormwater away from the TSF. A description of the current state of the TSF is provided in Table 1; structures comprising the TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown in Figures 2 and 3.

Consequence Classification

Based on GISTM consequence classification system, the DOU TSF is classified as a "Low" consequence facility.




Figure 1. Douglas Mine location

Table 1. Description of TSF

| TSF Design Summary | Description |
|---|---|
| Country | United States |
| GISTM consequence classification | Low |
| Deposition method | Slurry |
| Status | Inactive |
| Number (name) of tailings embankment structures | 1 (Douglas Tailings Dam) |
| Type of Construction | Single stage embankment construction |
| Design storm event | Work is ongoing to evaluate spillway capacity |
| Design earthquake | 1 in 10,000-year event |
| Maximum height (Current/Final) (m) | 14.9 |
| Crest length (m) | 320 |
| Overall downstream slope (H:V) | 3:1 |
| Most recent AFPR | 2024 |
| Most recent (and next) ITRB review | 2024 (2025) |

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Douglas Mine TSF

| Structure | Purpose |
|-------------------------|--|
| Douglas Tailings Dam | Tailings retaining structure |
| Filter Dam | Constructed across the original creek channel of Douglas Creek for secondary settling purposes during operations and now provides secondary containment in the unlikely event of a tailings release. |
| Douglas Creek Diversion | Diverts Douglas Creek from the original creek channel around the Filter Dam |




Figure 2. Douglas Mine TSF



Figure 3. Downstream face and area of the Douglas Mine TSF

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the TSF was conducted in 2025. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At the Douglas Mine, the most recent risk assessment did not identify any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of

studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

The TSF does not have any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The TSF does not have a credible flow failure scenario, even under extreme loading conditions.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at the TSF resulted in no material findings.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The TSF has no credible flow failure modes. Regardless, this TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

The most recent independent DSR of the TSF was in 2025. The next DSR will occur in 2035.

APPENDIX M – MAGMONT TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Magmont TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Magmont (MAG) property is the site of a former lead-zinc mine that operated from 1967 to 1994. Following cessation of mine operations, the site was closed and reclaimed in accordance with its Missouri Department of Natural Resource's Metallic Waste Management permit. The property is located in the Salem Plateau of the Ozark Mountains approximately 2 miles south of Bixby, MO, as shown in Figure 1. The site is managed as a joint venture between Teck American Incorporated (Teck) and Haliburton, with Teck the managing partner.

The terrain around MAG is characterized by forested hills and shallow creek valleys. The region is essentially a high plateau with rolling hills, often featuring steep bluffs and rocky outcrops. The site is situated high on a divide between two drainage catchments for the Black and Meramec Rivers; MAG drains to the Black. Missouri and MAG have a continental climate with strong seasonality. With minimal topographic barriers, dry-cold air enters the region in the winter from the northern plains and Canada and can result in snowfall from the typically humid air of the area. In the summer, moist warm air masses enter the area from the Gulf. This area of the U.S. Midwest experiences climatic events such as high-intensity rain, drought, heat waves, ice storms, windstorms and tornadoes. The site is located in an area of moderate seismicity.

TSF Description

The MAG TSF starter dam was constructed between 1966 and 1967. The TSF was raised using downstream methods between 1967 and 1979. Between the early 1990's and early 2000's the TSF was reclaimed in accordance with a State of Missouri Metallic Minerals Permit and site structures that were no longer needed were removed. Tailings were covered with earthen material to form a vegetated cover as part of the closure work.

A description of the current state of the MAG TSF is provided in Table 1; structures comprising the MAG TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. Photos of the TSF are provided in Figures 3 and 4 below.

Consequence Classification

Based on GISTM consequence classification system, the MAG TSF is classified as a "Significant" consequence facility. Regardless of classification, this facility meets "Extreme" earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.




Figure 1. Magmont Mine location

Table 1. Description of Magmont TSF

| TSF Design Summary | Description |
|---|--------------------------|
| Country | United States |
| GISTM consequence classification | Significant |
| Deposition method | Slurry |
| Status | Inactive |
| Number (name) of tailings embankment structures | 1 (Magmont Tailings Dam) |
| Type of Construction | Downstream |
| Design storm event | 1 in 10,000-year event |
| Design earthquake | 1 in 10,000-year event |
| Maximum height (Current/Final) (m) | 41.1 |
| Crest length (m) | 365.8 |
| Overall downstream slope (H:V) | Varies (2.0:1 and 4.5:1) |
| Most recent AFPR | 2024 |
| Most recent (and next) ITRB review | 2024 (2025) |

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Magmont TSF

| Structure | Purpose |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Magmont Tailings Dam | Tailings retaining structure |
| Tailings Cover | Two to six feet of locally borrowed clay cover that provides a growth medium for vegetation providing wildlife habitat, minimizes infiltration, maximizes evapotranspiration, and provides a physical barrier between tailings and the environment. The tailings cover is gently sloped toward the spillway and contains several ponds to provide detention/retention of stormwater. |
| Spillway | Integrated concrete-lined and grass-covered spillway and emergency spillway providing open channel flow of stormwater away from the TSF, primarily during precipitation events. |
| Tailings Dam Toe Drain System | Foundation drain system for the downstream tailings embankment to maintain low pore pressure in the tailings dam's primary structural elements. |




Figure 2. Magmont Mine TSF



Figure 3. Covered and vegetated tailings beach at Magmont (September 2019)



Figure 4. Downstream slope of the Magmont Tailings Dam (April 2025)

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the MAG TSF was conducted in 2025. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At MAG, the most recent risk assessment did not identify credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the MAG TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

The MAG TSF does not have any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The MAG TSF does not have a credible flow failure scenario.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR or AFPR.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The MAG TSF has no credible flow failure modes. Regardless, this TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

The most recent MAG TSF DSR was in 2025. The next DSR is planned for 2035.

APPENDIX N – PEND OREILLE MINE TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Pend Oreille Mine (POm) TSFs. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Pend Oreille mine (POm) property is the site of a former lead and zinc mine, which was operational from 1952 to 2019. Closure activities commenced in 2020 and remain ongoing. The property is located approximately 2 miles north of Metaline Falls, Washington, as shown in Figure 1. The site is owned and operated by Teck Washington Incorporated, a subsidiary of Teck American Incorporated.

The topography of the northeastern corner of Washington from Metaline to the Canadian Border is moderately rugged, with mountainous areas and intervening glaciated valleys. The area is heavily forested and dotted with abundant lakes derived from the melting of glacial ice. The Pend Oreille Mine area is characterized by warm, moderately moist summers and cool, snowy winters. The site is located in an area of low seismicity.

TSF Description

During operations, tailings were placed in a series of TSFs, named TDF-1, 2 and 3, all of which are currently inactive. TDF-1 and TDF-2 are retained by upstream constructed tailings dams and were operated from 1968 to 1973 and 1973 to 1975, respectively. TDF-2 does not store water and has a flow-through channel that directs surface water flows to TDF-1. TDF-1 has a small surface wetland with minimal water that is drained by a decant pipe. TDF-3, operated intermittently from 2004 to 2019, is formed by two earthen embankments enclosing a natural basin-like area. TDF-3 has geomembrane liners and a leakage collection system.

Both TDF-1 and TDF-2 were remediated and reclaimed in compliance with an approved Consent Decree from the Department of Ecology. Reclamation works are actively ongoing at TDF-3 and includes treatment and removal of retained water.

A description of the current state of POm's TSFs is provided in Table 1; structures comprising the POm TSFs are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown in Figure 2.

Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the POm TSFs.

Consequence Classification

Based on GISTM consequence classification system, the POm TDF-1 is "Significant", TDF-2 is "Low", and TDF-3 is "Significant". It is expected that the consequence classification of TDF-3 will reduce when closure work is complete.




Figure 1. Pend Oreille Mine location




Figure 2. Pend Oreille Mine TSFs

Table 1. Description of P Om TSFs

| TSF Design Summary | Description |
|---|---|
| Country | United States of America |
| GISTM consequence classification | TDF-1 – Significant TDF-2 – Low TDF-3 – Significant |
| Deposition method | Slurry |
| Status | Inactive |
| Number (name) of tailings embankment structures | 4 (TDF-1, TDF-2, TDF-3 Northeast and Northwest Dams) |
| Type of Construction | TDF-1 & 2 – Upstream, TDF-3 – Downstream |
| Design storm event | 1 in 1,000-year event |
| Design earthquake | 1 in 500-year event |
| Maximum height (Current/Final) (m) | TDF-1 – 21 TDF-2 – 6 TDF-3 – 24 |
| Crest length (m) | TDF-1 – 540 TDF-2 – 159 TDF-3 – 396 |
| Overall downstream slope (H:V) | TDF-1 – 2.2:1 TDF-2 – 2:1 TDF-3 – 2.5:1 |
| Most recent AFPR | 2024 |
| Most recent (and next) ITRB review | 2024 (2025) |

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising P Om TSFs

| Structure | Purpose |
|------------------------|------------------------------|
| TDF-1 | Tailings retention structure |
| TDF-2 | Tailings retention structure |
| TDF-3: NE Tailings Dam | Tailings retention structure |
| TDF-3 NW Tailings Dam | Tailings retention structure |

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the POM TSFs was conducted in 2025. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and will be reviewed by the ITRB at their next meeting. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the POm TSF, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At POm, the most recent risk assessment identified three credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

| Failure Mode | What could happen? | What are we doing to control the risk? |
|--|---|---|
| Slope Instability – a mass movement of embankment material down a slope. | TDF-1: The tailings could lose strength and slump out of the facility if stress conditions were to change or a major earthquake occurred. Some tailings and water could reach the Pend Oreille river. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Design modifications are in progress, with the objective of eliminating this failure mode. • Ongoing monitoring for changing conditions. • Water accumulation on the tailings surface is minimized. |
| Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment. | TDF-1: Water is discharged via decant structure that could be overwhelmed in a major flood, causing water to flow over the embankment of the TSF and eroding some tailings into the Pend Oreille River. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Design modifications are in progress, with the objective of eliminating this failure mode. • Ongoing monitoring for changing conditions. • Water accumulation on the tailings surface is minimized. |
| Slope Instability – a mass movement of embankment material down a slope. | TDF-3: The TDF-3 embankments may be susceptible to excessive deformation under a major earthquake. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Additional stability assessments are underway to better understand this potential failure mode. • Continue ongoing closure works for TDF-3, which will include partial dam deconstruction and drainage of the tailings to improve stability. |

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the P Om TSFs, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental impact to the area downstream of TDF-1 and 3. As discussed above, despite these risks being unlikely to occur, Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The P Om TDF-1 and TDF-3 have credible failure modes that, although unlikely to occur, would result in a flow failure scenario; this is described above in the section entitled 'Discussion of Material Risks'. Teck has assessed the potential for human exposure (potential for a person to be located in the inundation area) and vulnerability (existing physical, social, economic and environmental conditions that make people and the environment more susceptible to the impacts) to understand the severity of the potential impacts.

The material risks described above for both TDF-1 and TDF-3 would result in impact to the nearby Pend Oreille River. There are no homes or cabins downstream. The area of influence for TDF-3 also includes the Pend Oreille Mine industrial facility. P Om employees are trained in emergency scenarios and we have escape routes identified. The potential effects to people and the environment in the unlikely scenario of a flow failure at Pend Oreille may include impacts to surrounding waterbodies, health and safety of persons on the Pend Oreille site.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

All findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR related to material risks have either been addressed or are being addressed as part of ongoing works discussed above – see prior discussion on Material Risks for further information.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at the P Om TSFs resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The POf TSFs has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the POf TSFs, the most recent independent DSR was in 2020. The next DSR is occurring in 2025.

APPENDIX O – CAUTIONARY NOTE ON FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

Tailings Storage Facility GISTM Disclosure Report

CAUTIONARY NOTE ON FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

This report contains certain forward-looking information and forward-looking statements as defined in applicable securities laws (collectively referred to as “forward-looking statements”). These statements relate to future events or our future performance. All statements other than statements of historical fact are forward-looking statements. The use of any of the words “aim”, “intend”, “expect”, “plan”, “estimate”, “potential”, “commit”, “would”, “may”, “must”, “will”, “should”, “believe”, “focus”, “targets”, “goals”, “believe”, “continue” and similar expressions is intended to identify forward-looking statements. These statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual results or events to differ materially from those anticipated in such forward-looking statements. These statements speak only as of the date of this report.

Forward-looking statements in this report include, but are not limited to, statements relating to: our sustainability strategy; our short-term and long-term sustainability goals, including, but not limited to our water policy goals; our expectations with respect to working towards responsible water stewardship; our strategic priorities and related goals, targets, commitments and plans and our expectations regarding those goals, targets, commitments and plans; the estimated timing and spending to achieve our goals; expectations regarding the conduct of our suppliers and contractors; our ability to manage our tailings facilities in a safe and environmentally responsible way; the GISTM Standards; the expectation that all of our active and inactive tailings storage facilities will be operated in full conformance with GISTM Standards; expectations regarding the benefits of technology and innovation, including, technology and innovation related to health and safety, including improved technology to support operational occupational hygiene team, technology and innovation relating to tailings, including, but not limited to, projects related to dewatering and co-mingling, the use of additives, and the development of a digital tailings management system; expectations regarding increasing local employment and employment of Indigenous Peoples; engagement with Indigenous Peoples and local communities; our ability to ensure responsible use of our products; our goal to contribute to community organizations and global initiatives; our expectations, plans, strategies and objectives of management; closure or divestment of certain legacy projects, operations or facilities; anticipated production or construction commencement dates or closure dates; anticipated operating modes and productive lives of projects, mines and facilities; identified risks and anticipated potential or actual impacts or outcomes; our ability to mitigate material risks discussed in this report; Teck’s expectations with respect to oversight and independent review to maintain safe and responsible tailings management throughout the mining life cycle, including planning, design, construction, operation, and closure; our expectations with respect to our commitments, timing and plans to improve, manage and maintain safe tailings storage management; the potential effect of possible future events on risks, impacts or outcomes; the ability to retain experienced multidisciplinary teams, including tailings engineers, environmental specialists, social performance specialists, and risk specialists; our expectations with respect to our commitments to sustainability reporting, framework, standards and initiatives; our expectations with respect to our commitments, timing and plans to achieve certain outcomes, targets or aspirations with respect to health, safety, environment and the communities where we operate; our ability to acknowledge and correct failure scenarios of tailings storage facilities or other relevant scenarios; our ability to prepare for long term recovery in the event of a tailings facility failure; our expectations with respect to regulatory developments and new or changed standards; our expectations with respect to Teck’s EPRP; and the ability of Teck to carry out the work in a prioritized manner as disclosed to reduce risk.

The forward-looking statements in this report are based on a number of estimates, projections, beliefs and assumptions that the management team believed to be reasonable as of the date of this report, though inherently uncertain and difficult to predict, including, but not limited to, expectations and assumptions concerning: the development, performance and effectiveness of technology needed to achieve our sustainability goals and priorities; our ability to maintain our plans and expectations with respect to this tailings report; our ability to implement new source control or mine design strategies on commercially reasonable terms without impacting production objectives; our ability to successfully implement our technology and innovation strategy; our ability to attract and retain skilled employees; access to lands to carry out tailings management and reclamation work; relationships with local communities and indigenous groups; costs of closure; environmental compliance costs generally; the imposition of tariffs, import or export restrictions, or other trade barriers or retaliatory measure by foreign or domestic governments; the availability of qualified employees and contractors for our operations and tailings management; the ability to retain and hire employees; our ability to procure equipment and operating supplies in sufficient quantities and on a timely basis; and assumptions regarding the development of our business generally.

Forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause the actual results, performance, experience or achievements of Teck to be materially different from those expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements. Risks and uncertainties that could influence actual results include, but are not limited to: general business and economic conditions, interest rates, commodity and power prices; acts of foreign or domestic governments; outcome of legal proceedings; the geological, operational and price assumptions on which this report is based on; our ability to obtain, comply with and renew permits, licenses and leases in a timely manner; risks associated with the consequence of climate change; risks associated with permitting and development of our properties; operational problems; regulatory action; environmental compliance challenges; changes in laws and governmental regulations; costs of compliance with environmental and other laws and regulation; risks relating to the development and use of new technology or lack of appropriate technologies needed to advance our goals and plans; natural disasters and adverse weather conditions; changes in commodity prices; operations in foreign countries; imposition of tariffs, import or export restrictions, or other trade barriers or retaliatory measures by foreign or domestic governments; our ongoing relations with our employees and with our business and joint venture partners; and the future operation and financial performance of the company generally.

We caution you that the foregoing list of important factors and assumptions is not exhaustive. Other events or circumstances could cause our actual results to differ materially from those estimated or projected and expressed in, or implied by, our forward-looking statements. You should also carefully consider the matters discussed under “Risk Factors” in Teck’s most recent Annual Information Form and its most recent management’s discussion and analysis and other documents available at www.sedarplus.ca and in public filings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission at www.sec.gov. The forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this report. Teck does not assume the obligation to revise or update these forward-looking statements after the date of this document or to revise them to reflect the occurrence of future unanticipated events, except as may be required under applicable securities laws.

APPENDIX P – PWC ASSURANCE REPORT



**Independent practitioner's limited assurance report on Teck Resources Limited's
Statement of Conformance with the International Council on Mining and Metals
Conformance protocols: Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management**

To the Directors of Teck Resources Limited

We have conducted a limited assurance engagement on Teck Resources Limited (Teck)'s Statement of Conformance with the International Council on Mining and Metals Conformance protocols: Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (the subject matter) of Teck's Tailings facilities; Pine Point; Beaverdell; Fisherman Road; Duck Pond; Magmont; Sa Dena Hes; Sullivan; Pinchi; Pend Oreille; Douglas Mine; Lennard Shelf; Louvicourt; Highland Valley Copper (Highmont Tailings Storage Facility).

The statement is included in the executive summary of the Tailings Storage Facility GISTM Disclosure Report (the criteria) as at August 5, 2025. This engagement was conducted by a multidisciplinary team including assurance practitioners and engineers.

Responsibilities for the subject matter

Management of Teck is responsible for:

- the preparation of the subject matter in accordance with the International Council on Mining and Metals Conformance protocols: Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (ICMM Conformance Protocols: GISTM), applied as explained in table 2 of the criteria;
- designing, implementing and maintaining such internal control as management determines is necessary to enable the preparation of the subject matter, in accordance with the ICMM Conformance Protocols: GISTM, that is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error; and
- the selection and application of appropriate sustainability reporting methods and making assumptions and estimates that are reasonable in the circumstances.

Inherent limitations in preparing the subject matter

Conformance with the ICMM Conformance Protocols: GISTM is subject to inherent uncertainty due to the assumptions and judgment applied in the identification of risk and impact (that determines the applicability and implementation of the Global Industry Standard on Tailings).

Our independence and quality management

We have complied with the independence and other ethical requirements of the International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (including International Independence Standards) issued by the International Ethics Standard Board for Accountants (IESBA Code) and of the relevant rules of professional conduct / code of ethics applicable to the practice of public accounting and related to assurance engagements, issued by various professional accounting bodies, which are founded on fundamental principles of integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional behaviour.

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"PwC" refers to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, an Ontario limited liability partnership.



The firm applies Canadian Standard on Quality Management 1, *Quality Management for Firms that Perform Audits or Reviews of Financial Statements, or Other Assurance or Related Services Engagements*, which requires the firm to design, implement and operate a system of quality management including policies or procedures regarding compliance with ethical requirements, professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements.

Practitioner's responsibilities

Our responsibility is to plan and perform the assurance engagement to obtain limited assurance about whether the subject matter is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, and to issue a limited assurance report that includes our conclusion. Misstatements can arise from fraud or error and are considered material if, individually or in the aggregate, they could reasonably be expected to influence decisions of users taken on the basis of the subject matter.

We conducted our limited assurance engagement in accordance with Canadian Standard on Assurance Engagements (CSAE) 3000, *Attestation Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information* (CSAE 3000) and International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000 (Revised), *Assurance Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information* (ISAE 3000 (Revised)).

As part of a limited assurance engagement in accordance with CSAE 3000 and ISAE 3000 (Revised), we exercise professional judgment and maintain professional skepticism throughout the engagement.

We also:

- Determine the suitability in the circumstances of Teck's use of ICMM Conformance Protocols: GISTM as the basis for the preparation of the subject matter;
- Perform risk assessment procedures, including obtaining an understanding of internal control relevant to the engagement, to identify where material misstatements are likely to arise, whether due to fraud or error, but not for the purpose of providing a conclusion on the effectiveness of Teck's internal control; and
- Design and perform procedures responsive to where material misstatements are likely to arise in the subject matter. The risk of not detecting a material misstatement resulting from fraud is higher than for one resulting from error, as fraud may involve collusion, forgery, intentional omissions, misrepresentations or the override of internal control.

We believe that the evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our conclusion.

Summary of the work performed

A limited assurance engagement involves performing procedures to obtain evidence about the subject matter. The procedures in a limited assurance engagement vary in nature and timing from, and are less in extent than for, a reasonable assurance engagement. Consequently, the level of assurance obtained in a limited assurance engagement is substantially lower than the assurance that would have been obtained had a reasonable assurance engagement been performed.



The nature, timing and extent of procedures selected depend on professional judgment, including the identification of where material misstatements are likely to arise in the subject matter, whether due to fraud or error.

In conducting our limited assurance engagement, we:

- performed physical site visits to all facilities listed in the subject matter;
- performed procedures to gain assurance over the accuracy of Teck's statement of conformance, which included inquiries of relevant personnel and inspecting supporting documentation that supports the subject matter;
- performed substantive assurance procedures on selected information in the subject matter; and
- obtained an understanding of Teck's reporting processes relevant to the preparation of its subject matter by:
 - performing inquiries on the review process of disclosures; and
 - reviewing relevant disclosures included within Teck's Tailings Storage Facility GISTM Disclosure Report.

Limited assurance conclusion

Based on the procedures we have performed and the evidence we have obtained, nothing has come to our attention that causes us to believe that the subject matter as at August 5, 2025 is not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the International Council on Mining and Metals Conformance protocols: Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management applied as explained in table 2 of the criteria.

Restriction on use

Our report has been prepared solely for the directors of Teck to assist Teck in reporting on its conformance with the International Council on Mining and Metals Conformance protocols: Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management. The subject matter therefore may not be suitable, and is not to be used, for any other purpose. Our report is intended solely for Teck.

We neither assume nor accept any responsibility or liability to any third party in respect of this report.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Chartered Professional Accountants

Vancouver, British Columbia
August 5, 2025