Tailings Storage Facility GISTM Disclosure Report

Date: December 31, 2025

Teck

Executive Summary

Teck Resources Limited and its consolidated subsidiaries (referred to collectively in this document as "Teck") have committed to conformance with the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (GISTM) in accordance with the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) Conformance Protocol: Global Industry Standard for Tailings Management across all Tailings Storage Facilities (TSFs) operated or managed by Teck. This report provides information on Teck's tailings facilities in accordance with GISTM Requirement 15.1.

Teck has programs in place for tailings management, environmental management, community engagement, and risk management. Information about these systems is described in this report and on Teck's website. Teck applies multiple layers of oversight and independent review to maintain safe and responsible tailings management. Engineers of Record (EORs) and Independent Tailings Review Boards (ITRBs) are in place where required. Teck also has experienced multidisciplinary teams, including tailings engineers, Responsible Tailings Facility Engineers (RTFEs), environmental specialists, social performance specialists, and risk specialists, who work collaboratively to manage each TSF.

Each Teck TSF undergoes a process of risk identification, assessment, and management. Risks are addressed in a prioritized manner with the aim of reducing risks to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). Material risks, if present, are described in this report, as well as mitigation and management measures that are in place. Regardless of the presence of material risks, all Teck TSFs have associated emergency preparedness and response measures, integrated into site-wide mine emergency response plans.

As of August 5, 2025, all Teck inactive TSFs classified as having "High," "Significant," or "Low" consequence classifications under the GISTM are in conformance with the ICMM's Conformance Protocols: Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management. PricewaterhouseCoopersLLP have completed limited assurance on Teck's conformance for these inactive facilities classified as having "High," "Significant," or "Low" consequence classifications under the GISTM.

As of December 31, 2025, Teck's active TSFs at the Highland Valley Copper, Red Dog, and Carmen de Andacollo sites are also in conformance. The Quebrada Blanca TSF partially meets GISTM requirements, with remaining gaps primarily related to documentation updates and additional community engagement. Work to meet all remaining requirements is ongoing and includes updating selected documentation to reflect the initial construction phase, design modifications, and an updated assessment of potential failure modes. This work is expected to continue through 2026. Appropriate tailings management and governance systems are in place, with established independent reviews and ongoing community engagement.

Contents

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

This report contains information on Teck's tailings storage facilities (TSFs) in alignment with Requirement 15.1 of the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (GISTM).

This report provides an overview of Teck's general approach to tailings management, covering key elements required under GISTM Requirement 15.1. Additional details can be found on teck.com/tailings. Facility-specific disclosure information for each of Teck's TSFs is appended to this report. Information provided for inactive TSFs is current as of August 2025 while information provided for active TSFs is current as of December 2025.

What are Tailings and Tailings Storage Facilities?

Tailings are a common by-product of the mining process. They are typically created as mined ore is crushed, ground, and/or processed to separate valuable minerals and to create a sellable concentrate product. The residual material from this process primarily comprises ground rock and is called tailings. Due to the nature of the ore separation processes, tailings are commonly transported as a slurry of fine mineral particles and water, but may also be dewatered and transported using conventional earth-moving equipment. The tailings are then placed in a specially designed and engineered TSF.

TSFs exist in mining areas around the world. Teck recognizes that TSF failures have the potential to significantly impact communities, local economies and the surrounding environment. Teck's TSFs are designed by experienced, expert professional engineers based on factors such as the composition of the tailings being stored, site geology and geotechnical conditions, geochemical conditions, precipitation/ climate, seismic activity, community input, and environmental protection. Teck's teams take measures to safely manage each Teck TSF throughout the mining life cycle, including planning, design, construction, operation, and closure.

What is the GISTM?

In August 2020, the GISTM was released as the first global standard focused specifically on the safe management of TSFs. It was developed through a collaboration between the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), the United Nations Environment Programme, and the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI). The standard sets a global benchmark for the safe management of TSFs, with the goal of zero harm to people and the environment from TSF failures. Teck participated in the advisory group that contributed to the development of the GISTM and was actively involved in drafting the ICMM's Tailings Management Good Practice Guide and Conformance Protocol, both of which were created to support implementation of the standard.

Teck's Commitment

Teck is committed to the safe and environmentally responsible management of TSFs throughout the entire mining life cycle to protect the health and safety of people, the environment, and Communities of Interest (COI). This commitment is guided by Teck's Tailings Management Policy and broader Sustainability Strategy.

As a company, Teck is committed to:

- Managing TSFs in a manner that addresses risks and reduces potential long-term impacts to the environment and surrounding communities and includes consideration of climate change.
- Meaningful engagement with COI in a manner that respects Human Rights (HR) and Indigenous rights, including incorporating a local and Indigenous knowledge base into decision making, where appropriate.
- Management and decision-making practices that incorporate Best Available Practices and Technologies (BAPT), where practicable.
- Development of emergency response plans and implementation of mechanisms for post-incident recovery in collaboration with our COI.
- Maintaining our Management System to identify and implement regulatory requirements, objectives, training and competency requirements, resourcing allocation and risk management.
- Governance processes include internal and external audits, independent reviews, and assurance activities with the intent of continuous improvement in performance and safety.
- Transparent disclosure of information on our TSFs and their performance in a timely manner.

Teck's Tailings Facilities

Teck manages 27 TSFs across its active and legacy mine sites. This includes:

- 5 active facilities currently in operation.
- 22 inactive facilities that no longer receive tailings and remain under monitoring and management.

Some sites may have multiple TSFs, depending on the site operational history and site characteristics. The locations of Teck's TSFs are illustrated in Figure 1 and summarized in Table 1.

Additionally, Teck holds non-operated joint venture interests in two tailings facilities:

- Antamina (Peru): An active TSF at an operating mine site.
- NorthMet (United States): An inactive TSF at a growth-stage project.

GISTM disclosures for these non-operated TSFs are managed and published by the respective operating partners in accordance with their own GISTM commitments.

CANADA

	Site	# of TSF	Status
1	Pine Point	1	Inactive
2	Sä Dena Hes	1	Inactive
3	Pinchi	1	Inactive
4	Highland Valley Copper	5	3 Inactive, 2 Active
5	Beaverdell	2	Inactive
6	Fisherman Road	1	Inactive
7	Sullivan	5	Inactive
8	Louvicourt	1	Inactive
9	Duck Pond	1	Inactive

UNITED STATES

	Site	# of TSF	Status
10	Red Dog	1	Active
11	Pend Oreille	3	Inactive
12	Douglas	1	Inactive
13	Magmont	1	Inactive

CHILE

	Site	# of TSF	Status
14	Quebrada Blanca	1	Active
15	Carmen de Andacollo	1	Active

AUSTRALIA

	Site	# of TSF	Status
16	Lennard Shelf	1	Inactive

Figure 1. Map of Teck's TSFs

Table 1. Summary of Teck's TSFs

Country	Site	TSF Name(s)	Status	GISTM Consequence Classification
Australia	Lennard Shelf	Lennard Shelf - Tailings	Inactive	Significant
Canada	Beaverdell	Beaverdell - North TSF	Inactive	Significant
		Beaverdell - South TSF	Inactive	Significant
	Duck Pond	Duck Pond Tailings Pond	Inactive	Significant
	Fisherman Road	Fisherman Road - Tailings	Inactive	Significant
	Highland Valley Copper	Bethlehem TSF	Inactive	Very High
		Highland TSF	Active	Extreme
		7 Day	Active	Low
		Highmont TSF	Inactive	Significant
		Trojan TSF	Inactive	Very High
	Louvicourt	Louvicourt - Tailings	Inactive	High
	Pinchi	Pinchi Lake - Tailings	Inactive	Significant
	Pine Point	Pine Point Mines - Tailings	Inactive	Significant
	Sa Dena Hes	Sa Dena Hes - Tailings	Inactive	Significant
	Sullivan	Iron TSF	Inactive	Low
		Old Iron TSF	Inactive	Significant
		Siliceous TSF	Inactive	Significant
		Gypsum TSF	Inactive	Significant
		Calcine TSF	Inactive	Low
Chile	Carmen de Andacollo	Depósito de Relaves CdA	Active	Extreme
	Quebrada Blanca	Depósito de Relaves QB	Active	Extreme
United States	Douglas Mine	Douglas Tailings Dam	Inactive	Low
	Magmont	Magmont Mine Tailings Facility	Inactive	Significant
	Pend Oreille	TDF-1	Inactive	Significant
		TDF-2	Inactive	Low
		TDF-3	Inactive	Significant
	Red Dog	Red Dog TSF	Active	Very High

For further information, please consult Teck's tailings inventory.

TECK'S APPROACH TO TAILINGS MANAGEMENT

At Teck, the safety and security of communities, employees, and the environment is our top priority. To uphold our commitments, we have implemented a multi-tiered Tailings Management System (TMS) that includes:

- Corporate policies, standards, procedures, and guidance

- Site-specific procedures and monitoring programs
- Multiple levels of reviews
- Independent oversight and continuous improvement initiatives

Each TSF is managed in accordance with a TMS which outlines relevant management elements. Additionally, every TSF has an Operations, Maintenance and Surveillance (OMS) manual that defines facility-specific operational requirements. Teck has a team dedicated to managing legacy mine sites, which includes tailings, environmental and social performance professionals.

Further details on Teck's TSF management approach, activities, and practices are available on Teck's website through Teck's Approach to Tailings Management.

Key Roles

Teck's approach to tailings management is supported by a multidisciplinary structure that includes corporate leadership, technical experts, site-based teams, and independent reviewers. Each role contributes to the safe, responsible, and transparent management of TSFs in alignment with the GISTM.

Leadership and Oversight

- **Board of Directors:** Oversees tailings management policies and standards through the Safety, Operations and Projects Committee.
- **Accountable Executives (AEs):** Senior leaders with ultimate accountability for each TSF.
- **General Manager (GM):** Site leader who is accountable for overall safety at their site, including TSFs.

Engineering and Technical Experts

- **Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer (RTFE):** Experienced tailings engineer assigned to each TSF who provides oversight of the construction and operation in accordance with the design. The RTFE is supported by a team of engineers and technicians appropriate to the complexity and status of the TSF needs.
- **Engineer of Record (EOR):** An experienced tailings facility design engineer responsible for the design of each TSF.
- **Central Tailings Team:** A central team of experienced professionals providing company-wide tailings oversight, guidance, and technical support, including leading Teck's Tailings Governance Review (TGR) program.
- **Independent Tailings Review Board (ITRB):** A panel of global experts who provide independent advice to Teck's tailings teams. An ITRB is in place for each Teck TSF, who meet annually (at minimum).

Site and Enterprise Support Teams

- **Multidisciplinary Site Teams:** Include environmental, health and safety, and emergency response personnel who support monitoring, risk management, and emergency preparedness at the site level.
- **Social Performance Team:** Personnel who work with tailings engineers and multidisciplinary site teams to coordinate engagement with communities and Indigenous Peoples, identify social risks, and integrate socio-economic and human rights considerations into planning. The team also supports grievance management, transparent communication, and maintains site-level records to support GISTM assurance and disclosure.

Collaboration and Continuous Improvement

- **Tailings Working Group (TWG):** Leading tailings engineers across Teck who collaborate to share learnings and lead continual improvement and consistency efforts.
- **Tailings Community of Practice (CoP):** A company-wide, multidisciplinary forum dedicated to knowledge sharing, learning, innovation, and continuous improvement in tailings management. The Tailings CoP comprises professionals in tailings engineering, social performance, environmental management, risk management, and other key disciplines.

These key roles in tailings management are illustrated in Figure 2. For further information on key roles involved in the implementation of tailings management, consult Teck's Approach to Tailings Management.



Figure 2. Illustration of Teck's Governance Structure Related to Tailings Management

Risk Management

Teck has a comprehensive and robust risk management framework designed to identify, assess, and mitigate risks associated with TSFs. Teck's approach focuses on understanding and mitigating potential failure modes, even highly unlikely ones, to reduce risks.

Potential failure modes are identified through detailed technical evaluations conducted by expert teams, including Teck's RTFEs, EORs, and multidisciplinary specialists. These teams analyze various factors such as the materials used in the structure, the foundation conditions, climatic and seismic conditions, climate change, construction and foundation materials properties, construction quality, structural configuration, drainage systems, and surface water control measures. It is important to note that the presence of failure modes does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may have failure modes and be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Once potential failure modes are identified, risk assessments are conducted with input from the RTFE, EOR and multidisciplinary team members. The assessment evaluates the likelihood of occurrence, potential consequences (further discussed below), and actions to control each failure mode. Appropriate

Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) are involved in evaluating potential impacts to people, including risks to health and safety, livelihoods, and cultural values. Where relevant, outcomes of risk assessments inform site-level engagement and emergency preparedness activities with Project Affected People (PAP).

Where necessary, measures that further reduce the likelihood and/or consequences are documented in risk treatment plans. This could include measures such as additional instrumentation or monitoring, construction or design modifications, or additional studies to improve understanding. All risk treatment plans are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams.

Teck is committed to continuous improvement in TSF risk management, following the as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) process, in accordance with the GISTM. This means we continuously seek opportunities to reduce risk wherever practicable, even when the risks are already low.

Teck procedures require that changes that could impact the risk profile of a TSF, such as modifications to design, operations, or environmental conditions, must undergo review by the EOR, RTFE and central tailings team. These changes are documented, assessed for risk impacts, reviewed and approved at an appropriate level, and implemented only after formal approval.

Determining Impacts and Consequences

Teck uses a range of assessments to understand the potential consequences of credible failure modes. These look at possible impacts on people's safety, communities, the environment, and economic impacts. Assessments may include potential breach scenarios, community impact analysis, human exposure and vulnerability assessments, and environmental impact evaluations. These evaluations focus only on what could happen, not how likely a failure or an impact is, and help guide risk assessments and risk mitigation planning.

GISTM defines a consequence classification system that groups TSFs based on possible factors such as the number of people who could be affected, potential for loss of life, environmental damage, impacts on culture, and effects on infrastructure and the economy. Teck uses the results of failure mode analysis and these impact assessments to help determine the appropriate consequence classification for each TSF.

It is important to distinguish consequence classification from risk. While risk considers both likelihood and consequences, consequence classification only considers potential outcomes in the event of failure. A TSF with a higher consequence classification does not necessarily have a higher risk – the level of risk depends on how effectively risks are managed. A TSF with a higher consequence classification can be operated safely if risks are controlled and maintained at low levels.

Design and Performance Reviews

Teck applies several layers of oversight and independent review to maintain safe and responsible tailings management. These include:

- Regular inspections conducted by qualified Teck personnel
- Annual facility performance reports (AFPRs) completed by the EOR to assess the TSF performance
- Internal technical reviews conducted by Teck SMEs
- Dam safety reviews (DSRs) by external third-party experts every three to ten years, depending on the TSF consequence classification
- ITRBs, which are composed of senior external independent experts who meet at minimum annually to review TSF performance, design, operation, surveillance, maintenance, and management

- TGRs, which are completed every two to three years by senior Teck tailings personnel to assess conformance with internal standards, share learnings across sites, and promote continuous improvement opportunities
- Annual tailings management review meetings, where all key personnel – including the RTFE, AE, EOR, site personnel, GM, and the central tailings team – review the TSF performance and risk management over the prior year as well as plans and priorities for the following year

Teck's review processes provide multiple layers of oversight, incorporating perspectives from internal, external, third-party, and independent experts across both technical and non-technical disciplines. Findings from these reviews are prioritized and tracked to completion, shaping Teck's ongoing work plans to address key actions and further strengthen tailings safety and management.

Environmental Management and Monitoring

Environmental risks, such as air quality, water management, and climate change considerations, are incorporated into the TSF risk assessment and environmental consequence evaluation process for each TSF. These environmental consequences are assessed for each potential failure mode and contribute to the facility's consequence classification.

A multidisciplinary team, including environmental performance SMEs, supports the development of TSF risk assessments, risk treatment plans, environmental protection strategies, and climate change adaptation and mitigation planning. Environmental considerations are reviewed through Teck's TSF review and assurance programs, including ITRBs, internal governance reviews, and third-party assurance activities.

Each Teck site implements an ongoing environmental monitoring program to assess site conditions, including those relevant to the TSFs. These programs support adaptative management by identifying potential environmental impacts and informing appropriate mitigation measures when necessary. These monitoring programs include aspects such as air quality, biodiversity and closure, climate change, and water stewardship.

Environmental monitoring is integrated into TSF OMS programs. Environmental personnel working at TSFs receive training on OMS requirements to align their activities with facility-specific protocols.

For additional information on Teck's approach to environmental management, visit our website.

Social Management and Monitoring

Teck's approach to tailings management includes engaging with local and Indigenous communities and other COI to identify and address potential social impacts. Social performance risks are included in the risk assessment process for each TSF, and potential impacts on people, such as health and safety, access to land, livelihoods, and cultural values, are considered for each potential failure mode.

A multidisciplinary team, including social performance SMEs, contributes to the development of risk assessments, risk treatment plans, and emergency preparedness measures. These considerations are also reviewed through Teck's internal governance processes and external assurance activities related to TSF management.

Teck engages with COI throughout the lifecycle of each TSF through regular meetings, surveys, and structured feedback mechanisms, including options for anonymous submissions. These engagement

processes help communities stay informed, raise concerns, and provide input into decisions that may affect them. Feedback is documented and tracked to support accountability and transparency.

Recognizing the significance of Indigenous engagement, Teck collaborates closely with Indigenous governments, organizations, and rights holders to seek Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) where new activities may affect their rights, lands, or interests. Teck does this, as appropriate, by engaging transparently, respecting Indigenous rights, incorporating Indigenous knowledge, and creating opportunities for meaningful participation in decisions and activities affecting Indigenous Peoples' lands and interests.

The Community Response Mechanism (CRM) provides a formal, accessible, and culturally appropriate way for COI to submit feedback or concerns. The CRM aligns with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP) and is regularly evaluated so it remains effective and responsive.

In addition, Teck's confidential whistleblower platform is available for reporting concerns related to ethics or conduct. Teck is committed to fairly and impartially investigating reports made in good faith and strictly prohibits any form of retaliation in relation to such reports. More information is available at www.teck.com/speakup.

Through the integration of social performance governance, feedback mechanisms, and inclusive engagement strategies, Teck seeks to uphold its commitment to human rights, responsible mining, and meaningful engagement with COI, in alignment with the GISTM.

For additional information about Teck's Social Performance approach, visit our website.

Safe Closure

Teck has a comprehensive risk management program in place such that risks at TSFs are understood and managed at all current and future phases of the TSF lifecycle. Assessments, reviews and approvals of facilities nearing a 'safe closure' status are an ongoing process and are underway. Should Teck designate any facilities in 'safe closure', this will be disclosed in future communications; at this time, Teck is applying the GISTM requirements in full to all facilities.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

Each Teck TSF has an Emergency, Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) integrated with the site Mine Emergency Response Plan (MERP) to support a coordinated approach to tailings-related emergencies. The EPRP provides preparedness and response information to aid site teams in responding to an emerging TSF incident. The MERP outlines broader site-level emergency and crisis response actions, prioritizing life safety, humanitarian aid, and environmental protection. The plans are reviewed and tested annually to assess their effectiveness, resource adequacy, personnel training, and collaboration with external emergency response agencies and COI.

Teck's EPRPs are regularly reviewed and continuously improved through collaboration with external organizations, including local and regional government agencies, COI, and representatives of populations at risk, in alignment with the Mining Association of Canada (MAC) Tailings Management Protocol. Each EPRP defines required resources, surveillance requirements, training requirements, communication protocols, and testing schedules. The EPRPs are based on credible TSF failure scenarios and outline response actions to reduce associated downstream impacts. At all sites, emergency measures would be

taken to protect human life and minimize consequences in the highly unlikely event of an imminent TSF flow failure.

Teck's engagement framework outlines how public sector agencies and other organizations participate in emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. Each MERP identifies key response organizations, their roles, and communication protocols for coordinating actions during an emergency. Regular MERP tests involve representatives from emergency response agencies and COI to strengthen collaboration and readiness.

FINANCIAL CAPACITY

Teck confirms that it has adequate financial capacity to cover currently estimated costs of planned closure, early closure, reclamation, and post-closure of all Teck TSFs and appurtenant structures. These costs are disclosed annually in aggregate form in our annual financial statements contained within our Annual Report. These cost estimates are based on the tailings facility closure designs described in TSF-specific disclosures (see appended materials). Further, Teck maintains insurance for our TSFs to the extent commercially available.

CONFORMANCE TO THE GLOBAL INDUSTRY STANDARD ON TAILINGS MANAGEMENT

Teck follows the ICMM Conformance Protocols: Global Industry Standard for Tailings Management in assessing conformance with the GISTM. Conformance is determined based on whether systems or practices are in place to achieve the intended outcomes of the standard while managing risk to TSF safety. Levels of conformance (modified from the ICMM Conformance Protocols) are outlined in Table 2 below.

As of August 5, 2025, all Teck inactive TSFs classified as having "High," "Significant," or "Low" (Table 1) potential consequence classifications under the GISTM are in conformance with the ICMM's Conformance Protocols: Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management. Conformance is defined in Table 2 below. Teck have obtained limited assurance on Teck conformance for these facilities; please refer to PricewaterhouseCoopersLLP limited assurance report in Appendix T.

As of December 31, 2025, Teck's active TSFs at the Highland Valley Copper, Red Dog, and Carmen de Andacollo sites are also in conformance. The Quebrada Blanca TSF partially meets GISTM requirements, with remaining gaps primarily related to documentation updates and additional community engagement. Work to meet all remaining requirements is ongoing and includes updating selected documentation to reflect the initial construction phase, design modifications, and an updated assessment of potential failure modes. This work is expected to continue through 2026. Appropriate tailings management and governance systems are in place, with established independent reviews and ongoing community engagement.

Table 2. Levels of Conformance (modified from ICMM Conformance Protocols)

Level of Conformance	Description
Meets	Systems and/or practices related to the Requirement have been implemented, and there is sufficient evidence that the Requirement is being met. Note: Where an Operator is required to undertake engineering work or other measures to conform to some requirements, it is not necessary for such measures to be complete by the implementation deadlines for an Operator to be in conformance, but both the measures and associated timelines should be clearly documented and approved by an AE. This status can also apply to Requirements where a documented, scheduled and resourced process is in place to achieve the Requirement (e.g. engagement plans).
Partially Meets	Systems and/or practices related to meeting the Requirement have been only partially implemented. Gaps or weaknesses persist that may contribute to an inability to meet the Requirement, or insufficient verifiable evidence has been provided to demonstrate that the activity is aligned with the Requirement
Does Not Meet	Systems and/or practices required to support implementation of the Requirement are not in place, are not being implemented or cannot be evidenced.
Not Applicable	The specific Requirement is not applicable to the TSF

APPENDIX A – ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

List of Acronyms

AE	Accountable Executive
AFPR	Annual Facility Performance Report
ALARP	As Low as Reasonably Practicable
BAPT	Best Available Practices and Technologies
COI	Communities of Interest
CoP	Community of Practice
CRM	Community Response Mechanism
DSR	Dam Safety Review
EOR	Engineer of Record
EPRP	Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan
FPIC	Free, prior and informed consent
GISTM	Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management
GM	General Manager
HR	Human Rights
ICMM	International Council of Mining and Metals
ITRB	Independent Tailings Review Board
MAC	Mining Association of Canada
MERP	Mine Emergency Response Plan
OMS	Operations, Maintenance and Surveillance
PAP	Project-Affected People
PMF	Probable Maximum Flood
PRI	Principles for Responsible Investment
RTFE	Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer
SME	Subject Matter Expert
TGR	Tailings Governance Review
TMS	Tailings Management System
TSF	Tailings Storage Facility
TWG	Tailings Working Group
UNDRIP	United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNGP	United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

List of Definitions (Teck's definitions, unless otherwise stated)

Communities of Interest (COI)	Individuals or groups that may be affected by or have the ability to influence Teck. COI may include, but are not restricted to, Indigenous Peoples, community members, under-represented groups, personnel, contractors, suppliers, local environmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local governments and institutions. Other COI may include regional or national environmental organizations and NGOs, governments, and shareholders. Excluded from this definition of COI is/are Teck investors and customer.
Community Response Mechanism (CRM)	A formal process through which COI can provide feedback, request information, raise questions, concerns, or complaints, have their concerns responded to and seek to achieve effective remedy in a prompt, fair and respectful manner.
Credible Failure Modes/Scenarios	Refers to technically feasible failure mechanisms given the materials present in the structure and its foundation, the properties of these materials, the configuration of the structure, drainage conditions and surface water control at the facility, throughout its lifecycle. Credible failure modes can and do typically vary during the lifecycle of the facility as the conditions vary. A facility that is appropriately designed and operated considers all of these credible failure modes and includes sufficient resilience against each. Different failure modes will result in different failure scenarios. Credible catastrophic failure modes do not exist for all tailings facilities. The term 'credible failure mode' is not associated with a probability of this event occurring and having credible failure modes is not a reflection of facility safety. (GISTM)
Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP)	A detailed, site-specific plan developed to identify hazards of the tailing's facility, assess internal and external capacity to respond, maintain a state of readiness and respond if an event occurs.
Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC)	A mechanism that safeguards the individual and collective rights of indigenous and tribal peoples, including their land and resource rights and their right to self-determination. The minimum conditions that are required to secure consent include that it is 'free' from all forms of coercion, undue influence or pressure, provided 'prior' to a decision or action being taken that affects individual and collective human rights, and offered on the basis that affected peoples are 'informed' of their rights and the impacts of decisions or actions on those rights. FPIC is considered to be an ongoing process of negotiation, subject to an initial consent. To obtain FPIC, 'consent' must be secured through an agreed process of good faith consultation and cooperation with indigenous and tribal peoples through their own representative institutions. The process should be grounded in a recognition that the indigenous or tribal peoples are customary landowners. FPIC is not only a question of process, but also of outcome, and is obtained when terms are fully respectful of land, resource and other implicated rights. (GISTM)
Human Rights (HR)	Human Rights refer to universal rights of all human beings, regardless of legal jurisdiction or other localizing factors, including ethnicity, nationality, sex, indigenous identity, and other statuses.

Material	“Important enough to merit attention or have an effective influence or bearing on the determination in question. For the Standard, the criteria for what is material will be defined by Operator…” (GISTM). Herein, ‘material’ refers to the two highest levels of consequence on the Teck risk matrix.
Project-Affected People (PAP)	People who may experience impacts from a tailings facility. People affected by a tailings facility may include, for example, people who live nearby; people who hear, smell or see the facility; or people who might own, reside on or use the land on which the facility is to be located or may potentially inundate. (GISTM)
Risk	The effect of uncertainty on objectives. An effect is a deviation from the expected. It can be positive, negative or both, and can address, create, or result in opportunities or threats. Risk is usually expressed in terms of risk sources, potential events, their consequences, and their likelihood.
Slurry Tailings	A mixture of tailings and rock that behaves like a liquid during transportation.
Tailings	A by-product of mining, consisting of the processed rock or soil remaining from the separation of the commodities of value from the rock or soil in which they occur. (Teck Tailings Policy)
Tailings Storage Facility (TSF)	A facility that is designed and managed to contain the tailings produced by a mine, excluding tailings placed in an underground mine. (Teck Tailings Policy)
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)	The UNDRIP is the most comprehensive international instrument on the rights of Indigenous Peoples. It establishes a universal framework of minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the Indigenous Peoples of the world and it elaborates on existing human rights standards and fundamental freedoms as they apply to the specific situation of Indigenous Peoples. (United Nations)
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP)	The UNGPs are a global framework established by the United Nations in 2011 to prevent and address human rights impacts linked to business activities. These consist of 31 principles, which outline the state's duty to protect human rights, businesses' responsibility to respect human rights, and the need to ensure victims have access to remedy.

APPENDIX B – LENNARD SHELF TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Lennard Shelf (LEN) TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Lennard Shelf property is the site of a former lead-zinc mine that operated periodically from 1997 to 2008; decommissioning and closure of the site was completed in 2010. The property is located 25 km southeast of Fitzroy Crossing within the West Kimberley region of Western Australia, as shown in Figure 1. The site is owned by Lennard Shelf Pty Ltd, a joint venture between Teck and Glencore plc. Teck is the operator for the site.

The site is located in a climatic region that may be characterized as sub-tropical savannah. The average annual rainfall is in the order of 525 mm, with most of this falling in the wet season (December to March). There is significant annual precipitation variability, with annual values in excess of 1100 mm on record. The site is situated in a zone of low seismicity.

TSF Description

The LEN TSF was constructed via central thickened tailings discharge, where tailings slurry is thickened and deposited centrally to form a low conical hill within a ring-shaped perimeter embankment. Permanent closure and decommissioning activities were completed in 2010. Activities included covering exposed tailings with a vegetated soil cover. This cover was constructed to limit the release of contaminants to the air, water, and land. Surface contouring and revegetation have been completed for protection against erosion. The rehabilitated TSF has no external catchment contributing run-off onto the TSF surface area. Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the LEN TSF.

A description of the current state of the LEN TSF is provided in Table 1; structures comprising the LEN TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown in Figure 2. A photo of the TSF is provided below in Figure 3.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, the LEN TSF is classified as a "Significant" consequence facility. Regardless of classification, this facility meets “Extreme” earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.



Figure 1. Lennard Shelf mine location

Table 1. Description of Lennard Shelf TSF

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	Australia
GISTM consequence classification	Significant
Deposition method	Central Thickened Discharge
Status	Inactive
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	1 (Lennard Shelf Tailings Embankment)
Type of Construction	Single-stage construction
Design storm event	1 in 10,000-year event
Design earthquake	1 in 10,000-year event
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	12
Crest length (m)	4,800
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	4:1 to 5:1
Most recent AFPR	2025
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2025 (2026)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Lennard Shelf TSF

Structure	Purpose
Rehabilitated Tailings Embankment	Tailings retaining structure
Tailings Cover	Self-sustaining native plants cover across the surface, resistant to erosion and promotes drainage toward inner perimeter drains.
Inner Perimeter Drains	Convey clean water runoff across rehabilitated tailings cover toward spillways.
Spillways	Convey clean water flow from inner perimeter drains to the environment.

Figure 2. LEN TSF

Figure 3. Aerial View of LEN TSF

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the LEN TSF was conducted in 2024. Risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At LEN, the most recent risk assessment did not identify credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the LEN TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

The LEN TSF does not have any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The LEN TSF does not have a credible flow failure scenario, even under extreme loading conditions.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The LEN TSF has no credible flow failure modes. Regardless, this TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the LEN TSF, the most recent DSR was completed in 2025. The timing of the next DSR will be determined by Teck taking into consideration regulatory, internal and GISTM requirements.

APPENDIX C – BEAVERDELL TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITIES

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Beaverdell TSFs. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facilities Description

Site Overview

The Beaverdell Mine, previously known as the Highland Bell mine, is a former underground mine located adjacent to the unincorporated community of Beaverdell, 70 km southeast of Kelowna, British Columbia, as shown in Figure 1. The mine ceased operations in 1991.

Beaverdell is situated in the southeastern corner of British Columbia's Interior Plateau. Its physiography is characteristic of the region, with tributaries originating in broad, shallow upland valleys and descending through steep canyons to flat valley floors that drain into the West Kettle River. Beaverdell experiences a continental climate, with cold winters and warm, dry summers. The site is situated in a zone of low seismicity.

Description of TSFs

Tailings associated with historic on-site extraction of silver and other saleable metals at the Beaverdell Mine are stored in two TSFs – the South TSF (Cells 1 to 5) and the North TSF (Cells 6 and 7). Precipitation is routed through the South TSF via a spillway at Cell 3, while a spillway at Cell 7 routes precipitation through the North TSF. Soil application and planting has been completed on the North and South TSFs.

A description of the current state of the inactive Beaverdell TSFs is provided in Table 1. Structures comprising the Beaverdell TSFs are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown in Figure 2. Photos of the TSF are also provided below in Figures 3 and 4.

Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the Beaverdell TSFs.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, the Beaverdell TSFs are classified as "Significant" consequence facilities. The North TSF meets "Extreme" earthquake and storm event criteria as defined by GISTM.



Figure 1. Beaverdell Mine location

Table 1. Description of Beaverdell TSFs

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	Canada
GISTM consequence classification	North TSF: Significant South TSF: Significant
Deposition method	Slurry
Status	Inactive
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	2 (North TSF – Cells 6 & 7 and South TSF – Cells 1 to 5)
Type of Construction	Earthfill using downstream construction method
Design storm event	1/3 between the 1 in 1000-year event and the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) (North and South TSFs; North TSF confirmed stable for 1 in 10,000-year event)
Design earthquake	1 in 2475-year event (North and South TSFs; North TSF confirmed stable for 1 in 10,000-year event)
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	North TSF – 12 South TSF – 10
Crest length (m)	North TSF – 840 South TSF – 1,010
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	North TSF – 1.4:1 to 2.6:1 South TSF – 1.2:1 to 4:1
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2024 (2025)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Beaverdell TSFs

Structure	Purpose
South TSF (Cells 1 – 5)	Tailings retaining structures
North TSF (Cells 6 – 7)	Tailings retaining structures
Cell 3 Spillway	Directs runoff (precipitation and snow melt) from the South TSF to the river if the spillway is activated during the design storm. Smaller precipitation events are contained within the South TSF.
Cell 7 Spillway	Directs runoff (precipitation and snow melt) from the North TSF to the environment; the North TSF can contain the PMF before the Cell 7 Spillway is activated.



Figure 2. Beaverdell Mine Tailings Storage Facilities

Figure 3. Cell 7 - looking north towards Cell 6

Figure 4. West Kettle River and erosion protection adjacent to Cell 5 looking southwest

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the Beaverdell TSFs was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the Beaverdell TSFs, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At Beaverdell, the most recent risk assessment identified two credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

Failure Mode	What could happen?	What are we doing to control the risk?
Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment.	River flood water level exceeds elevation of the South TSF Cell 3 Embankment and flood waters enter Cell 3. Flood waters and eroded tailings may be discharged via the Cell 3 Spillway to the river.	• Emergency stockpile of riprap is available on site; equipment would be staged nearby if flooding is forecast. • Monitoring, including regular monitoring during freshet to detect potential significant flooding or precipitation events. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly.
Instability – damage to the embankment due to loss of toe support	Damage to the South TSF embankments caused by external erosion from a large flood event in the river could lead to tailings discharge into the environment.	• Revetment at South TSF can sustain an extreme flood even in the river. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Scheduled care and maintenance of embankments. • River flood monitoring protocol in place.

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the Beaverdell TSFs, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental impact to the area downstream of the TSFs. As discussed above, despite these risks being unlikely to occur, Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Beaverdell TSFs do not have a credible flow failure scenario.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

All findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR related to material risks have been addressed.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at the BEA TSFs resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The TSFs at Beaverdell have an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the Beaverdell TSFs, the most recent independent DSR was completed in 2021. The next DSR is scheduled to occur in 2026.

APPENDIX D – DUCK POND MINE TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Duck Pond TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Duck Pond property is the site of a former copper and zinc mine that operated from 2007 to 2015. It is located approximately 30 km south of Millertown in central Newfoundland, as shown in Figure 1. During operations, ore was extracted mostly from the underground mine, with small open pits developed in the last years of operation.

The terrain around Duck Pond is characterized by a system of tributaries flow to the Exploits River with forested hillsides, low slopes and a chain of lakes. The valley base is very broad and both upland and lowland areas are typically marshy with alluvial foundations. The site experiences mild continental seasonal weather patterns with periodically heavy snowfalls, rain and high winds. The site is in a zone of low seismicity.

TSF Description

Duck Pond's inactive TSF includes two components: the Tailings Management Area (TMA) and the Polishing Pond. A water cover is maintained on this facility.

A description of the current state of the Duck Pond TSF is provided in Table 1. Structures comprising the Duck Pond TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. Figure 3 shows a photo of the TSF.

Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the Duck Pond TSF. Closure and reclamation work at Duck Pond began in 2015 when operations ceased.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, the Duck Pond TSF is classified as a "Significant". Regardless of classification, this facility meets "Extreme" earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.



Figure 1. Duck Pond Location

Table 1. Description of the Duck Pond TSF

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	Canada
GISTM consequence classification	Significant
Deposition method	Slurry via subaqueous deposition
Status	Inactive
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	2 (Dam A, Dam B)
Type of Construction	Earth-fill embankments
Design storm event	1 in 10,000-year event
Design earthquake	1 in 1,000-year event (confirmed stable for 10,000-year event)
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	Dam A – 9.5 Dam B – 6.5
Crest length (m)	Dam A – 850 Dam B – 580
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	2:1
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2025 (2026)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Duck Pond TSF

Structure	Purpose
Dam A	Tailings retaining structure
Dam B	Tailings retaining structure
Polishing Pond (Dam C)	Polishing Pond (to support management of water quality during active care closure and will be removed for passive care when treatment in the TMA ends)
TMA Emergency Spillway at Dam B	Designed to protect Dam B from overtopping during extreme flood events.



Figure 2. Duck Pond Mine TSF

Figure 3. Aerial View of Duck Pond TSF Facing East

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the Duck Pond TSF was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the Duck Pond TSF, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck’s risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At Duck Pond, the most recent risk assessment identified three credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck’s criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

Failure Mode	What could happen?	What are we doing to control the risk?
Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment.	Water level exceeds crest elevation of the embankment from blockage of spillway, or crest settlement due to liquefaction of embankment or foundation materials causing release to the drainage areas downstream of the facility.	• Engineered structures (e.g., spillways) to convey water during extreme floods. • Maintain operating water levels to provide adequate storage through flood events. • Water level monitoring. • Routine and event-driven inspections. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structure.
Internal Erosion – transport of embankment material through the foundation.	Seepage erosion process that transports soil particles from embankment from either frost penetration into core, presence of water above abutment, or sufficient gradient (together with unstable filter and differential settlement).	• Structures engineered to resist internal erosion. • Established operating water levels and action plans. • Instrumentation to assess performance of embankments. • Routine and event-driven inspections. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structure.
Instability – Damage to the embankment caused by extreme static or earthquake loading.	Damage or slumping of embankment caused by extreme static or earthquake loading.	• Embankments designed and constructed to resist seismic events within regulatory guidelines. • Foundation investigations completed to characterize materials and assign appropriate strengths for design. • Routine and event-driven inspections. • Scheduled care and maintenance of embankment.

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the Duck Pond TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed

by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental, public health and safety, private property and infrastructure impacts upstream of Millertown, Newfoundland as well as recreational land users in affected tributaries of the Exploits River. As discussed above, despite these risks being unlikely to occur, Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Duck Pond TSF has three credible failure modes that, although unlikely to occur, could result in a flow failure scenario; these are described above in the section entitled 'Discussion of Material Risks'. An inundation study has been completed to identify the potentially impacted area. Based on this study, Teck has assessed the potential for human exposure (potential for a person to be located in the inundation area) and vulnerability (existing physical, social, economic and environmental conditions that make people and the environment more susceptible to the impacts) to understand the severity of the potential impacts of a flow failure scenario.

The area of influence for a flow failure scenario at the Duck Pond TSF includes the drainage areas and creeks leading to the Exploits River, downstream of Dams A and B, and the polishing pond. The potential impacts to people, communities and the environment may include impacts to water supply, public health and safety, community infrastructure including access roads and Harpoon Brook Bridge and Indigenous territory. Potential impacts to Indigenous rights include interference with traditional, cultural and economic practices, including perceived and real impacts to subsistence foods including fish and species that may consume or encounter affected water or exposed tailings.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

All findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR related to material risks have either been addressed or are being addressed as part of the 2025 site activities – see prior discussion on Material Risks for further information.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The Duck Pond TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the Duck Pond TSF, the most recent independent DSR was in 2016. The next DSR is occurring in 2026.

APPENDIX E – FISHERMAN ROAD TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Fisherman Road TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Fisherman Road TSF is the site of historic tailings deposition and storage associated with the former Kenville Mine, which operated from 1890 to 1956.

The site is located in Blewett, approximately 7 km west of Nelson, British Columbia and is situated along the south side of the Kootenay River, within a broad east-west oriented valley that was deepened by glacial activity. Water levels in the Kootenay River are controlled by the Corra Linn hydroelectric dam located approximately 6 km downstream. Along the south side of the river, the sediments which form the foundation of the TSF consist of post-glacial overbank, fluvial, lacustrine and glacial till deposits underlain by bedrock.

Fisherman Road is west of the Rocky Mountain Tench and its climate is characterized as part of the mountain climate regime. The area has a humid continental climate with four distinct seasons. Winters are cold while summers are warm and drier. The site is in a zone of low seismicity.

TSF Description

The Fisherman Road TSF stores tailings on the upslope (south) side of Fisherman Road embankment, a public access road. Tailings are also present in Main Bay and trace amounts of tailings have been found in some of the surrounding areas. Tailings were placed in these locations by historical mining operations.

The downstream slope of the Fisherman Road embankment is approximately 1 m high along most of its length, except for an approximate 100 m long section along the east boundary where the berm is 3 m high to separate the TSF from Main Bay. The surface of the TSF is currently covered primarily by trees and vegetation.

A corrugated steel pipe culvert, referred to as the TSF Outlet, through the Fisherman Road berm at the southeast corner discharges surface water flow from the TSF into Main Bay. The Fisherman Road public road and the TSF Outlet are owned and operated by Ministry of Transportation and Transit of British Columbia.

A description of the current state of the Fisherman Road TSF is provided in Table 1. Structures comprising the Fisherman Road TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. A photo of the TSF is provided below in Figure 3.

Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the Fisherman Road TSF. Since 2012, Teck has completed studies to assess potential long-term options to further improve the site for the public and the environment. In 2025, Teck will undertake a review of past studies as well as engage with the community and road owner to inform planning for the long-term strategy for the Fisherman Road site.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, the Fisherman Road TSF is classified as a "Significant" consequence facility.



Figure 1. Fisherman Road Location

Table 1. Description of Fisherman Road TSF

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	Canada
GISTM consequence classification	Significant
Deposition method	Spigot
Status	Inactive
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	1 (Fisherman Road Embankment)
Type of Construction	Earth fill embankment, single stage construction
Design storm event	1 in 50-year event (interpreted existing condition)
Design earthquake (road embankment)	1 in 1,000-year event (interpreted existing condition)
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	3
Crest length (m)	350
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	1:1
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2024 (2025)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Fisherman Road TSF

Structure	Purpose
Fisherman Road Embankment	To retain tailings



Figure 2. Plan View of Fisherman Road TSF

Figure 3. Photograph of Fisherman Road TSF

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the Fisherman Road TSF was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the Fisherman Road TSF, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At Fisherman Road, the most recent risk assessment identified one credible failure scenario that met the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria. This risk, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, is summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

Failure Mode	What could happen?	What are we doing to control the risk?
Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment.	A large precipitation event and blockage of TSF outlet causing water level to exceed the top of the embankment and damage it. This could lead to flooding of public road infrastructure atop the embankment and environmental damage to fish habitat from tailings release.	• Options for further risk reduction are under consideration as part of planned 2025 works. • An engineered structure (TSF outlet) exists to discharge excess surface water. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall, earthquake) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Monitoring, including remote camera surveillance, on-site weather station, and automatic rainfall alert to detect potential overtopping. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures.

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the Fisherman Road TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental impact caused by tailings mobilization into the Kootenay River; and health and safety impact to road users attempting to cross the road during flood event. As discussed above, despite these risks being unlikely to occur, Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Fisherman Road TSF has one credible failure mode that, although unlikely to occur, would result in a flow failure scenario; this is described above in the section entitled 'Discussion of Material Risks'. An inundation study has been completed to identify the potentially impacted area. Based on this study, Teck has assessed the potential for human exposure (potential for a person to be located in the inundation area) and vulnerability (existing physical, social, economic and environmental conditions that make people and the environment more susceptible to the impacts) to understand the severity of the potential impacts of a flow failure scenario.

The area of influence for a flow failure scenario at the Fisherman Road TSF includes the Fisherman Road, Main Bay area on the east of the TSF, and the Kootenay River downstream of the TSF. The potential effects to people and the environment in the unlikely scenario of a flow failure mode at the Fisherman Road TSF may include impacts to local public health and safety, community infrastructure, and Indigenous territory. Potential impacts to Indigenous rights include interference with traditional, cultural and economic practices, including perceived and real impacts to subsistence foods including fish and species that may consume or encounter affected water or exposed tailings.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

All findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR related to material risks have either been addressed or are being addressed as part of the 2025 site activities – see prior discussion on Material Risks for further information.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The TSF at Fisherman Road has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements. The 2024 EPRP test has been rescheduled due to availability of local emergency management staff.

Independent Reviews

At the Fisherman Road TSF, the most recent independent DSR was in 2024. The next DSR is scheduled to occur in 2029.

APPENDIX F – HIGHMONT TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Highmont TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Highland Valley Copper (HVC) Operations property is an open pit copper and molybdenum mine formed by the amalgamation of three historic mining operations: Bethlehem Copper, Lornex and Highmont. The property is located approximately 17 km west of Logan Lake and about 50 km southwest of Kamloops in British Columbia (BC), Canada, as shown in Figure 1.

The HVC site lies within the Highland Valley which is broad, glaciated and U-shaped, bounded on the west by the Thompson River and on the east by the Guichon Creek Valley. The region is characterized as having hummocky terrain with gentle to moderate slopes, with the Highmont TSF located on the eastern side within the watershed of the Witches Brook which is a tributary of the Guichon Creek. The site lies in the rain shadow of the Coast and Cascade mountains of the Southern Interior of BC, with a climate that is one of the warmest and driest in the province in the summer, and is dry while cold in the winter. Storms are typically convective (i.e., severe thunderstorms with heavy rainfall and strong winds). The site is located in an area of moderate seismicity.

Figure 1. Highland Valley Copper Operations site location

TSF Description

The Highmont TSF was constructed and operated between 1980 and 1984 and is an inactive facility. A description of the current state of the Highmont TSF is provided in Table 1 and structures comprising the Highmont TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2.

Between 2003 and 2012 the majority of the TSF was reclaimed by installing a closure spillway, flattening the downstream slopes of the dams, and revegetating the tailings beach and dams. These were completed in alignment with the HVC site's end land use plan which at the time included creation of areas to support agricultural grazing and the development of wildlife habitat. Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the Highmont TSF.

Consequence Classification

Based on GISTM consequence classification system, the Highmont TSF is classified as a "Significant" consequence facility. Regardless of classification, this facility meets "Extreme" earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.

Table 1. Description of Highmont TSF

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	Canada
GISTM consequence classification	Significant
Deposition method	Slurry
Status	Inactive
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	3 (North Dam, East Dam, South Dam)
Type of construction	Centerline
Design storm event	One-third between 1 in 1,000-year event and the Probable Maximum Flood (confirmed stable for Probable Maximum Flood event)
Design earthquake	1 in 2,475-year event (confirmed stable for 1 in 10,000-year event)
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	North Dam – 35 East Dam – 30 South Dam – 30
Crest length (m)	North Dam –1,200 East Dam – 1,200 South Dam – 1,300
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	North Dam – 2.5:1 East Dam – 2.3:1 South Dam – 2.3:1
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2025 (2025)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Highmont TSF

Structure	Purpose
North Dam	Cross-valley dam that retains tailings on the north boundary of the TSF
East Dam	A dam that retains tailings on the east boundary of the TSF, abutting natural ground to the north and the South Dam to the south
South Dam	A dam that retains tailings on the south boundary of the TSF, abutting natural ground to the west and the East Dam to the east
S1 Pond Dam	Collects surface runoff and seepage from the east side of the North Dam, and pumped flows from the S2 Pond and S8 Pond
S2 Pond Dam	Collects surface runoff and seepage from the west side of the North Dam
S3 Pond Dam	Collects surface runoff and seepage from the east side of the South Dam
S5 Pond Dam	Collects surface runoff and seepage from the East Dam
S8 Pond Dam	Collects surface runoff and seepage from the middle of the North Dam, and pumped flows from the S2 Pond



Figure 2. Highmont TSF

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the Highmont TSF was conducted in 2025. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At Highmont TSF, the most recent risk assessment did not identify any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the Highmont TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

The Highmont TSF does not have any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Highmont TSF does not have a credible flow failure scenario.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPRs) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSRs)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR reports.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The Highmont TSF has no credible flow failure modes. Regardless, this TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the Highmont TSF, the most recent independent DSR was in 2023. The next DSR is occurring in 2028.

APPENDIX G – LOUVICOURT TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Louvicourt (LOU) TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The LOU mine is a former underground zinc, copper, gold and silver mine located approximately 20 km east of Val-d'Or, Quebec, as shown in Figure 1. The mine operated from 1994 to 2005. Environmental rehabilitation was conducted in 2007.

Approximately 45% of the tailings produced from the mine were pumped to the LOU TSF, located approximately 9 km northwest of the mine (Figure 1). The tailings were deposited under a water cover in the tailings pond for long-term storage to prevent oxidation and acid generation. The remainder of the tailings produced from the mine were used as paste backfill for the underground mine.

The site is located in Québec's Abitibi-Témiscamingue region, close to the border with Ontario. The region has an overall cold continental climate. Winter typically lasts from November to April. Summer is the wettest season. On an average annual basis, precipitation typically exceeds evaporation. The site is situated in a zone of low to moderate seismicity.

The regional topography is gently sloping with waterways that direct surface water flow towards James Bay. At the site, the terrain includes nearly flat plains, mostly covered with fine-grained sediments from glacial lakes. The TSF is located on the south-southeast bank of the Colombière River. The topography to the south-southeast, south and southwest is confining and relatively higher in elevation comprising natural soil and bedrock outcrops.

TSF Description

The LOU TSF comprises a tailings pond and polishing pond. The polishing pond is located immediately downstream (east) of the tailings pond. Water flows from the tailings pond through an operational spillway to the polishing pond, then through another operational spillway from the polishing pond to the downstream environment.

The tailings are maintained below a water cover to prevent oxidation and acid generation. The tailings pond is bounded by Dams 1A, 1B and 1C to the north and by Dams 1D and 1E to the east, Dams 2A and 2B to the west, and natural topography to the south. In addition to the operational spillway, two emergency spillways are located to the east at Dam 1E, at the northeast corner of the facility.

A description of the current state of the LOU TSF is provided in Table 1. Structures comprising the LOU TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown in Figure 2. A photo of the TSF is provided in Figure 3.

Teck has an ongoing program of environmental monitoring, surveillance and maintenance at the LOU TSF.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, the LOU TSF is classified as a "High" consequence facility. Regardless of classification, this facility meets “Extreme” earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.



Figure 1. Louvicourt Mine Location

Table 1. Description of Louvicourt TSF

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	Canada
GISTM consequence classification	High
Deposition method	Subaqueous
Status	Inactive
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	7 structures (Dam 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 1E, 2A and 2B)
Type of Construction	Earth fill dam, single stage construction
Design storm event	PMF
Design earthquake	1 in 10,000-year return period
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	18
Crest length (m)	2,510
Overall downstream slope (Horizontal: Vertical)	2:1
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2024 (2025)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Louvicourt TSF

TSF Design Summary	Description
Tailings Pond (including Dam 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 1E, 2A and 2B)	To retain tailings which are covered by water to prevent oxidation and acid-generation.
Polishing Pond (including Dam 4A, and 4B)	Receives water from the tailings pond and naturally enhances the water quality without active treatment. The Polishing Pond acts primarily as a safeguard to check that water released from the facility meets environmental quality standards.



Figure 2. Plan view of Louvicourt Mine TSF

Figure 3. Photograph of Louvicourt Mine TSF

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the LOU TSF was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the LOU TSF, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck’s risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At LOU, the most recent risk assessment identified two credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck’s criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

Failure Mode	What could happen?	What are we doing to control the risk?
Slope Instability – a mass movement of embankment material down a slope.	A very large construction load, greater than the design, is added to the embankment and causes slope instability and damage to the embankment; or A very large earthquake event, greater than the design, causes slope instability and damage to embankment; or Slow deformation of the foundation results in strength loss causing slope instability and damage to embankment. Embankment damage could lead to release of tailings and/or water.	• Embankments are designed and constructed to meet Canadian Dam Association guidelines. A toe berm will also be expanded in 2025 at one location of the TSF to comply with Quebec mine closure guidelines. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melting, heavy rainfall, and earthquake) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Monitoring, including remote camera surveillance, automatic earthquake alert, regular instrumentation review, and regular satellite monitoring, regular survey to detect potential ground movement. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected. • Scheduled care and maintenance activities
Internal Erosion – transport of embankment material through the foundation.	A very large precipitation event and blockage of spillway causing water level to rise and induce seepage erosion process that transports soil particles from embankment and damages the embankment. Embankment damage could lead to release of tailings and/or water.	• Structures are engineered to resist internal erosion between the dam core and downstream filter. • Established and managed operating water levels in TSF and water retention structures. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melting, heavy rainfall) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Monitoring, including remote camera surveillance and regular satellite monitoring to detect potential blocking of spillway. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected. • Scheduled care and maintenance activities

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the LOU TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed

by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental impacts to the area downstream of the TSF from water and tailings release. As discussed above, despite these risks being unlikely to occur, Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The LOU TSF has two credible failure modes that, although unlikely to occur, would result in a flow failure scenario; these are described above in the section entitled 'Discussion of Material Risks'. An inundation study has been completed to identify the potentially impacted area. Based on this study, Teck has assessed the potential for human exposure (potential for a person to be located in the inundation area) and vulnerability (existing physical, social, economic and environmental conditions that make people and the environment more susceptible to the impacts) to understand the severity of the potential impacts of a flow failure scenario.

The area of influence for a flow failure scenario at the LOU TSF includes a hunting cabin and shelter near the TSF, Chemin Pare Bridge, the fire house pump, Highway 397 Bridge, three local roads, a structure near the Bourlamaque River banks, and recreational areas of Colombière and Bourlamaque rivers, Blouin Lake, and other nearby lakes. The potential effects to people and the environment in the unlikely scenario of a flow failure at the LOU TSF may include loss of life and impacts to surrounding waterbodies, public health and safety, community infrastructure, and Indigenous territory. Potential impacts to Indigenous rights include interference with traditional, cultural and economic practices, including perceived and real impacts to subsistence foods including fish and species that may consume or encounter affected water or exposed tailings.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

All findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR related to material risks have either been addressed or are being addressed as part of the 2025 site activities including proposed toe berm construction – see prior discussion on Material Risks for further information.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The TSF at LOU has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck’s requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the LOU TSF, the most recent independent DSR was in 2020. The next DSR is scheduled for 2025.

APPENDIX H – PINCHI LAKE TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Pinchi Lake TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Pinchi Lake Mine was a former mercury mine that operated from 1940 to 1944 and from 1968 to 1975. The property is located on the north shore of Pinchi Lake, 25 km from Fort St. James, British Columbia, as shown in Figure 1.

The Pinchi Lake Mine is in a heavily wooded area with rolling hills. The climate is considered a humid continental climate, characterized by winters with significant snowfall and short, warm summers. The site is situated in a zone of low to moderate seismicity.

TSF Description

The Pinchi Lake TSF and associated water management infrastructure includes an earthfill tailings embankment, a dry tailings impoundment with vegetation cover on the surface, a closure spillway channel, and the Ed Creek diversion channel which diverts Ed Creek away from the TSF.

A description of the current state of the inactive Pinchi Lake TSF is provided in Table 1. Structures comprising the Pinchi Lake TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. Photos are provided below in Figures 3 and 4.

Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the Pinchi Lake TSF. Pinchi Lake TSF decommissioning and reclamation activities were completed from 2010 to 2012. The decommissioning activities included draining of the tailings pond, construction of a closure spillway channel to pass non-contact runoff through the facility, capping the TSF with till material, and reclaiming 55 hectares of land by seeding and planting native species to improve diversity and habitat.

Consequence Classification

Based on GISTM consequence classification system, the Pinchi Lake TSF is classified as a "Significant" consequence facility. Regardless of classification, this facility meets “Extreme” earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.



Figure 1. Pinchi Lake TSF location

Table 1. Description of Pinchi Lake TSF

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	Canada
GISTM consequence classification	Significant
Deposition method	Slurry
Status	Inactive
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	1 (TSF Embankment – East, South, West Legs)
Type of Construction	Earthfill tailings embankment
Design storm event	1 in 10,000-year event
Design earthquake	Designed for 1 in 2,475-year event(confirmed stable for 1 in 10,000-year event)
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	15
Crest length (m)	1,300
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	3:1
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2025 (2026)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Pinchi Lake TSF

Structure	Purpose
Embankment	Earthfill tailings retaining structure.
Tailings Impoundment	Does not include water storage and has a vegetation cover on the tailings surface, contains approximately 1 million cubic metres of tailings.
Closure Spillway	Structure that provides release of non-contact runoff through the closed cover surface



Figure 2. Pinchi Lake Mine TSF and Water Management Features

Figure 3. Pinchi TSF looking west-northwest

Figure 4. South leg of Pinchi TSF embankment looking west

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the Pinchi Lake TSF was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At the Pinchi Lake TSF, the most recent risk assessment identified no credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the Pinchi Lake TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

The Pinchi Lake TSF does not have any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Pinchi Lake TSF does not have a credible flow failure scenario even under extreme loading conditions.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR reports.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The Pinchi Lake TSF has no credible flow failure modes. Regardless, this TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the Pinchi Lake TSF, the most recent independent DSR was completed in 2023. The next DSR is scheduled to occur in 2028.

APPENDIX I – PINE POINT TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Pine Point TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

Pine Point Mine is an inactive lead-zinc mine located in the Northwest Territories approximately 68 km west of Fort Resolution and 90 km east of Hay River, as shown in Figure 1. The mine operated from 1964 to 1988. After the mine ceased operations in 1988, Teck reclaimed the mining areas and the associated leases were returned to the government of the Northwest Territories by 1990. Teck retained, and continues to manage, the inactive Pine Point TSF.

The terrain around the TSF gently slopes northwest towards Great Slave Lake. The area is a sporadic discontinuous permafrost area with no evidence of permafrost within the TSF area. Materials covering the site consist of mainly sand and gravel, lacustrine, glaciolacustrine and glacial till deposits formed during and after glaciation period. These deposits are underlaid by siltstone and limestone bedrock. The climate at the site is characterized by long cold winters with freshet generally starting in late April and finishing at the beginning of June, followed by short and warm summers. The site is situated in a zone of low seismicity.

TSF Description

The inactive Pine Point TSF retains tailings with earthfill embankments on four sides - North, West, East and South Dikes - and natural topography on the east. Due to local topography, a permanent pond, named Main Pond, is formed on the north side of the TSF. Two concrete spillways are present in the North Dike to allow passive flood water discharge to the downstream environment.

Main Pond water is conveyed to a polishing pond through a gated culvert that passes through an internal embankment, named Internal Dike. Water is treated then discharged via siphons through the polishing pond spillway to the downstream environment.

A description of the current state of the Pine Point TSF is provided in Table 1. Structures comprising the Pine Point TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. A photo of the TSF is provided in Figure 3.

After the mine was closed, a gravel cover was constructed over the tailings to control dust. Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the Pine Point TSF.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, the Pine Point TSF is classified as a "Significant" consequence facility.



Figure 1. Pine Point site location

Table 1. Description of Pine Point TSF

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	Canada
GISTM consequence classification	Significant
Deposition method	Slurry
Status	Inactive
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	4 structures (North Dike including 2 spillways; East Dike; South Dike; and West Dike)
Type of Construction	Downstream construction
Design storm event	1 in 1,000-year event
Design earthquake	1 in 10,000-year event
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	North and West Dikes – 9 South Dike – 6 East Dike – 2
Crest length (m)	North Dike – 3,010 West Dike – 2,310 South Dike – 2,480 East Dike – 628
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	North, South and East Dikes – ≥1.7:1 West Dike – 1.8:1
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2024 (2025)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures comprising the Pine Point TSF

Structure	Purpose
North Dike	Retains tailings and ponded water. Water collects and ponds against the North Dike and forms the Main Pond. The North Dike features 2 spillways which serve to control Main Pond water level.
West Dike	Retains tailings and ponded water.
South Dike	Retains tailings.
East Dike	Retains ponded water.
Internal Dike	Forms a Polishing Pond where the water from the Main Pond undergoes seasonal water treatment prior to release to the environment.
Main Pond	Stores surface water runoff (snowmelt and rainwater).
Polishing Pond	Water from Main Pond undergoes seasonal water treatment.



Figure 2. Plan view of Pine Point TSF

Figure 3. Photograph of Pine Point TSF

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the Pine Point TSF was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the Pine Point TSF, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck’s risk management framework, a risk is considered ‘material’ when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck’s corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely to occur. At Pine Point TSF, the most recent risk assessment identified three credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck’s criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

Failure Mode	What could happen?	What are we doing to control the risk?
Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment.	A large precipitation event and blockage of spillways causing water level to exceed the top of the embankment and damage the embankment. The embankment damage could result in the release of tailings and water.	• Engineered structures (spillways) exist to transport excess water. • Monitoring of snowpack to inform freshet water level forecast. • Monitoring, including precipitation forecast, real-time water level monitoring, on-site weather station monitoring, and remote camera surveillance to detect potential large precipitation, and overtopping. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures.
Slope Instability – a mass movement of embankment material down the slope.	A large load/force greater than the design is exerted on the embankment, causing slope instability and damage to the embankment. A very large earthquake event greater than design causes slope instability and damage to embankment. The embankment damage could result in release of tailings and water.	• Embankments are designed and constructed to meet provincial regulatory requirements and Canadian Dam Association guidelines. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall, and earthquake) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Monitoring, including remote camera surveillance, automatic earthquake alert, regular instrumentation review, and regular satellite monitoring to detect potential ground movement. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures.

Table 3 (Continued). Summary of Material Risks

Failure Mode	What could happen?	What are we doing to control the risk?
Internal Erosion – transport of embankment material through the foundation.	A large precipitation event and blockage of spillways causing water level to rise and induce seepage erosion process that transports soil particles from embankment and damages the embankment. The embankment damage could result in the release of tailings and water.	• Structures are engineered to resist internal erosion between the core and shell. • Water levels are maintained lower than during historical operations, reducing the gradient and potential for internal erosion. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Monitoring, including remote camera surveillance, on-site weather station, automatic rainfall alert, and regular instrumentation review to detect potential blockage of spillways and elevated water level. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures.

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures. Additional assessments are being undertaken to enhance flood management capacity and to reduce the risk to ALARP.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the Pine Point TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental impact to the area downstream of the TSF.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Pine Point TSF has three credible failure modes that, although unlikely to occur, would result in a flow failure scenario; these are described above in the section entitled 'Discussion of Material Risks'. An inundation study has been completed to identify the potentially impacted area. Based on this study, Teck

has assessed the potential for human exposure (potential for a person to be located in the inundation area) and vulnerability (existing physical, social, economic and environmental conditions that make people and the environment more susceptible to the impacts) to understand the severity of the potential impacts of a flow failure scenario.

The area of influence for a flow failure scenario at Pine Point includes the relatively flat peat land between the TSF and Great Slave Lake, with potential for released water and tailings to reach Great Slave Lake. There are no inhabited buildings in the area and hence no permanent population at risk. The potential effects to people and the environment in the unlikely scenario of a flow failure mode at the Pine Point TSF may include impacts to health and safety for temporary populations (such as hunters, trappers, etc.). Potential impacts to Indigenous rights include interference with traditional, cultural and economic practices, including perceived and real impacts to subsistence foods including species that may consume or encounter affected water or exposed tailings.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

All findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR related to material risks have either been addressed or are being addressed as part of the 2025 activities – see prior discussion.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The Pine Point TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck’s requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the Pine Point TSF, the most recent independent DSR was in 2024. The next DSR will occur in 2034.

APPENDIX J – SÄ DENA HES TAILINGS MANAGEMENT AREA

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Sä Dena Hes (SDH) Tailings Management Area (TMA). This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The SDH property is the site of a former lead-zinc mine that operated from 1991 to 1992; decommissioning and closure of the site was completed in 2015. The property is located 45 km north of Watson Lake in the Yukon Territory, as shown in Figure 1. The site is owned by the SDH Operating Corporation, which is a 50/50 joint venture between Teck and Pan-Pacific Metal Mining Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of Korea Zinc Company, Ltd. Teck is the operator.

The terrain around SDH is characterized by moderately steep, forested hillsides. The valley bases vary from narrow to very broad and are typically marshy with alluvial foundations. The site is situated on a divide between two drainage catchments and lies in the rain shadow of the Coast and St. Elias Mountains. These mountain ranges form a barrier against Pacific influences, resulting in a continental climate (cold winters, hot summers and sparse precipitation). Additionally, the Cassiar Mountains create a secondary rain shadow effect. The site is situated in a zone of low seismicity.

TSF Description

A description of the current state of the SDH TMA is provided in Table 1; structures comprising the SDH TMA are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. Photos of the TMA are provided below in Figure 3 and Figure 4.

Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the SDH TMA. Closure and decommissioning activities were completed in 2015. Activities included covering exposed tailings with a vegetated soil cover. This cover was constructed to limit the release of contaminants to the air, water, and land. Surface contouring and revegetation have been completed for protection against erosion.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, the SDH TMA is classified as a "Significant" consequence facility. Regardless of classification, this facility meets “Extreme” earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.



Figure 1. Sä Dena Hes mine location

Table 1. Description of Sä Dena Hes TMA

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	Canada
GISTM consequence classification	Significant
Deposition method	Slurry
Status	Inactive
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	1 (North Embankment)
Type of Construction	Single stage embankment construction
Design storm event	1 in 1,000-year event (able to withstand 1 in 10,000-year event under snow-free conditions)
Design earthquake	1 in 2,475-year event (confirmed stable under 10,000-year event)
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	15
Crest length (m)	260
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	2.5:1
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2024 (2025)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Sä Dena Hes TMA

Structure	Purpose
North Embankment	Tailings retaining structure
North Tailings Pond/South Tailings Pond Cover	Controls wind erosion of tailings, minimizes the impact of dust, and facilitates revegetation. The cover promotes runoff of clean water through constructed drainage features.
North Drainage Channel	Directs clean runoff from the covered tailings areas to the South Drainage Channel, via the SRS pond, and away from the TSF.
North Embankment	Tailings retaining structure

Figure 2. Sä Dena Hes mine tailings management area


Figure 3. SDH TSF North Embankment looking east

Figure 4. SDH tailings management area looking north

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the SDH TMA was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the SDH TMA, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck’s risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At SDH, the most recent risk assessment identified two credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck’s criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

Failure Mode	What could happen?	What are we doing to control the risk?
Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment.	Blockage of the TSF cover drainage channel from large snowpack or ice blockage causing formation of a temporary pond during snowmelt that overtops the embankment resulting in tailings erosion, or A very large precipitation event occurs that forms a temporary pond near the embankment that overtops it, resulting in tailings erosion.	• Tailings cover is designed to drain away from the embankment to reduce water pooling. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Monitoring, including remote camera surveillance and regular satellite monitoring during freshet to detect potential ground movement or pooling. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected. • The north embankment will be raised which will fully eliminate this potential failure mode and will also include adding stronger erosion protection on the downstream slope.
Internal Erosion – transport of embankment material through the foundation.	Transport of embankment material through its foundation over several years leading to deformation of the embankment which could lead to transport of eroded tailings downstream from a seasonal pond.	• Tailings cover is designed to drain away from the embankment to reduce water pooling and for water to drain through the embankment, in accordance with the design intent, without displacing embankment material. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall) inspections are completed. Maintenance needs are addressed promptly. • Monitoring, including remote camera surveillance and regular satellite monitoring during freshet to detect potential ground movement or pooling. If detected, issues would be promptly corrected.

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the SDH TMA, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental impact to the area downstream of the North Embankment. As discussed above, despite these risks being unlikely to occur, Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The SDH TMA does not have a credible flow failure scenario.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

All findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR related to material risks have either been addressed or are being addressed as part of construction activities – see prior discussion on Material Risks for further information.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The SDH TMA has no credible flow failure modes. Regardless, this TMA has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the SDH TMA, the most recent independent DSR was in 2015. The next DSR is occurring in 2025.

APPENDIX K – SULLIVAN MINE TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITIES

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Sullivan TSFs. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Sullivan Mine property is the site of a former silver, zinc and lead mine that operated from 1892 to 2001. The property is located in the City of Kimberley, in the southeast corner of British Columbia. Teck began reclamation work of the Sullivan property and the surrounding area in the 1990s and completed reclamation work in accordance with the Decommissioning and Closure Plan for Kimberley Operations, dated September 2000 (Closure Plan), in 2008.

The Sullivan Mine is situated in the foothills of the Purcell Mountain range on the edge of the Rocky Mountain Trench. The tailings area is located on a largely flat bench north of the community of Marysville, which drains generally to the south-southeast towards the St. Mary River, primarily through the Cow, James, and Luke Creek drainages. The site is in an area of historically moderate to low seismicity.

TSF Description

On the Sullivan Mine property, there are five TSFs (Iron, Old Iron, Calcine, Gypsum, Siliceous). At all TSFs, tailings are retained by engineered earthfill embankment structures. There are also collection ponds, pump stations, seepage collection points and a Drainage Water Treatment Plant on-site to manage mine contact water.

Reclamation work on the TSFs was initiated in 1990 and was completed in 2008. During the reclamation process, a significant amount of work was conducted to enhance long-term stability of the TSFs. These enhancements included construction of water management structures including diversion channels and spillways, an engineered soil cover with vegetation established on the surface, and modifications to the containment structures including flattening of slopes and/or the construction of toe berms, such that the TSFs structures meet or exceed industry standards.

A description of the current state of the Sullivan TSFs is provided in Table 1; structures comprising the Sullivan TSFs are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. Photos of the TSFs are provided below in Figures 3 to 6.

Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the Sullivane Mine TSFs.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM classification system, Sullivan Mine TSFs have been classified between “Low” and "Significant", as outlined in Table 1.



Figure 1. Sullivan Mine location

Table 1. Description of Sullivan TSFs

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	Canada
GISTM consequence classification	Iron, Calcine TSFs – Low Old Iron, Silicious, Gypsum TSFs – Significant
Deposition method	Slurry deposition
Status	Inactive
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	9 (Iron Dike, Old Iron Dike, No. 1 Siliceous Dike, No. 2 Siliceous Dike, No. 3 Siliceous Dike, East Gypsum Dike, West Gypsum Dike, Northeast Gypsum Dike, Calcine Dike)
Type of Construction	Upstream
Design storm event	1 in 10,000-year event – Calcine PMF – Iron TSF, Old Iron TSF, Siliceous, Gypsum TSF
Design earthquake	1 in 10,000-year event[2]
Maximum heights (Final) (m)	Iron Dike – 29.0 Old Iron Dike – 7.6 No. 1 Siliceous Dike – 4.9[1] No. 2 Siliceous Dike – 9.5 No. 3 Siliceous Dike – 12.5 East Gypsum Dike – 16.8 West Gypsum Dike – 22.9 Northeast Gypsum Dike – 10.0 Calcine Dike – 4.6[3]
Crest lengths (m)	Iron Dike – 1,500 Old Iron Dike – 520 No. 1 Siliceous Dike – 2,000 No. 2 Siliceous Dike – 730 No. 3 Siliceous Dike – 1,540 East Gypsum Dike – 670 West Gypsum Dike – 640 Northeast Gypsum Dike – 120 Calcine Dike – 520

Table 1 (Continued). Description of Sullivan TSFs

TSF Design Summary	Description
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	Iron Dike – 3.5:1 Old Iron Dike – 15:1 No. 1 Siliceous Dike – 7:1 No. 2 Siliceous Dike – 3:1 No. 3 Siliceous Dike – 2.5:1 East Gypsum Dike – 3:1 to 7:1 West Gypsum Dike – 3:1 Northeast Gypsum Dike – 1.5:1 Calcine Dike – 1.5:1
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2024 (2025)

1 Tailings were placed downstream of the No.1 Siliceous Dike. The original height of the No.1 Siliceous Dike from original ground is 16.8 m.

2 Work is ongoing to determine the earthquake resiliency of the Silicious TSF

3 A municipal landfill abuts the downstream slope of the Calcine Dike. The height of the Calcine Dike from original ground is 15.2 m.

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising the Sullivan Mine TSFs

Structure	Purpose
Iron TSF	Tailings retention structure
Old Iron TSF	Tailings retention structure
Siliceous TSF	Tailings retention structure
Gypsum TSF	Tailings retention structure
Calcine TSF	Tailings retention structure



Figure 2. Sullivan Mine TSFs

Figure 3. Iron TSF, looking north

Figure 4. Gypsum TSF, West Gypsum Dike, looking north

Figure 5. Old Iron TSF, looking north

Figure 6. Calcine Dike crest and downstream slope

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the Sullivan TSFs was conducted in 2024. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At the Sullivan Mine, the most recent risk assessment identified no credible failure scenarios for the TSFs that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the Sullivan Mine, impacts associated with credible failure scenarios have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

The Sullivan TSFs do not have any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Sullivan TSFs have no material risks associated with credible flow failure modes.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at the Sullivan Mine resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The TSFs at Sullivan have an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

The most recent independent DSR for Sullivan was completed in 2023. The next DSR is occurring in 2028.

APPENDIX L – DOUGLAS MINE TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Douglas Mine TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Douglas Mine property is the site of a former phosphate mine that operated from 1962 to 1968. The site was closed and reclaimed incrementally between the early 1970s to the 2010s. The property is located about 10 miles south of Drummond, Montana, as shown in Figure 1. The site is owned by Teck American Incorporated.

The Douglas Mine is located west of the Continental Divide which drains into the Pacific Ocean through the Columbia River. The Continental Divide influences the climate of the adjacent areas. West of the divide, the climate can be identified as modified north Pacific coast type. The site is located in an arid region near the Deer Lodge valley, which is one of the driest areas of the western part of Montana with an average of 11 inches of precipitation annually. The terrain around the Douglas Mine is characterized by open range with plains type grasses and a scattering of small trees. The site is located in an area of moderate seismicity.

TSF Description

The inactive TSF was initially constructed in 1963 and received mill tailings from the Douglas Mine concentrator for about 5 years until 1968. The tailings were initially reclaimed by covering with soil in about 1970 and incrementally reclaimed to the early 2010s, including removal of all site structures, placement of additional soil to cover the tailings, seeding to vegetate the soil cover, fencing to prevent grazing of the cover, and additional controls to divert stormwater away from the TSF. A description of the current state of the TSF is provided in Table 1; structures comprising the TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown in Figures 2 and 3.

Consequence Classification

Based on GISTM consequence classification system, the DOU TSF is classified as a "Low" consequence facility.



Figure 1. Douglas Mine location

Table 1. Description of TSF

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	United States
GISTM consequence classification	Low
Deposition method	Slurry
Status	Inactive
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	1 (Douglas Tailings Dam)
Type of Construction	Single stage embankment construction
Design storm event	Work is ongoing to evaluate spillway capacity
Design earthquake	1 in 10,000-year event
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	14.9
Crest length (m)	320
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	3:1
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2024 (2025)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Douglas Mine TSF

Structure	Purpose
Douglas Tailings Dam	Tailings retaining structure
Filter Dam	Constructed across the original creek channel of Douglas Creek for secondary settling purposes during operations and now provides secondary containment in the unlikely event of a tailings release.
Douglas Creek Diversion	Diverts Douglas Creek from the original creek channel around the Filter Dam



Figure 2. Douglas Mine TSF

Figure 3. Downstream face and area of the Douglas Mine TSF

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the TSF was conducted in 2025. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck’s risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At the Douglas Mine, the most recent risk assessment did not identify any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck’s criteria.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of

studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

The TSF does not have any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The TSF does not have a credible flow failure scenario, even under extreme loading conditions.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at the TSF resulted in no material findings.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The TSF has no credible flow failure modes. Regardless, this TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

The most recent independent DSR of the TSF was in 2025. The next DSR will occur in 2035.

APPENDIX M – MAGMONT TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Magmont TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Magmont (MAG) property is the site of a former lead-zinc mine that operated from 1967 to 1994. Following cessation of mine operations, the site was closed and reclaimed in accordance with its Missouri Department of Natural Resource's Metallic Waste Management permit. The property is located in the Salem Plateau of the Ozark Mountains approximately 2 miles south of Bixby, MO, as shown in Figure 1. The site is managed as a joint venture between Teck American Incorporated (Teck) and Haliburton, with Teck the managing partner.

The terrain around MAG is characterized by forested hills and shallow creek valleys. The region is essentially a high plateau with rolling hills, often featuring steep bluffs and rocky outcrops. The site is situated high on a divide between two drainage catchments for the Black and Meramec Rivers; MAG drains to the Black. Missouri and MAG have a continental climate with strong seasonality. With minimal topographic barriers, dry-cold air enters the region in the winter from the northern plains and Canada and can result in snowfall from the typically humid air of the area. In the summer, moist warm air masses enter the area from the Gulf. This area of the U.S. Midwest experiences climatic events such as high-intensity rain, drought, heat waves, ice storms, windstorms and tornadoes. The site is located in an area of moderate seismicity.

TSF Description

The MAG TSF starter dam was constructed between 1966 and 1967. The TSF was raised using downstream methods between 1967 and 1979. Between the early 1990's and early 2000's the TSF was reclaimed in accordance with a State of Missouri Metallic Minerals Permit and site structures that were no longer needed were removed. Tailings were covered with earthen material to form a vegetated cover as part of the closure work.

A description of the current state of the MAG TSF is provided in Table 1; structures comprising the MAG TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. Photos of the TSF are provided in Figures 3 and 4 below.

Consequence Classification

Based on GISTM consequence classification system, the MAG TSF is classified as a "Significant" consequence facility. Regardless of classification, this facility meets "Extreme" earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.



Figure 1. Magmont Mine location

Table 1. Description of Magmont TSF

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	United States
GISTM consequence classification	Significant
Deposition method	Slurry
Status	Inactive
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	1 (Magmont Tailings Dam)
Type of Construction	Downstream
Design storm event	1 in 10,000-year event
Design earthquake	1 in 10,000-year event
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	41.1
Crest length (m)	365.8
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	Varies (2.0:1 and 4.5:1)
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2024 (2025)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising Magmont TSF

Structure	Purpose
Magmont Tailings Dam	Tailings retaining structure
Tailings Cover	Two to six feet of locally borrowed clay cover that provides a growth medium for vegetation providing wildlife habitat, minimizes infiltration, maximizes evapotranspiration, and provides a physical barrier between tailings and the environment. The tailings cover is gently sloped toward the spillway and contains several ponds to provide detention/retention of stormwater.
Spillway	Integrated concrete-lined and grass-covered spillway and emergency spillway providing open channel flow of stormwater away from the TSF, primarily during precipitation events.
Tailings Dam Toe Drain System	Foundation drain system for the downstream tailings embankment to maintain low pore pressure in the tailings dam's primary structural elements.



Figure 2. Magmont Mine TSF


Figure 3. Covered and vegetated tailings beach at Magmont (September 2019)

Figure 4. Downstream slope of the Magmont Tailings Dam (April 2025)

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the MAG TSF was conducted in 2025. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At MAG, the most recent risk assessment did not identify credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the MAG TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

The MAG TSF does not have any credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The MAG TSF does not have a credible flow failure scenario.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR or AFPR.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The MAG TSF has no credible flow failure modes. Regardless, this TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

The most recent MAG TSF DSR was in 2025. The next DSR is planned for 2035.

APPENDIX N – PEND OREILLE MINE TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Pend Oreille Mine (POm) TSFs. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The Pend Oreille mine (POm) property is the site of a former lead and zinc mine, which was operational from 1952 to 2019. Closure activities commenced in 2020 and remain ongoing. The property is located approximately 2 miles north of Metaline Falls, Washington, as shown in Figure 1. The site is owned and operated by Teck Washington Incorporated, a subsidiary of Teck American Incorporated.

The topography of the northeastern corner of Washington from Metaline to the Canadian Border is moderately rugged, with mountainous areas and intervening glaciated valleys. The area is heavily forested and dotted with abundant lakes derived from the melting of glacial ice. The Pend Oreille Mine area is characterized by warm, moderately moist summers and cool, snowy winters. The site is located in an area of low seismicity.

TSF Description

During operations, tailings were placed in a series of TSFs, named TDF-1, 2 and 3, all of which are currently inactive. TDF-1 and TDF-2 are retained by upstream constructed tailings dams and were operated from 1968 to 1973 and 1973 to 1975, respectively. TDF-2 does not store water and has a flow-through channel that directs surface water flows to TDF-1. TDF-1 has a small surface wetland with minimal water that is drained by a decant pipe. TDF-3, operated intermittently from 2004 to 2019, is formed by two earthen embankments enclosing a natural basin-like area. TDF-3 has geomembrane liners and a leakage collection system.

Both TDF-1 and TDF-2 were remediated and reclaimed in compliance with an approved Consent Decree from the Department of Ecology. Reclamation works are actively ongoing at TDF-3 and includes treatment and removal of retained water.

A description of the current state of POm's TSFs is provided in Table 1; structures comprising the POm TSFs are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown in Figure 2.

Teck has an ongoing program of surveillance and maintenance at the POm TSFs.

Consequence Classification

Based on GISTM consequence classification system, the POm TDF-1 is "Significant", TDF-2 is "Low", and TDF-3 is "Significant". It is expected that the consequence classification of TDF-3 will reduce when closure work is complete.



Figure 1. Pend Oreille Mine location

Figure 2. Pend Oreille Mine TSFs

Table 1. Description of POm TSFs

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	United States of America
GISTM consequence classification	TDF-1 – Significant TDF-2 – Low TDF-3 – Significant
Deposition method	Slurry
Status	Inactive
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	4 (TDF-1, TDF-2, TDF-3 Northeast and Northwest Dams)
Type of Construction	TDF-1 & 2 – Upstream, TDF-3 – Downstream
Design storm event	1 in 1,000-year event
Design earthquake	1 in 500-year event
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	TDF-1 – 21 TDF-2 – 6 TDF-3 – 24
Crest length (m)	TDF-1 – 540 TDF-2 – 159 TDF-3 – 396
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	TDF-1 – 2.2:1 TDF-2 – 2:1 TDF-3 – 2.5:1
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2024 (2025)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising POm TSFs

Structure	Purpose
TDF-1	Tailings retention structure
TDF-2	Tailings retention structure
TDF-3: NE Tailings Dam	Tailings retention structure
TDF-3 NW Tailings Dam	Tailings retention structure

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the POM TSFs was conducted in 2025. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and will be reviewed by the ITRB at their next meeting. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the POm TSF, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At POm, the most recent risk assessment identified three credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

Failure Mode	What could happen?	What are we doing to control the risk?
Slope Instability – a mass movement of embankment material down a slope.	TDF-1: The tailings could lose strength and slump out of the facility if stress conditions were to change or a major earthquake occurred. Some tailings and water could reach the Pend Oreille river.	• Design modifications are in progress, with the objective of eliminating this failure mode. • Ongoing monitoring for changing conditions. • Water accumulation on the tailings surface is minimized.
Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment.	TDF-1: Water is discharged via decant structure that could be overwhelmed in a major flood, causing water to flow over the embankment of the TSF and eroding some tailings into the Pend Oreille River.	• Design modifications are in progress, with the objective of eliminating this failure mode. • Ongoing monitoring for changing conditions. • Water accumulation on the tailings surface is minimized.
Slope Instability – a mass movement of embankment material down a slope.	TDF-3: The TDF-3 embankments may be susceptible to excessive deformation under a major earthquake.	• Additional stability assessments are underway to better understand this potential failure mode. • Continue ongoing closure works for TDF-3, which will include partial dam deconstruction and drainage of the tailings to improve stability.

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the POm TSFs, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental impact to the area downstream of TDF-1 and 3. As discussed above, despite these risks being unlikely to occur, Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The POm TDF-1 and TDF-3 have credible failure modes that, although unlikely to occur, would result in a flow failure scenario; this is described above in the section entitled ‘Discussion of Material Risks’. Teck has assessed the potential for human exposure (potential for a person to be located in the inundation area) and vulnerability (existing physical, social, economic and environmental conditions that make people and the environment more susceptible to the impacts) to understand the severity of the potential impacts.

The material risks described above for both TDF-1 and TDF-3 would result in impact to the nearby Pend Oreille River. There are no homes or cabins downstream. The area of influence for TDF-3 also includes the Pend Oreille Mine industrial facility. POm employees are trained in emergency scenarios and we have escape routes identified. The potential effects to people and the environment in the unlikely scenario of a flow failure at Pend Oreille may include impacts to surrounding waterbodies, health and safety of persons on the Pend Oreille site.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPR) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSR)

All findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR related to material risks have either been addressed or are being addressed as part of ongoing works discussed above – see prior discussion on Material Risks for further information.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at the POm TSFs resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The POm TSFs has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the POm TSFs, the most recent independent DSR was in 2020. The next DSR is occurring in 2025.

APPENDIX O – CARMEN DE ANDACOLLO TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Carmen de Andacollo (CdA) TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The CdA property is an open pit copper mine. It is 2 km from the town of Andacollo and 56 km southeast of the city of La Serena, in the IV Region of Coquimbo, Chile, as shown in Figure 1.

The CdA site is located in the foothills of Los Andes Mountain range. The topography consists of moderately sloping hills. The climate is semi-desertic, with generally dry conditions. The site is located in an area of high seismicity.



Figure 1. Carmen de Andacollo Operations site location

TSF Description

At the CdA TSF, tailings are retained by six containment structures and natural high topography to the west. The containment structures have been raised in stages over the mine life and have now joined to form a continuous retention embankment. The TSF structures have been constructed higher than the minimum level needed for operating water needs, storm storage, and tailings storage. Waste rock dumps are located adjacent to the TMF structures (downstream).

A description of the CdA TSF is provided in Table 1 and structures comprising the CdA TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. A photo of the TSF is provided below in Figure 3.

Consequence Classification

Based on GISTM consequence classification system, the CdA TSF is classified as “Extreme”.

Table 1. Description of CdA TSF

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	Chile
GISTM consequence classification	Extreme
Deposition method	Slurry
Status	Active
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	6 (North, Northeast, East, East-South, South and West Containment Structures)
Type of construction	Downstream-constructed zoned earth fill
Design storm event	PMF
Design earthquake	Maximum Credible Earthquake
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	115/151
Crest length (m)	3509
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	1.8:1
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2025 (2026)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising CdA TSF

Structure	Purpose
North Containment Structure	Tailings and water retaining structure
Northeast Containment Structure	Tailings and water retaining structure
East Containment Structure	Tailings and water retaining structure
East-South Containment Structure	Tailings and water retaining structure
South Containment Structure	Tailings and water retaining structure
West Containment Structure	Tailings and water retaining structure



Figure 2. CdA TSF

Figure 3. CdA TSF

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the CdA TSF was conducted in 2025. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the CdA TSF, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck’s risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At the CdA TSF, the most recent risk assessment identified two material risks – it should be noted that neither would result in a credible failure scenario leading to a release of tailings. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

Risk Source	What could happen?	What are we doing to control the risk?
Seepage – flow of water from tailings impoundment into natural environment downstream.	A combination of water from the impounded tailings and natural precipitation/runoff travels through fractured rock beneath the TSF into the downstream ravines, affecting the water quality downstream of the facility.	• Work plan is being implemented to understand cause of seepage and degree of potential impact and to develop mitigation measures. • Interception ditches and pump-back systems are under construction and have begun initial operation and are intended to prevent seepage reaching the downstream environment, as a preliminary mitigation measure while long-term solution(s) are developed. • Open communications with the regulator and community, including establishment of a community working group and a participatory monitoring program.
Rockfall – fall of material from slopes downstream of the dams onto roadways beneath.	Should a fall of material occur while personnel or equipment are present below, there is potential to cause damage to equipment or injure persons.	• A survey of areas with potential rockfall has been conducted. • Rocks have periodically been removed from slopes at risk of falling. • Safety berms are being constructed and warning signs are being installed in areas exposed to rockfall.

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the CdA TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as engineering assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include potential safety impacts to personnel, equipment damage, and environmental impacts to the area downstream of the TSF. Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The CdA TSF does not have a credible flow failure scenario.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPRs) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSRs)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR reports.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

The CdA environmental and social performance teams continue to work collaboratively in response to the TSF seepage (see discussion of material risk above). In addition to the risk management measures discussed above, a working group has been established with the local community (landowners) to systematically address their concerns, provide information, monitor the seepage, and develop environmental management measures.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The CdA TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck’s requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the CdA TSF, the most recent independent DSR was in 2024. The next DSR is scheduled to occur in 2029.

APPENDIX P – HIGHLAND VALLEY COPPER TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITIES

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Highland Valley Copper (HVC) TSFs[1]. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The HVC Operations property is an open pit copper and molybdenum mine formed by the amalgamation of three historic mining operations: Bethlehem Copper, Lornex and Highmont. The property is located approximately 17 km west of Logan Lake and about 50 km southwest of Kamloops in British Columbia (BC), Canada, as shown in Figure 1.

The HVC site lies within the Highland Valley which is broad, glaciated and U-shaped, bounded on the west by the Thompson River and on the east by the Guichon Creek Valley. The region is characterized as having hummocky terrain with gentle to moderate slopes. The site lies in the rain shadow of the Coast and Cascade mountains of the Southern Interior of BC, with a climate that is one of the warmest and driest in the province in the summer and is dry while cold in the winter. Storms are typically convective (i.e., severe thunderstorms with heavy rainfall and strong winds). The site is located in an area of moderate seismicity.

[1] The initial GISTM disclosure for the Highmont TSF, also located at HVC, occurred together with Teck's other inactive facilities with consequence classifications of Low, Significant, and High. This disclosure can be found in Appendix F.

Figure 1. Highland Valley Copper Operations site location

TSF Description

On the HVC property there are 5 TSFs – Highland, 7-Day Pond, Trojan, Bethlehem, and Highmont (which is discussed in Appendix F). At all TSFs, tailings are retained by engineered embankment structures. The Highland TSF is the current active location for tailings deposition and the 7-Day Pond TSF is used for tailings storage during plant maintenance activities; the other TSFs are inactive.

A description of the HVC TSFs is provided in Table 1 with locations shown on Figure 2. Structures comprising the HVC TSFs are briefly described in Table 2. Photos of the TSFs are provided below in Figures 3 to 7.

Consequence Classification

Based on the GISTM consequence classification system, the HVC TSFs are classified between "Low" and “Extreme”, as outlined in Table 3. Regardless of classification, the Highland L-L Dam, Bethlehem dams and Trojan Dam meet “Extreme” earthquake and storm event criteria, as defined by GISTM.

Table 1. Description of HVC TSFs

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	Canada
GISTM consequence classification	Highland – Extreme 7-Day Pond – Low Bethlehem – Very High Trojan – Very High
Deposition method	Cyclone sand and slurry deposition
Status	Highland, 7-Day Pond – Active Bethlehem, Trojan – Inactive
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	6 (Highland – L-L Dam and H-H Dam; 7-Day Pond – East Berm; Bethlehem – Dam No.1 and Bose Lake Dam; Trojan – Trojan Dam)
Type of construction	Highland – Centreline cycloned sand with till core (L-L Dam); Centreline rock and earthfill dam (H-H Dam) 7-Day Pond – Single stage, compacted fill Bethlehem – Centreline rockfill dam with a glacial till starter dam and upstream cycloned sand beach (Dam No. 1); Downstream glacial till with rockfill toe berm (Bose Lake Dam) Trojan – Rockfill starter dam with upstream cycloned sand raises
Design storm event	Highland – 120-hour PMF 7-Day Pond – 72-hour, 1/3 between 1,000-year event and PMF Bethlehem – 24-hour PMF (confirmed stable for 1 in 10,000-year event) Trojan – 24-hour PMF (confirmed stable for 1 in 10,000-year event)
Design earthquake	Highland – 1 in 10,000-year event (L-L Dam) and 1 in 5,000-year event (H-H Dam) 7-Day Pond – 1 in 2,475-year event Bethlehem – ½ between 2,475 and 10,000-year events (confirmed stable for 1 in 10,000-year event) Trojan – ½ between 2,475 and 10,000-year events (confirmed stable for 1 in 10,000-year event)
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	Highland – 172 (L-L Dam); 48 (H-H Dam) 7-Day Pond – 6 Bethlehem – 91 (Dam No. 1); 31 (Bose Lake Dam) Trojan – 70
Crest length (m)	Highland – 2,980 (L-L Dam); 1,800 (H-H Dam) 7-Day Pond – 200 Bethlehem – 2,000 (Dam No. 1); 600 (Bose Lake Dam) Trojan – 1,500
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	Highland – 2.5:1 to 7:1 (L-L Dam); 2:1 (H-H Dam) 7-Day Pond – 1.5:1 Bethlehem – 2.2:1 to 3:1 (Dam No. 1); 2:1 (Bose Lake Dam) Trojan – 3.7:1

Table 1. Description of HVC TSFs (Continued)

TSF Design Summary	Description
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2025 (2026)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising HVC TSFs

TSF	Structure	Purpose
Highland TSF	L-L Dam	Tailings and water retaining structure
	H-H Dam	Tailings retaining structure
	24 Mile Pond	Receives seepage from the H-H Dam and acts as storage for tailings overflow from the H-H Pumphouse.
	Seepage Water Reclaim Pond	Primary seepage collection pond downstream of the L-L Dam, from which water is pumped back to the TSF. It also receives water from surface runoff, sediment ponds, and other seepage collection ponds.
	Seepage Pond 1	Partially decommissioned sediment cell. To be used until new sediment pond (Sediment Pond 3) is commissioned, anticipated to be in 2027.
	Seepage Pond 2	Collects seepage primarily from finger drains under the northern portions of the L-L Dam.
	Seepage Pond 3	Collects construction water and sediment from hydraulic sand placement on the downstream side of the L-L Dam.
	Seepage Pond 4	Collects construction water and sediment from hydraulic sand placement on the downstream side of the L-L Dam.
7-Day Pond	East Berm	Tailings and water retaining structure
Bethlehem	Dam No. 1	Tailings retaining structure
	Bose Lake Dam	Tailings and water retaining structure
	R3 Seepage Pond	Collects local runoff and seepage from Dam No. 1
Trojan	Trojan Dam	Tailings and water retaining structure
	R4 Seepage Pond	Collects seepage from the Trojan Dam toe and surface runoff from the local catchment.
	Lower Trojan Pond	Collects local runoff and flows from the R3 Seepage Pond (from Bethlehem Dam No. 1) and from R4 Seepage Pond



Figure 2. HVC TSFs.

Figure 3. Photo of the L-L Dam at the Highland TSF.

Figure 4. Photo of the H-H Dam at the Highland TSF.

Figure 5. Plan view of the 7-Day Pond TSF.

Figure 6. Photo of the Bethlehem TSF.

Figure 7. Photo of the Trojan TSF.

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the HVC TSFs was conducted in 2025. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the HVC TSFs, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed

and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck's risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At the HVC TSFs, the most recent risk assessment identified five credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck's criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

Failure Mode	What could happen?	What are we doing to control the risk?
Slope Instability – a mass movement of embankment material down a slope.	Highland (L-L Dam): Deformation of the embankment due to movement along an undetected weak foundation unit triggered by a very large construction load, greater than the design, a very large earthquake event, or slow deformation. Trojan: A very large earthquake event, greater than the design, or slow deformation of the dam and/or foundation causes slope instability and damage to embankment. For all cases above, embankment damage could lead to release of tailings and/or water.	All facilities: • Embankment is designed and constructed to meet Canadian Dam Association guidelines with a surveillance program in place. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melting, heavy rainfall, and earthquake) inspections. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures. • Embankments are designed and constructed to withstand extreme loading events. Highland (L-L Dam): • Embankment design includes a stress-deformation model that is calibrated against performance monitoring, and a surveillance program with real-time instrumentation monitoring is in place.
Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment.	Trojan: A large precipitation event assuming a scenario with a blocked spillway could cause the water level to exceed the embankment crest level and damage the embankment. For the case above, embankment damage could lead to release of tailings and/or water.	• Monitoring of snowpack to inform freshet water level forecast. • Monitoring of pond level, including precipitation forecast. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall) inspections. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks (Continued)

Failure Mode	What could happen?	What are we doing to control the risk?
Internal Erosion – transport of embankment material through the foundation.	Highland (L-L Dam): A very large precipitation event causing water level to rise and induce seepage erosion process that transports soil particles from the dam foundation could cause embankment instability. Trojan: A very large precipitation event causing water level to rise and induce seepage erosion process that transports tailings particles and water through or along a decommissioned pipe beneath the dam. For all cases above, tailings and/or water could be released.	Highland and Trojan: • TSFs are managed with a wide tailings beach, which is intended to reduce seepage gradients. • Structure is engineered to resist internal erosion with filter zones. • TSF water levels are actively managed. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melting, heavy rainfall, and earthquake) inspections. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures.

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the HVC TSFs, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental impacts to the area downstream of the TSFs from water and tailings release. As discussed above, despite these risks being unlikely to occur, Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The Highland and Trojan TSFs have credible failure modes that, although unlikely to occur, would result in flow failure scenarios; this is described above in the section entitled 'Discussion of Material Risks'. Teck has assessed the potential for human exposure (potential for a person to be located in the inundation area) and vulnerability (existing physical, social, economic and environmental conditions that make people and the environment more susceptible to the impacts) to understand the severity of the potential impacts.

The material risks described above for the Highland TSF would result in impact to areas downstream of the TSF, both on site and along sections of the Thompson, Nicola and Fraser Rivers, with the severity of effects decreasing along the length of the rivers. There is potential for impacts to life and property, on critical public infrastructure and Indigenous Peoples' use of land and resources.

The material risks described above for the Trojan TSF would result in impact to areas downstream of the TSF, both on site and along sections of the Witches Brook, Guichon Creek, Mamit Lake and potentially the Nicola River, with the severity of effects decreasing along the length of the water streams. There is potential for impacts to life and property, on Highway 97C, Highway 8 and Indigenous Peoples' use of land and resources.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPRs) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSRs)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR reports.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at these TSFs resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The HVC TSFs have EPRPs in place that align with Teck’s requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the HVC TSFs, the most recent independent DSRs were in 2022 (Highland) and 2023 (7-Day Pond, Trojan and Bethlehem). The next DSRs is scheduled to occur in 2027 and 2028.

APPENDIX Q – QUEBRADA BLANCA TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Quebrada Blanca (QB) TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The QB property is an open pit copper mine. It is located 240 km southeast of the city of Iquique and 1,500 km north of Santiago, Chile, as shown in Figure 1.

The QB site is located in the Collahuasi Mountain range in a desert environment, where vegetation is limited and bare earth and rock is exposed over the site. The terrain is mountainous with steep sided valleys with alluvial and colluvial sediments in the valley bottom and over bedrock on the valley walls. The site is located in a region of high seismicity.



Figure 1. Quebrada Blanca Operations site location

TSF Description

At the QB TSF, tailings are retained by a cross-valley dam which received tailings for the first time in 2023. Construction of the QB TSF is ongoing.

A description of the QB TSF is provided in Table 1 and structures comprising the QB TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. A photo of the TSF is provided below in Figure 3.

Consequence Classification

Based on GISTM consequence classification system, the QB TSF is classified as “Extreme” for the current stage of construction.

Table 1. Description of QB TSF

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	Chile
GISTM consequence classification	Extreme
Deposition method	Slurry
Status	Active
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	1 (QB TMF)
Type of construction	Centerline Cycloned Sand Dam With Rockfill Starter Dam
Design storm event	PMF
Design earthquake	Maximum Credible Earthquake
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	140 / 310
Crest length (m)	682
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	1.4:1 (rockfill portion, supported by compacted tailings sand with an ultimate overall angle of 4.7:1)
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2025 (2026)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising QB TSF

Structure	Purpose
QB TMF	Tailings and water retaining structure
Seepage Collection Pond 1	Collects seepage
Seepage Collection Pond 2	Collects seepage

Figure 2. QB TSF


Figure 3. QB TSF

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the QB TSF was conducted in 2025. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the QB TSF, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck’s risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At the QB TSF, the most recent risk assessment identified three credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of a material risk under Teck’s criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

Risk Source	What could happen?	What are we doing to control the risk?
Instability – Damage to the embankment caused by extreme earthquake loading.	Extreme earthquake loading leading to liquefaction of embankment and release of tailings and water into the area downstream of the TSF.	• Embankments designed and constructed to resist extreme seismic events within regulatory guidelines. • Foundation and fill investigations completed to characterize materials and understand material strengths.
Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment.	Water level exceeds crest elevation of the embankment due to a storm event in excess of the design, causing release of tailings and water into the area downstream of the TSF. Or Tailings distribution pipelines rupture, eroding the dam crest sufficiently to initiate a dam breach causing release of tailings and water into the area downstream of the TSF.	• Embankment has the capacity to contain the 10,000 year return period flood, with freeboard provisions in accordance with Chilean regulations. • Water recovery from TSF to mill is being maximized. • Established and managed operating water levels in TSF. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melting, heavy rainfall) inspections. • Monitoring, including bathymetric surveys and inspections. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures.
Internal Erosion – transport of embankment material through dam fill.	Seepage gradients rise to a level initiating transport of soil particles from embankment causing damage to the embankment and potentially release of tailings and water into the area downstream of the TSF.	• Dam design includes internal filter zones and an upstream HDPE liner. • Establish and maintain a tailings beach and manage operating water levels in the TSF. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melting, heavy rainfall) inspections. • Monitoring, including piezometers and inspections of this area. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures.

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the QB TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as engineering assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include potential safety impacts to personnel, equipment damage, and environmental impacts to the area downstream of the TSF. Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The QB TSF has 3 credible failure modes that, although unlikely to occur, would result in a flow failure scenario; these are described above in the section entitled 'Discussion of Material Risks'. An inundation study has been completed to identify the potentially impacted area. Based on this study and the failure modes discussed above, Teck is updating assessments of the potential for human exposure (potential for a person to be located in the inundation area) and vulnerability (existing physical, social, economic and environmental conditions that make people and the environment more susceptible to the impacts) to understand the severity of the potential impacts of a flow failure scenario.

The area of influence for a potential flow failure scenario at the QB TSF includes the area downstream of the TSF. There are no communities or inhabited buildings located within the potential inundation area and hence no permanent population at risk. The potential effects to people and the environment in the unlikely scenario of a flow failure at the QB TSF may include life safety risk to mine employees and impacts to downstream groundwater and surface water.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPRs) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSRs)

All material findings identified in the latest AFPR have been addressed. A DSR has not yet been completed at the QB TSF because it is less than 5 years since the start of the TSF construction.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The QB TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the QB TSF, the first DSR is scheduled to occur in 2027.

APPENDIX R – RED DOG TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITY

This section presents a summary of the information required for disclosure under Requirement 15.1 of the GISTM, specific to the Red Dog Operations (RDO) tailings storage facility (TSF. This should be read together with the Teck-wide disclosure information contained within the main body of this report.

Tailings Storage Facility Description

Site Overview

The RDO property is an open pit zinc and lead mine. RDO is managed under an innovative operating agreement in which the land is owned by NANA Regional Corporation, an Alaska Native Corporation, and RDO is operated by Teck. The mine is located above the Arctic Circle and about 90 miles north of Kotzebue, Alaska, as shown in Figure 1.

The RDO site is located in the Northwest Arctic Borough at the western end of the DeLong Mountains of the Brooks Range. The topography consists of moderately sloping hills and broad stream valleys vegetated by low tundra grasses and shrubs. Winters are extremely cold with widespread snow cover and the summers are short and moderate. The site is an area of continuous permafrost and river taliks surrounding Red Dog Creek. The site is located in an area of moderate seismicity.



Figure 1. Red Dog Operations site location

TSF Description

At the RDO TSF, tailings are retained by two dams at either end of the impoundment – the Tailings Main Dam (TMD) and the Tailings Back Dam (TBD). The TMD has two components: the Embankment, a valley fill dam with a downstream buttress, and the Wing Wall which is an extension of the Embankment

and provides containment between the impoundment and mill facilities. The TSF has been constructed to its planned ultimate elevation.

A description of the RDO TSF is provided in Table 1 and structures comprising the RDO TSF are briefly described in Table 2 and are shown on Figure 2. A photo of the TSFs is provided below in Figure 3.

Consequence Classification

Based on GISTM consequence classification system, the RDO TSF is classified as “Extreme”.

Table 1. Description of RDO TSF

TSF Design Summary	Description
Country	United States of America
GISTM consequence classification	Extreme
Deposition method	Slurry
Status	Active
Number (name) of tailings embankment structures	2 (Tailings Main Dam and Tailings Back Dam)
Type of construction	Tailings Main Dam – Downstream gravel and rockfill dam with upstream geomembrane liner Tailings Back Dam – Centerline gravel and rockfill with a central plastic concrete seepage barrier
Design storm event	24-hour PMF
Design earthquake	1 in 10,000-year event
Maximum height (Current/Final) (m)	66
Crest length (m)	Tailings Main Dam – 1875 Tailings Back Dam – 1607
Overall downstream slope (H:V)	Tailings Main Dam – 2.5:1 Tailings Back Dam – 3:1
Most recent AFPR	2024
Most recent (and next) ITRB review	2025 (2026)

Note: Further details regarding the TSF configuration can be found in our facility inventory at www.Teck.com/tailings.

Table 2. Structures Comprising RDO TSF

Structure	Purpose
Tailings Main Dam (including embankment and wing wall)	Tailings and water retaining structure
Tailings Back Dam	Tailings and water retaining structure
Tailings Main Dam Seepage Collection Dam	Retains seepage and stormwater not pumped to the TSF by seepage pumps



Figure 2. RDO TSF

Figure 3. Red Dog Operations TSF, Mill and Camp Facing Southwest

Summary of Risk Assessment Findings

The most recent risk assessment for the RDO TSF was conducted in 2025. These risk assessments are prepared with assistance from the EOR and a multidisciplinary team of SMEs and are reviewed by the ITRB. Teck regularly updates these risk assessments, and the key findings from the most recent assessment are described below.

A summary of material risks for the RDO TSF, and associated risk management measures that are in place, is provided below. Risk controls are documented in the risk assessment process and are managed and understood in a collaborative approach by Teck's internal tailings team, RTFE and EOR. It is important to note that the presence of a material risk does not imply that the system is unsafe; a facility may be acceptably safe provided that the risks are appropriately managed.

Discussion of Material Risks

Under Teck’s risk management framework, a risk is considered 'material' when its potential consequences align with the two highest consequence categories on Teck's corporate risk matrix, regardless of how likely it is to occur. At the RDO TSF, the most recent risk assessment identified two credible failure scenarios that meet the definition of material risk under Teck’s criteria. These risks, as well as key associated elements of Teck's risk management plans, are summarized in the table below.

Table 3. Summary of Material Risks

Failure Mode	What could happen?	What are we doing to control the risk?
Overtopping – uncontrolled flow of water over the embankment.	In the event of an extreme storm event (probable maximum flood), if inadequate flood storage capacity is maintained in the TSF, there is potential for the dam to overtop, leading to erosion and potential dam breach, resulting in a release of tailings and water.	• Pumping system intended to manage water and maintain adequate levels. • Installation of an emergency spillway planned for 2026. • Focused water volume reduction projects are underway across site. • Monitoring, including precipitation forecasts, real-time water level monitoring, and remote camera surveillance. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melt, heavy rainfall) inspections. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures.
Internal Erosion – transport of embankment or foundation material through the foundation.	In the event of excessive seepage or unusually high hydraulic gradients within the dam, there is a potential for tailings to migrate into the dam fill or into the foundation, potentially causing dam instability and leading to release of tailings and water.	• TSF is managed with a wide tailings beach, which is intended to reduce seepage flow and hydraulic gradients. Deposition plans are prepared to maintain target beach lengths. • Structures are engineered to resist internal erosion (i.e. seepage is reduced by way of a constructed cut-off wall and geomembrane liner). • TSF water levels are actively managed. • Routine and event-driven (e.g., in response to snow melting, heavy rainfall, and earthquake) inspections. • Scheduled care and maintenance of engineered structures.

The risk management measures described above are approved at the appropriate leadership level and implemented by site teams. In addition to Teck's internal protocols, the DSR, ITRB and AFPRs review the adequacy of these risk management measures.

Summary of Impact Assessments and of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to Tailings Facility Credible Flow Failure Scenarios

Summary of Impact Assessments

For the RDO TSF, impacts associated with credible failure modes have been informed by the multidisciplinary risk assessment (see discussion in the main body of this report), which is itself informed by a variety of studies such as dam breach and inundation assessments, environmental understanding, and human and community impact assessments.

Impacts associated with the material risks described above include environmental impacts to the area downstream of the TSF and loss of subsistence resources, culture, and identity to the Indigenous communities closest to the operation. As discussed above, despite these risks being unlikely to occur, Teck's teams have comprehensive risk management plans and controls in place to prevent, proactively detect, and respond to these emerging issues, were they to occur.

Summary of Human Exposure and Vulnerability to TSF Credible Flow Failure Scenario

The RDO TSF has two credible failure modes that, although unlikely to occur, would result in flow failure scenarios; this is described above in the section entitled ‘Discussion of Material Risks’. Teck has assessed the potential for human exposure (potential for a person to be located in the inundation area) and vulnerability (existing physical, social, economic and environmental conditions that make people and the environment more susceptible to the impacts) to understand the severity of the potential impacts.

The material risks described above for the RDO TSF would result in impact to areas downstream of the TSF, including the mining operation work and camp areas directly downstream of the dam, Red Dog Creek, Ikalukrok Creek, and the Wulik River. There is potential for life safety risks to mine employees, impacts to water resources, including domestic water resources used by the downstream community, the aquatic environment, public health and safety, community services and infrastructure, and current use of land and resources for traditional purposes by Indigenous Peoples.

Summary of Material Findings

Findings are considered 'material' to Teck when the observation relates to identified material risks (see earlier discussion of material risks), regardless of the likelihood of an occurrence. It is important to note that a 'material finding' does not mean a failure scenario is likely to occur.

Findings of Annual Facility Performance Reports (AFPRs) and Dam Safety Reviews (DSRs)

There were no material findings identified in the latest DSR and AFPR reports.

Findings from the Environmental and Social Monitoring Program

Environmental and social monitoring programs at this TSF resulted in no material findings over the prior year.

Summary of the Tailings Facility Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) for Facilities with Credible Flow Failure Modes

The RDO TSF has an EPRP in place that aligns with Teck's requirements.

Independent Reviews

At the RDO TSF, the most recent independent DSRs was in 2023. The next DSR is scheduled to occur in 2026.

APPENDIX S – CAUTIONARY NOTE ON FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

Tailings Storage Facility GISTM Disclosure Report

CAUTIONARY NOTE ON FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

This report contains certain forward-looking information and forward-looking statements as defined in applicable securities laws (collectively referred to as “forward-looking statements”). These statements relate to future events or our future performance. All statements other than statements of historical fact are forward-looking statements. The use of any of the words “aim”, “intend”, “expect”, “plan”, “estimate”, “potential”, “commit”, “would”, “may”, “must”, “will”, “should”, “believe”, “focus”, “targets”, “goals”, “believe”, “continue” and similar expressions is intended to identify forward-looking statements. These statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual results or events to differ materially from those anticipated in such forward-looking statements. These statements speak only as of the date of this report.

Forward-looking statements in this report include, but are not limited to, statements relating to: our sustainability strategy; our short-term and long-term sustainability goals, including, but not limited to our water policy goals; our expectations with respect to working towards responsible water stewardship; our strategic priorities and related goals, targets, commitments and plans and our expectations regarding those goals, targets, commitments and plans; the estimated timing and spending to achieve our goals; expectations regarding the conduct of our suppliers and contractors; our ability to manage our tailings facilities in a safe and environmentally responsible way; the GISTM Standards; the expectation that all of our active and inactive tailings storage facilities will be operated in full conformance with GISTM Standards; expectations regarding the benefits of technology and innovation, including, technology and innovation related to health and safety, including improved technology to support operational occupational hygiene team, technology and innovation relating to tailings, including, but not limited to, projects related to dewatering and co-mingling, the use of additives, and the development of a digital tailings management system; expectations regarding increasing local employment and employment of Indigenous Peoples; engagement with Indigenous Peoples and local communities; our ability to ensure responsible use of our products; our goal to contribute to community organizations and global initiatives; our expectations, plans, strategies and objectives of management; closure or divestment of certain legacy projects, operations or facilities; anticipated production or construction commencement dates or closure dates; anticipated operating modes and productive lives of projects, mines and facilities; identified risks and anticipated potential or actual impacts or outcomes; our ability to mitigate material risks discussed in this report; Teck’s expectations with respect to oversight and independent review to maintain safe and responsible tailings management throughout the mining life cycle, including planning, design, construction, operation, and closure; our expectations with respect to our commitments, timing and plans to improve, manage and maintain safe tailings storage management; the potential effect of possible future events on risks, impacts or outcomes; the ability to retain experienced multidisciplinary teams, including tailings engineers, environmental specialists, social performance specialists, and risk specialists; our expectations with respect to our commitments to sustainability reporting, framework, standards and initiatives; our expectations with respect to our commitments, timing and plans to achieve certain outcomes, targets or aspirations with respect to health, safety, environment and the communities where we operate; our ability to acknowledge and correct failure scenarios of tailings storage facilities or other relevant scenarios; our ability to prepare for long term recovery in the event of a tailings facility failure; our expectations with respect to regulatory developments and new or changed standards; our expectations with respect to Teck’s EPRP; and the ability of Teck to carry out the work in a prioritized manner as disclosed to reduce risk.

The forward-looking statements in this report are based on a number of estimates, projections, beliefs and assumptions that the management team believed to be reasonable as of the date of this report, though inherently uncertain and difficult to predict, including, but not limited to, expectations and assumptions concerning: the development, performance and effectiveness of technology needed to achieve our sustainability goals and priorities; our ability to maintain our plans and expectations with respect to this tailings report; our ability to implement new source control or mine design strategies on commercially reasonable terms without impacting production objectives; our ability to successfully implement our technology and innovation strategy; our ability to attract and retain skilled employees; access to lands to carry out tailings management and reclamation work; relationships with local communities and indigenous groups; costs of closure; environmental compliance costs generally; the imposition of tariffs, import or export restrictions, or other trade barriers or retaliatory measure by foreign or domestic governments; the availability of qualified employees and contractors for our operations and tailings management; the ability to retain and hire employees; our ability to procure equipment and operating supplies in sufficient quantities and on a timely basis; and assumptions regarding the development of our business generally.

Forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause the actual results, performance, experience or achievements of Teck to be materially different from those expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements. Risks and uncertainties that could influence actual results include, but are not limited to: general business and economic conditions, interest rates, commodity and power prices; acts of foreign or domestic governments; outcome of legal proceedings; the geological, operational and price assumptions on which this report is based on; our ability to obtain, comply with and renew permits, licenses and leases in a timely manner; risks associated with the consequence of climate change; risks associated with permitting and development of our properties; operational problems; regulatory action; environmental compliance challenges; changes in laws and governmental regulations; costs of compliance with environmental and other laws and regulation; risks relating to the development and use of new technology or lack of appropriate technologies needed to advance our goals and plans; natural disasters and adverse weather conditions; changes in commodity prices; operations in foreign countries; imposition of tariffs, import or export restrictions, or other trade barriers or retaliatory measures by foreign or domestic governments; our ongoing relations with our employees and with our business and joint venture partners; and the future operation and financial performance of the company generally.

We caution you that the foregoing list of important factors and assumptions is not exhaustive. Other events or circumstances could cause our actual results to differ materially from those estimated or projected and expressed in, or implied by, our forward-looking statements. You should also carefully consider the matters discussed under “Risk Factors” in Teck’s most recent Annual Information Form and its most recent management’s discussion and analysis and other documents available at www.sedarplus.ca and in public filings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission at www.sec.gov. The forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this report. Teck does not assume the obligation to revise or update these forward-looking statements after the date of this document or to revise them to reflect the occurrence of future unanticipated events, except as may be required under applicable securities laws.

APPENDIX T – PWC ASSURANCE REPORT

Independent practitioner's limited assurance report on Teck Resources Limited's Statement of Conformance with the International Council on Mining and Metals Conformance protocols: Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management

To the Directors of Teck Resources Limited

We have conducted a limited assurance engagement on Teck Resources Limited (Teck)'s Statement of Conformance with the International Council on Mining and Metals Conformance protocols: Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (the subject matter) of Teck's Tailings facilities; Pine Point; Beaverdell; Fisherman Road; Duck Pond; Magmont; Sa Dena Hes; Sullivan; Pinchi; Pend Oreille; Douglas Mine; Lennard Shelf; Louvicourt; Highland Valley Copper (Highmont Tailings Storage Facility).

The statement is included in the executive summary of the Tailings Storage Facility GISTM Disclosure Report (the criteria) as at August 5, 2025. This engagement was conducted by a multidisciplinary team including assurance practitioners and engineers.

Responsibilities for the subject matter
Management of Teck is responsible for:

- the preparation of the subject matter in accordance with the International Council on Mining and Metals Conformance protocols: Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (ICMM Conformance Protocols: GISTM), applied as explained in table 2 of the criteria;
- designing, implementing and maintaining such internal control as management determines is necessary to enable the preparation of the subject matter, in accordance with the ICMM Conformance Protocols: GISTM, that is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error; and
- the selection and application of appropriate sustainability reporting methods and making assumptions and estimates that are reasonable in the circumstances.

Inherent limitations in preparing the subject matter
Conformance with the ICMM Conformance Protocols: GISTM is subject to inherent uncertainty due to the assumptions and judgment applied in the identification of risk and impact (that determines the applicability and implementation of the Global Industry Standard on Tailings).

Our independence and quality management
We have complied with the independence and other ethical requirements of the International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (including International Independence Standards) issued by the International Ethics Standard Board for Accountants (IESBA Code) and of the relevant rules of professional conduct / code of ethics applicable to the practice of public accounting and related to assurance engagements, issued by various professional accounting bodies, which are founded on fundamental principles of integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional behaviour.

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The firm applies Canadian Standard on Quality Management 1, *Quality Management for Firms that Perform Audits or Reviews of Financial Statements, or Other Assurance or Related Services Engagements*, which requires the firm to design, implement and operate a system of quality management including policies or procedures regarding compliance with ethical requirements, professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements.

Practitioner's responsibilities
Our responsibility is to plan and perform the assurance engagement to obtain limited assurance about whether the subject matter is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, and to issue a limited assurance report that includes our conclusion. Misstatements can arise from fraud or error and are considered material if, individually or in the aggregate, they could reasonably be expected to influence decisions of users taken on the basis of the subject matter.

We conducted our limited assurance engagement in accordance with Canadian Standard on Assurance Engagements (CSAE) 3000, *Attestation Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information* (CSAE 3000) and International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000 (Revised), *Assurance Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information* (ISAE 3000 (Revised)).

As part of a limited assurance engagement in accordance with CSAE 3000 and ISAE 3000 (Revised), we exercise professional judgment and maintain professional skepticism throughout the engagement. We also:

- Determine the suitability in the circumstances of Teck's use of ICMM Conformance Protocols: GISTM as the basis for the preparation of the subject matter;
- Perform risk assessment procedures, including obtaining an understanding of internal control relevant to the engagement, to identify where material misstatements are likely to arise, whether due to fraud or error, but not for the purpose of providing a conclusion on the effectiveness of Teck's internal control; and
- Design and perform procedures responsive to where material misstatements are likely to arise in the subject matter. The risk of not detecting a material misstatement resulting from fraud is higher than for one resulting from error, as fraud may involve collusion, forgery, intentional omissions, misrepresentations or the override of internal control.

We believe that the evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our conclusion.

Summary of the work performed
A limited assurance engagement involves performing procedures to obtain evidence about the subject matter. The procedures in a limited assurance engagement vary in nature and timing from, and are less in extent than for, a reasonable assurance engagement. Consequently, the level of assurance obtained in a limited assurance engagement is substantially lower than the assurance that would have been obtained had a reasonable assurance engagement been performed.

The nature, timing and extent of procedures selected depend on professional judgment, including the identification of where material misstatements are likely to arise in the subject matter, whether due to fraud or error.

In conducting our limited assurance engagement, we:

- performed physical site visits to all facilities listed in the subject matter;
- performed procedures to gain assurance over the accuracy of Teck's statement of conformance, which included inquiries of relevant personnel and inspecting supporting documentation that supports the subject matter;
- performed substantive assurance procedures on selected information in the subject matter; and
- obtained an understanding of Teck's reporting processes relevant to the preparation of its subject matter by:
  - performing inquiries on the review process of disclosures; and
  - reviewing relevant disclosures included within Teck's Tailings Storage Facility GISTM Disclosure Report.

Limited assurance conclusion

Based on the procedures we have performed and the evidence we have obtained, nothing has come to our attention that causes us to believe that the subject matter as at August 5, 2025 is not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the International Council on Mining and Metals Conformance protocols: Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management applied as explained in table 2 of the criteria.

Restriction on use

Our report has been prepared solely for the directors of Teck to assist Teck in reporting on its conformance with the International Council on Mining and Metals Conformance protocols: Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management. The subject matter therefore may not be suitable, and is not to be used, for any other purpose. Our report is intended solely for Teck.

We neither assume nor accept any responsibility or liability to any third party in respect of this report.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Chartered Professional Accountants

Vancouver, British Columbia
August 5, 2025